Case: 23-60203 Document: 83-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/25/2024
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
July 25, 2024
No. 23-60203
Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
L.N.,
Petitioner,
versus
Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,
Respondent.
______________________________
Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals
Agency No. A216 541 190
______________________________
Before Jones, Douglas, Circuit Judges, and Doughty, Chief District
Judge.*
Edith H. Jones, Circuit Judge:
L. N., a native and citizen of Angola, seeks review of a final order of
removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”).
In affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision, the BIA denied L. N.’s
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection pursuant to
the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Because the BIA sufficiently
_____________________
*
Chief United States District Judge for the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by
designation.
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considered the record before it and substantial evidence supports its decision,
we DENY the petition for review.
I
According to L. N., two individuals murdered her father and members
of her family in 1998 because her father had opposed corruption in the
Angolan government. Between 2003 and 2017, three incidents occurred
which, according to L. N., evidence persecution of her for her and her
father’s opposition to corruption in Angola. The first incident occurred in
Angola in 2008 when L. N. “woke up to find that individuals had shot at her
home during the night.” The second incident occurred eight years later
while she was living in Ecuador, and “two individuals dressed in native
Angolan clothing approached her, grabbed her by the hair, and put a gun
under her nose.” After she returned to Angola, a third incident occurred in
2017 when her “house in Angola was set on fire” and “flyers [were] left
outside her home which she believed related to her father’s reporting of
corruption.”
L. N. left Angola for the United States and sought asylum,
withholding from removal, and protection under the CAT. In a seventeenpage order, the IJ denied her claims and ordered her removed from the
United States. The IJ found that L. N. failed to establish a well-founded fear
of persecution in Angola.
L. N. appealed the IJ’s decision. In a short order, the BIA remanded
to the IJ to make findings regarding Dr. Johannes Schubert’s expert
testimony and “address the feasibility and reasonableness of internal
relocation” within Angola.
On remand, the IJ did just that and again concluded that L. N. was not
entitled to the relief she sought and ordered her removed. The BIA affirmed
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the IJ’s findings and dismissed L. N.’s appeal. L. N. petitions for review of
the BIA’s decision.
II
Although our review is generally limited to the BIA’s decision, “when
the IJ’s ruling affects the BIA’s decision, as it does here, we review the
decisions of both the BIA and the IJ.” Tibakweitira v. Wilkinson, 986 F.3d
905, 910 (5th Cir. 2021). “Factual findings are reviewed for substantial
evidence, and constitutional claims and questions of law are reviewed de
novo.”
Id. (citing Fuentes-Pena v. Barr,
917 F.3d 827, 829 (5th Cir. 2019)).
Under the substantial evidence standard, “the BIA’s finding is conclusive
unless, based on the evidence presented in the record, any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Sealed
Petitioner v. Sealed Respondent,
829 F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Martinez-Martinez v. Holder,
769 F.3d 897, 899 (5th Cir. 2014)).
III
Asylum is “available where 1) a person is ‘unwilling to return to’ their
home country ‘because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution’;
and 2) the applicant has demonstrated that ‘race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at
least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.’” Tamara-Gomez v.
Gonzales, 447 F.3d 343, 348 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42),
1158(b)). If the alleged persecution is committed by a private party, the
asylum-seeker must also show that the government officials are unable or
unwilling to help. Bertrand v. Garland,
36 F.4th 627, 631–32 (5th Cir. 2022).
To be eligible for withholding of removal, “an applicant must
demonstrate a ‘clear probability’ of persecution on the basis of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
Chen v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1131, 1138 (5th Cir. 2006). Withholding of
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removal requires a higher standard than asylum, so a party who fails to show
eligibility for asylum necessarily cannot show eligibility for withholding.
Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 224 (5th Cir. 2019). If a petitioner fails
to establish any one of the elements of asylum or withholding, her claim fails,
and the court need not consider her arguments concerning the remaining
elements of those forms of relief. INS v. Bagamasbad,
429 U.S. 24, 25,
97
S. Ct. 200, 201 (1976); Munoz-De Zelaya v. Garland,
80 F.4th 689, 693–94
(5th Cir. 2023).
