Elliott v. Sackett’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 federal appellate · 2 district · 59 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 107 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““An agreement merely to take land subject to a specified incumbrance, is not an agreement to assume and pay the incumbrance. The grantee of an equity of redemption, without words in the grant importing in some form that he assumes the payment of a mortgage does not bind himself personally to pay the debt. There must be words importing that he will pay the debt to make him personally liable.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Shepherd v. May · Bayou Land Co. v. Talley

2. ““The fact that Elliott made two payments of the interest on the incumbrance is not inconsistent with his not having assumed the payment of the incumbrance. As owner of the property subject to the incumbrance, and desirous of retaining it so long as there was any value in the equity of redemption, he would naturally pay the interest to save a foreclosure.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Yasuna v. Miller · Hulin v. Veatch

3. ““The actual contract of the parties, as understood by both of them, is-shown by the written agreement. Nothing was agreed upon to vary that. Sackett, as he shows by his testimony, knew the difference as to liability which the difference in the language would make, and knew what the language of the written agreement was, and must be held to have understood it to mean what it does mean, and to have known that Elliott understood it in the same sense. * * * Under all the circumstances proved in this case (and every case of the kind must depend very largely on its special circumstances), Elliott had a right to presume that the deed' would conform to the-written agreement, and was not guilty of such negligence or' laches, in not observing the provisions of the deed, as should preclude him from relief. * * * The deed did not effect what both parties intended by the actual. contrae!; which they made, and the cause is one for the interposition of a court of equity.” "When the instrument purports to carry into execution an agreement which it recites, and exceeds or falls short of that agreement, there is no difficulty in rectifying the mistake; for there is clear evidence in the instrument itself that it operates beyond its real intent. If, however, there is no reciial of any ■agreement, hnt a mistake is alleged, and extrinsic evidence tendered in proof that it was made, the limits of the equity for correction are more difficult to define. « * * It seems, however, that the instrument m”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Medical Society of South Carolina v. Gilbreth · Lloyd v. Lowe