108 Md. App. 284 - Hosain v. Malik’s Empirical Analysis
1996
Citation profile
34 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 34 later decisions — most recently October 2017 · most notably 110 Md. App. 493 - Maryland Commission on Human Relations v. Downey Communications, Inc. (1996), 125 Md. App. 602 - Holzman v. Fiola Blum, Inc. (1999)
34 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1738A
Relies on Webster v. Reproductive Health Services · Tichnell v. State · General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki · Ross v. Hoffman · Davis v. Davis
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[A]ppellant’s counsel’s silence and her failure to object at the time it would have been natural to do so, is naturally and reasonably construed as counsel’s waiver of any objection to the absence of the child’s attorney. See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 76 Md.App. 709, 719 , 548 A.2d 151 (1988) (“When a party has the option of objecting, his failure to do so is regarded as a waiver estopping him from obtaining review of that point on appeal.”) sjs sjj }{« ❖ Accordingly, after remaining silent and failing to object to the circuit court’s procedure, appellant’s counsel cannot now complain that the remand hearing improperly proceeded without the child’s attorney. As a consequence of appellant’s counsel remaining silent in this regard, neither the circuit court nor appellee had any way of knowing of appellant’s disagreement to going forward with the remand hearing. Indeed, the only way to construe appellant’s counsel’s failure to speak up is as an agreement to the manner in which the hearing proceeding. To review this issue now, would be patently unfair to the circuit court and to appellee.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“We recognize that Hazanit is different in many respects from the traditional maternal preference once followed in- this State. We recognize, however, that Ha-zanit is nonetheless similar to the traditional maternal preference in that they both are based on very old notions and assumptions (which are widely considered outdated, discriminatory, and outright false in today’s modern society)' concerning which parent is best able to care for a young child and with which parent that child best belongs. Viewed in this regard, standing as a factor to be weighed in the best interest of the child examination, Hazanit is no more objectionable than any other type of preference. As we noted in Malik, the courts of this State -will not refuse to enforce child custody awards of those states still recognizing the maternal preference as a factor:-”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“If the only difference between the custody laws of Maryland and Pakistan is that Pakistani courts apply a paternal preference the way Maryland courts once applied the maternal preference, the Pakistani order is entitled to comity. A custody decree of a sister state whose, custody law contains a preference for one parent over another would be entitled to comity, provided, of course, that the sister state’s custody law applies the best interest of the child- standard. .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.