To obtain CAT protection, an applicant “must demonstrate that, if
removed to a country, it is more likely than not [she] would be tortured by,
or with the acquiescence of, government officials acting under the color of
law.” Hakim v. Holder, 628 F.3d 151, 155 (5th Cir. 2010).
L. N. raises four arguments on appeal. First, she argues that the BIA
erred by failing to adequately consider evidence of state-sponsored
persecution and, had it done so, it would have concluded she suffered
persecution at the hands of the Angolan government. Second, she asserts the
record evidence compels a determination that the Angolan government was
unwilling or unable to protect her and remains unwilling to do so. Third, she
contends the BIA erred in failing to bifurcate its analysis of past and future
inability to protect her. Finally, she argues the evidence compels reversal on
her CAT claim. We address each argument in turn.
A
L. N. argues we should reverse and remand because the BIA failed to
adequately consider evidence of state-sponsored persecution and explain its
reasons for dismissal. She also contends that “the evidence compels a
finding of the involvement of the Angolan government in [her] persecution.”
But the record refutes these arguments and demonstrates that substantial
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evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that she did not suffer state-sponsored persecution.
1.
L. N. claims the BIA failed to give her a fair shake by not considering
evidence that the Angolan government itself persecuted her. However, the
IJ averred on remand that “[a]ll admitted evidence was considered in its
entirety[.]” The IJ’s orders extensively recount L. N.’s testimony.1 The IJ’s
account of her testimony encompasses her description of the shrouded
nature of the trial that resulted in the imprisonment of two individuals (for 18
years) for murdering her family members. His account also includes each of
the incidents of harm she experienced, including the 2008 incident at her
home. On remand from the BIA, the IJ addressed Dr. Schubert’s testimony
and the country conditions evidence. The IJ found that this evidence did
“not support a finding that [L. N.] will suffer persecution if she returns to
Angola” and explained why he arrived at that conclusion. Ultimately, the
BIA agreed with the IJ’s view of the evidence. It misreads the record to
conclude, as the dissent does,2 that the BIA and IJ failed to consider and
weigh all of the evidence before them.
_____________________
1
The dissent makes much of the fact that the IJ credited L. N.’s testimony but nevertheless
denied her the relief she requested. Post, at 17–19. But “even if the BIA treats an alien’s
evidence as credible, the agency need not find his evidence persuasive or sufficient to meet
the burden of proof.” Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 371,
141 S. Ct. 1669, 1680 (2021);
see also Bertrand,
36 F.4th at 631 & n.3 (stating we apply the same deferential substantial
evidence standard of review, even where “we must accept the alien’s version of the facts
because the IJ did not make a credibility determination”). Thus, aliens are often denied
asylum despite credible testimony. See, e.g., Chehab v. Holder,
538 F. App’x 466, 468, 470,
472 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (denying petition for review where “the IJ reasoned that
even were [the petitioner] credible, he would still be ineligible for asylum” for other
reasons).
2
Indeed, the dissent concedes:
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Requiring a second remand under these circumstances is also contrary
to this circuit’s case law. This court has declined to remand where the BIA
and the IJ afforded less attention to the pertinent record evidence than the
BIA and IJ did here. An unpublished decision in Melendez-Monge v. Garland,
No. 20-60814, 2022 WL 1532641 (5th Cir. May 16, 2022) (per curiam),
although not precedential, is instructive. There, “the IJ did not explicitly
consider [the] country reports in her analysis of each of [the petitioner’s]
claims, nor did the BIA explicitly mention the reports in adopting the IJ’s
decision and reasoning.” Id. at *2. But remand was “not warranted”
because “the IJ stated that ‘the Court considered . . . respondent’s
supporting documents . . . including the El Salvador Human Rights
Report.’” Id. The IJ’s statement that she considered this evidence
“overc[ame] [this court’s] ‘concern that the BIA did not adequately consider
the evidence before it.’” Id. (quoting Emmanuel-Tata v. Garland, No. 20-
60487,
2022 WL 126982, at *3 (5th Cir. Jan. 12, 2022). In this case, as just
discussed, the IJ did more than simply state that he considered the evidence.
