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← 109 F.3d 976 - United States v. Stanfield

United States v. Stanfield’s Empirical Analysis

109 F.3d 976 · 1997

Citation profile

56
cited by 56 later decisions
11
states following
May 2024
most recently cited

24 federal appellate · 3 district · 14 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 56 later decisions — most recently May 2024 · most notably United States v. Seidman (1998), United States v. Holt (2001)

24 federal appellate · 3 district · 14 state decisions — followed in 11 states

2101997200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 21 U.S.C. § 841 (§ 401 of the Controlled Substances Act)

Relies on Terry v. Ohio · Whren v. United States · Adams v. Williams · United States v. Brignoni-Ponce · Michigan v. Long

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 56 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “When, during already dangerous traffic stops, officers must approach vehicles whose occupants and interiors are blocked from view by tinted windows, the potential harm to which the officers are exposed increases exponentially, to the point, we believe, of unconscionability. Indeed, we can conceive of almost nothing more dangerous to a law enforcement officer in the context of a traffic stop than approaching an automobile whose passenger compartment is entirely hidden from the officer’s view by darkly tinted windows. As the officer exits his cruiser and proceeds toward the tinted-windowed vehicle, he has no way of knowing whether the vehicle’s driver is fumbling for his driver’s license or reaching for a gun; he does not know whether he is about to encounter a single law-abiding citizen or to be ambushed by a car-full of armed assailants. He literally does not even know whether a weapon has been trained on him from the moment the stop was initiated.”
    7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[W]henever, during a lawful traffic stop, officers are required to approach a vehicle with windows so heavily tinted that they are unable to view the interior of the stopped vehicle, they may, when it appears in their experienced judgment prudent to do so, open at least one of the vehicle doors and, without crossing the plane of the vehicle, visually inspect its interior in order to ascertain whether the driver is armed, whether he has access to weapons, or whether there are other occupants of the vehicle who might pose a danger to the officers.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “have been absolutely certain that the individual [was] armed; the [only question] is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would [have been] warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.