L. N. also inists upon remand because the BIA failed to “explain” why
“key” evidence in the record does not support her assertion that the Angolan
government was responsible for her persecution. But it is the Petitioner’s
burden to prove her entitlement to refugee status as a person who is unable
or unwilling to return to her country of nationality due to past persecution or
a well-founded fear of persecution on a protected ground. 8 U.S.C.
_____________________
The BIA remanded for further proceedings, concluding that the IJ failed to make findings
concerning the opinion of her expert, country conditions, the Angolan government’s
willingness and ability to protect her, and internal relocation. On remand, the IJ then
addressed these aspects of her claim but again denied relief, and the BIA subsequently
dismissed the appeal.
Post, at 17 (emphasis added).
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§§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A); Garland v. Ming Dai, 593
U.S. 357, 362,
141 S. Ct. 1669, 1675 (2021). Moreover, “[t]here is no
requirement that the BIA address evidentiary minutiae or write any lengthy
exegesis[.]” Parada-Orellana v. Garland,
21 F.4th 887, 894 (5th Cir. 2022)
(citation and quotations omitted). Its decision must simply “reflect
meaningful consideration of the relevant substantial evidence supporting the
alien’s claims.” Abdel-Masieh v. I.N.S.,
73 F.3d 579, 585 (5th Cir. 1996).
Thus, “[w]hen the BIA’s decision is neither inconsistent with [the evidence
at issue] nor gives reason to believe the BIA was unaware of it, we have no
reason to doubt that the agency considered the evidence.” Domingo-Mendez
v. Garland,
47 F.4th 51, 58 (1st Cir. 2022) (alteration in original) (citation and
quotations omitted). Accordingly, we have frequently held that the BIA’s
mere failure to discuss all the evidence in its decision is not enough to warrant
remand. See Ramirez v. Garland,
857 F. App’x 198, 199 (5th Cir. 2021) (per
curiam); Funes-Bonilla v. Holder,
521 F. App’x 337, 338 (5th Cir. 2013) (per
curiam) (“[A]lthough the BIA did not discuss all of the evidence of record,
we are satisfied that it meaningfully considered [the petitioner’s]
evidence.”); Haile v. Holder,
496 F. App’x 459, 460 (5th Cir. 2012) (per
curiam) (same).3
By any measure, L. N. received “meaningful consideration” of her
claims by the IJ and the BIA. She entered the United States and applied for
asylum six years ago. Since then, the IJ has denied her claims for relief in not
one but two detailed orders. To formulate its conclusion, the IJ considered
all the evidence in the record, including the testimony of L. N. and Dr.
Schubert and the country conditions evidence. For its part, the BIA
remanded to the IJ to take a closer look at Dr. Schubert’s testimony and the
_____________________
3
Citations to unpublished, non-precedential decisions in this context demonstrate that our
cases are both consistent and that the proposition of law in question is settled.
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country conditions evidence. The BIA then conducted an independent
review and concluded that the evidence in the record supports the IJ’s
conclusions.
At a minimum, the BIA afforded L. N.’s claims the amount of
consideration the law requires. Thus, remand is unnecessary.
2.
Apart from the paucity of support for remand based on the BIA’s
consideration and discussion of the evidence, it is settled that we need not
remand if it would be futile to do so. Jaco v. Garland, 24 F.4th 395, 406 (5th
Cir. 2021) (citing cases). “[E]ven if the Board erred at some point in its
analysis, we can still uphold its ultimate decision if there is no realistic
possibility that the Board’s conclusion would have been different absent the
error.” Nguhlefeh Njilefac v. Garland,
992 F.3d 362, 365 (5th Cir. 2021)
(internal quotation omitted). And “[i]t is the petitioner’s burden to
demonstrate that the evidence compels a contrary conclusion.” Argueta-Hernandez v. Garland,
87 F.4th 698, 707 (5th Cir. 2023) (emphasis added).
In an attempt to satisfy her burden, L. N. points to testimony that, in
her view, undermines the BIA’s conclusion concerning state-sponsored
persecution.4 But even if this evidence contradicts the BIA’s conclusion,
there is also evidence in the record that supports it. Showing equipoise is not
_____________________
4
L. N. primarily relies on: (1) her testimony, in which she stated she believes the Angolan
government is responsible for the murders of her family members; (2) Dr. Schubert’s
testimony, in which he stated “we can assume that [L. N.’s] perpetrators and persecutors
are indeed linked to the [Angolan] security forces”; (3) the fact that the trial of those who
murdered her family members was not open to the public; (4) country conditions reports,
which note that in Angola “the secret court systems are applicable only in cases of the
police and Armed Forces . . . .”; and (5) the fact that the Angolan police failed to adequately
address her concerns when she reported incidents of harm.
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sufficient to compel a finding that the Petitioner was persecuted by the
Angolan government.
First, L. N. contends that those responsible for murdering her family
in 1998 are connected to those who are responsible for the three incidents of
harm she experienced. But L. N. never identified who committed the
murders. When asked, “What, if anything, do you know about the
individuals who carried out the assassination [of your family members]?”, L.
N. replied, “I know nothing about the people who killed, who murdered my
family. I only know it was two individuals.” (Emphases added). In light of
this testimony, it cannot be said that the BIA erred in declining to conclude
that the Angolan government is to blame for murdering her family and
persecuting her.
Moreover, L. N. acknowledged that the Angolan government
punished those responsible for the murders of her family members, and the
perpetrators received eighteen-year prison sentences. From that evidence,
the BIA could have reasonably concluded that the Angolan government was
not involved in the murders of her family because the government would not
impose punishment for crimes that the government itself committed or
condoned.
The BIA’s conclusion, to be sure, is not the only possible conclusion
on this record. The Petitioner’s evidence is that the government conducted
trials in secrecy for crimes involving police or Armed Forces members, which
may imply government involvement. On the other hand, factions in a
government are not monolithic, and the secret trial could have indicated a rift
between official factions. The only connection between the government and
the murderers is by inference from the facts that the trial was conducted in
secret and the Petitioner was not informed of the murderers’ names. The
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BIA was not compelled to accept this inference even if it credited the
Petitioner’s testimony and Dr. Schubert’s expert “assumption.”
Further, L. N. testified that the Angolan government responded when
she reported harm. When shots were fired at her home in 2008, the police
showed up, inspected the bullet holes, and encouraged her to remain silent
for her safety. That caution is ambiguous: it can be taken as an implicit threat
or as a means of protecting the witness during an investigation. The
government’s willingness to respond to L. N.’s reports of harm supports the
BIA’s conclusion that that the government was not involved in causing that
harm. See Jaco, 24 F.4th at 406–07 (denying petition for review where “the
record reflect[ed] that the [Honduran] government was responsive to
[petitioner’s] fears when apprised of them”); see also Gomez-Medina v. Barr,
975 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 2020) (“[T]he most telling datum is [whether] . . .
the local authorities responded immediately to each incident.” (alterations in
original) (citation and quotations omitted)).
It is also undisputed that L. N. lived in Angola from 2003 until 2005
without experiencing any incidents of harm and experienced only one
incident between 2007 and 2015. The long periods of time during which L.
N. lived in Angola and did not experience harm buttress the BIA’s conclusion
that she is not entitled to the relief she seeks. See Lopez-Gomez v. Ashcroft,
263 F.3d 442, 446 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); (affirming the Board’s
decision where the petitioner lived in his country of origin for two years
without harm); see also Perez-Leiva v. Garland, No. 21-60935,
2022 WL
4990391, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 3, 2022) (per curiam) (denying petition for
review where Honduran petitioner’s daughter “had not been physically
harmed in the five-years since she relocated” within Honduras).
Where, as here, the evidence concerning state-sponsored persecution
merely cuts both ways, we cannot reverse the BIA’s decision. See Greenspan
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v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 240 (5th Cir. 1994) (affirming ALJ’s determination
under the substantial evidence standard where the evidence “cuts both
ways”); see also Tabora Gutierrez v. Garland,
12 F.4th 496, 502 (5th Cir. 2021)
(“[W]e may not reverse the BIA’s factual determinations unless we find not
only that the evidence supports a contrary conclusion, but that the evidence
compels it.” (emphasis in original) (citation and quotations omitted)).
B
L. N. next argues that when properly viewed, substantial evidence
does not support the BIA’s conclusion that the Angolan government was
willing and able to protect her. For this additional reason, L. N. advocates
reversal of the BIA’s decision.
But the evidence discussed in part III.A.2. of this opinion and other
evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion. For instance, the fact the
government incarcerated the murderers of L. N.’s family members suggests
the Angolan government sought to protect her from suffering a similar fate
by putting their killers behind bars.
Moreover, the police responded when shots were fired at L. N.’s
home in 2008. That the police showed up at the scene of the incident and
investigated suggests the government was and is willing to protect her.5 See
Jaco, 24 F.4th at 406–07 ; see also Gomez-Medina, 975 F.3d at 32. 6
_____________________
5
The dissent views the evidence concerning the police response differently than the BIA
did. Post, at 25–26. But the mere fact a different conclusion might be drawn from this
evidence does not require reversal. See La. Dep’t of Lab. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 108 F.3d
614, 617 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he mere fact that a different conclusion might be drawn from
the evidence does not necessarily preclude a determination that an administrative decision
was supported by substantial evidence.”).
6
The dissent chides the quality of the police investigation. Post, at 24–25. But the fact that
the police did not do more and ultimately determine who fired the shots is of no moment.
See Mejia-Alvarenga v. Garland,
95 F.4th 319, 325 (5th Cir. 2024) (“A government is not
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There is also evidence that the government can protect L. N. if she is
still at risk of harm by private actors. As the IJ observed, “[a]ccording to the
Country Report [for Angola], ‘[t]he security forces generally were
effective . . . at maintaining stability,’ and the ‘police presence in
neighborhoods and on streets [served to] enhanc[e] general safety and
security.’”
In sum, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusions that the
Angolan government was able and willing to protect L. N..
C
L. N. argues that the BIA committed legal error in failing to
“determine the Angolan authorities’ past ability and willingness to protect
[her] as an initial matter and separate from the predictive finding of how they
would act in the future.” In other words, she argues that the BIA was
required to bifurcate analysis of past and future inability or unwillingness to
protect L. N.. Accordingly, she requests remand.
The Government responds that, “[b]ecause Petitioner cannot
establish ‘persecution’ for immigration purposes without establishing the
government unwilling or unable requirement, a regulatory presumption of
future harm would not apply regardless of the severity of the harm Petitioner
alleges.” Thus, it was not error for the BIA to decline to reach the issue of
whether the mistreatment rose to the level of harm required for persecution.
_____________________
unable or unwilling to protect against private violence merely because it has difficulty
solving crimes or anticipating future acts of violence.” (citation and quotations omitted)).
Instead, the police response to this incident appears to have been par for the course. As L.
N. acknowledged, “[g]enerally, unless someone has died, the Angolan police will not
investigate.” Because the 2008 incident did not involve a casualty, the BIA could have
reasonably concluded that the police response was normal under the circumstances and
that they did not treat her differently because of her and her family’s opposition to
corruption.
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The BIA specifically stated that “respondent did not establish past
persecution” because “she did not meet her burden to show that the Angolan
authorities were or would be unable or unwilling to protect her from the
private actors she fears.” To prevail on a claim of past persecution, a
noncitizen must establish that she suffered persecution at the hands of the
government or forces that a government is unable or unwilling to control.
Tesfamichael v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 109, 113 (5th Cir. 2006). Because findings
of that nature are necessary to show past persecution, the BIA did not err in
relying on this analysis. We find no precedential support for a bifurcated
approach. We reject this argument.
D
Finally, we turn to L. N.’s CAT claims. L. N. argues that the BIA
erred in finding she provided insufficient evidence demonstrating a risk of
torture because it ignored government involvement and failed to consider
evidence supporting a likelihood of torture. She requests remand for the
agency to consider “all relevant evidence” in assessing her claim for CAT
relief.
The Government points out that L. N.’s claim is based on speculation.
“Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that [L. N.] did not show that,
upon return to her native country, she would more likely than not be tortured
by or with the acquiescence of the Angolan government.” It argues that the
Petitioner’s experiences do not rise to the level of torture, and that her
assertion she would be tortured by state actors was speculative.
We review the denial of CAT relief for substantial evidence. Zhang v.
Gonzales, 432 F.3d 339, 344 (5th Cir. 2018). One who seeks CAT relief must
show that she is more likely than not to be tortured with official acquiescence
if repatriated. Morales v. Sessions,
860 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2017).
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“Torture is defined as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person.” Id.
The BIA rejected this claim on the grounds that she had shown neither
past torture nor a likelihood of future torture. L. N. points to no
“particularized” evidence that would “demonstrate an individualized risk of
torture to her” but relies on evidence showing that she suffered nightmares
and physiological symptoms due to the incidents underlying her claims and
that violence is prevalent in Angola. See id. Substantial evidence supports
the BIA’s decisions regarding torture in Angola.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY the petition for review.
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Dana M. Douglas, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
part:
Although I agree with the majority that the Board did not err in failing
to bifurcate its analysis of past and future inability to protect L. N. and that
the evidence does not compel reversal on her CAT claim, I part ways on the
remainder of the opinion. I agree with L. N. that the BIA and IJ legally erred
by failing to explain its dismissal and discounting of credible evidence of
state-sponsored persecution. Further, I believe that the record evidence
compels the determination that the Angolan government was unwilling or
unable to protect L. N. and remains unwilling to do so. Because I would grant
the petition for review and remand for further proceedings on these points, I
respectfully dissent.
I
Because the majority does not provide all the context underlying L.
N.’s claims, we begin with a recitation of the full background. L. N. was the
daughter of an Angolan police commissioner. She attended meetings with
him, and he introduced her as his daughter. In 1998, her father, mother, and
brother were murdered. They were shot in the head, and her father’s tongue
was cut out. L. N. testified that in Angola, cutting one’s tongue out means
the person “spoke too much and reveal[ed] things” and that this act is meant
to serve as a warning to others that “if they speak, they will experience the
same fate.”
When her family was killed, L. N. was in Cuba. Her father sent her
there to protect her because he was receiving threats due to his work. She
learned of her family’s murder through the Angolan Consulate in Cuba, and
she testified that her family was killed because her father denounced
corruption. Specifically, her father denounced a group selling weapons.
According to L. N., this group was supported by the police and some
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members of the Angolan government. The government refused to disclose
any information on her family’s murderers, and instead only disclosed that
two unnamed men carried out the attack. “[T]here was no public trial, and
the government refused to reveal their names.” When she sought additional
information, investigators informed her that “they could not tell her
[anything] to protect her.” The two men were imprisoned from 1998 to
2016.
L. N.’s only surviving sister, who was in Cuba with her at the time of
their family’s murder, returned to Angola in 1999 to investigate the killings.
Her sister, however, subsequently “disappeared” and L. N. has not spoken
to her since 1999. The same year, L. N. left Cuba for Ecuador, where she was
granted temporary refugee status and remained until 2003. In 2003, she
returned to Angola and remained there until 2005, when she returned to
Ecuador. From 2007 to 2015, she lived in Angola, briefly returning to
Ecuador from 2015 to 2016 before returning to Angola through 2017.
L. N. credibly testified to three threats on her life. The first occurred
in Angola between 2008 and 2009. In this instance, shots were fired at the
house where she was staying. L. N. believes that she was targeted because
she is the only remaining member of her family. L. N. reported the incident
to the police, who inspected the bullet holes, suggested that she remain silent,
and asked her if she was afraid of disappearing.
She received the second threat on her life in Quito, Ecuador in 2016—
the same year her family’s unidentified murderers were released from prison.
As she was leaving her home, two people dressed in traditional Angolan
clothing grabbed her by the hair and put a gun under her nose. At the same
moment, a bus stopped, and as people were exiting the bus, L. N. was able to
flee her attackers. She reported the incident to the Ecuadorian police, but
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despite a month-long investigation, no arrests were made. She then returned
to Angola, first to Luanda and then to Lubango.
The third incident occurred in September 2017. As L. N. was
approaching her home, a neighbor informed her that her house had been set
on fire. The neighbor added that there were flyers outside the home that
read, “son of a fish is also a fish, and therefore knows how to swim.” L. N.
interpreted this as a threat related to the murder of her family.
After this incident, L. N. sought shelter at a monastery with nuns.
During her time there, the nuns punished her for being sexually impure,
claiming that all the tragedies she faced were her own fault, and burning her
between the legs. She was taken to the hospital because she developed
blisters and a fever from the burns, and then fled to the United States.
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a notice to
appear alleging that L. N. was removable because she applied for admission
without valid entry documents. She conceded the factual allegations against
her, and the IJ found her removable. She applied for asylum, withholding of
removal, and CAT relief. The IJ denied relief following a hearing at which L.
N. testified. The BIA remanded for further proceedings, concluding that the
IJ failed to make findings concerning the opinion of her expert, country
conditions, the Angolan government’s willingness and ability to protect her,
and internal relocation. On remand, the IJ then addressed these aspects of
her claim but again denied relief, and the BIA subsequently dismissed the
appeal.
II
I am persuaded by two of L. N.’s arguments and believe that the IJ’s
and BIA’s consideration of her claims was unsatisfactory. First, the Board
and IJ committed legal error by failing to explain its dismissal and discounting
of credible evidence of state-sponsored persecution. Importantly, we “may
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reverse a decision that was decided on the basis of an erroneous application
of the law.” Sealed Petitioner v. Sealed Respondent, 829 F.3d 379, 384 (quoting
Mikhael v. INS,
115 F.3d 299, 305 (5th Cir. 1997)). Next, even reviewing for
substantial evidence, the record compels a conclusion that the Angolan
government was and remains unwilling or unable to protect L. N..
Accordingly, remand to the BIA is warranted.
A
L. N. argues that the Board erred in finding insufficient evidence to
show that her persecution was state sponsored. She claims that the
evidence—including L. N.’s own testimony, her expert’s testimony, and
country condition reports—supports a finding that the Angolan government
perpetrated her persecution. She faults the IJ and BIA for failing to explain
its dismissal and discounting of credible evidence of state-sponsored
persecution where nothing exists in the record to contradict it. She seeks
remand to properly assign the burden of proof regarding internal relocation.
In response, the Government counters that L. N. has not demonstrated that
the harm she experienced was perpetrated by the Angolan government
because there is no compelling record evidence linking the perpetrators to
the Angolan government.
Notably, the IJ found L. N. to be credible. As we have held, “[t]hat
the IJ did not doubt [L. N.’s] testimony is significant, because we must accept
as true all the facts to which [L. N.] testified.” Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d
295, 306 (5th Cir. 2005). Here, L. N. testified regarding her belief that the
men responsible for her family members’ murders were associated with the
Angolan government. Her testimony was corroborated by evidence in the
record, including both an expert opinion and country conditions.
The majority attempts to downplay the significance of the IJ’s
credibility finding by indicating that an individual can be denied asylum
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despite a credibility finding. This may be true, but it does not undermine the
fact that our precedent requires us to accept all facts that L. N. testified to as
true. Zhao, 404 F.3d at 306. Moreover, where an applicant for asylum is
found credible, regulations state that this alone may be sufficient to sustain
the burden of proof (without the requirement of corroboration by any
additional evidence).
8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a). As noted infra, L. N. also
provided corroborating evidence.
For example, she presented uncontroverted expert testimony to
establish the involvement of the Angolan government. Dr. Schubert, her
expert, concluded that L. N.’s narrative was consistent with country
conditions and the likelihood of government involvement because of the
internal and private nature of the prosecution of the murderers of her family.
Country condition reports likewise support a finding of state involvement.
The U.S. Department of State confirms that “[b]oth the national police and
the [Angolan Armed Forces] have internal court systems that generally
remained closed to outside scrutiny.”
We review the BIA’s decision “‘procedurally’ to ensure that the
complain[ant] has received full and fair consideration of all circumstances
that give rise to his or her claims.” Cabrera v. Sessions, 890 F.3d 153, 162 (5th
Cir. 2018) (quoting Abdel-Masieh v. INS,
73 F.3d 579, 585 (5th Cir. 1996)).
The BIA’s decision “must reflect a meaningful consideration of all the
relevant evidence supporting an asylum seeker’s claims.”
Id. While “[w]e
do not require the BIA to specifically address every piece of evidence put
before it,” it is legal error for the agency to “fail[] to address. . . key
evidence.”
Id. Thus, the immigration court must explain its dismissal or
discounting of credible evidence, particularly when it contradicts an expert
opinion. Matter of M-A-M-Z-,
28 I&N Dec. 173, 177-78 (BIA 2020); see also
Castillo v. Barr,
980 F.3d 1278, 1283 (9th Cir. 2020) (“If the Board rejects
expert testimony, it must state in the record why the testimony was
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insufficient . . .”). Contrary to the majority, it is insufficient to accept a
statement by the BIA or IJ that it has considered and weighed all the
evidence, when our own reading of those opinions makes clear that the
agency has failed to address key evidence and failed to explain its dismissal
and discounting of credible evidence. This legal error cannot be surmounted
by pointing to substantial evidence that may support the BIA finding.
To support its holding that L. N. failed to prove the involvement of
government actors, the BIA pointed only to the fact that the two men were
arrested and prosecuted in connection with her family’s murders in 1998 and
that police responded in 2008 to shots fired at her home. However, it did not
explain how the fact that two men were arrested and prosecuted undermine
L. N.’s or Dr. Schubert’s credible testimony that state actors were involved
in the murders and attacks. Nowhere did the IJ or BIA address how the
shrouded nature of the trial supported the inference that government actors
were involved. The BIA also failed to explain how police responding to
gunfire in 2008 counters or diminishes the facts presented in the record
evidence to support government involvement. The Board errs when it
ignores credible evidence of state-sponsored persecution where nothing
exists in the record to contradict it. M-A-M-Z-, 28 I&N Dec. at 177-78. The
record evidence identified by the Board does not contradict the likelihood of
government involvement.
Here, the BIA stated that “the respondent did not provide evidence
connecting the individuals she fears with the Angolan government or
evidence that they were acting on behalf of the government.” It noted Dr.
Schubert’s affidavit but dismissed it as an “assum[ption], based on the
respondent’s testimony.” The IJ also stated that although L. N. “credibly
testified that her father was a police commissioner, she has not substantiated
her claim that government actors carried out the murder of her family.”
Instead, the IJ claimed that L. N. “simply reference[d] a criminal group that
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she believes is involved with the police and Dr. Schubert’s ‘assum[ption]’
that her perpetrators are linked to the government.” “Based on this alone,”
the IJ claimed it could not conclude that her persecutor is the Angolan
government.
But this was not the only evidence or credible testimony provided by
L. N.. She points to evidence that no public trial was held, that the Angolan
government refused to name the individuals tried in connection with the
murder, and that Dr. Schubert’s expert opinion is based on “his independent
knowledge of Angola, the consistency of Ms. L. N.’s narrative with country
conditions, and the key fact of secrecy around the trial and identity of the men
sentenced.” Additionally, Dr. Schubert’s expert opinion testimony provides
an example of the Angolan government’s handling of another murder by
agents of the state security service—in the same secretive manner at issue
here—to explain the basis for his opinion. Indeed, it was not only L. N.’s
testimony that enforced his expert opinion, but the additional evidence of the
Angolan government’s refusal to hold a public trial or share the names of the
men convicted. As noted, this is consistent with country conditions reports
of internal court systems for the Angola Armed Forces and national police,
which are closed to the public.
The majority draws its own conclusions to affirm the Board based on
rationale that the BIA never stated. For example, it states that the “BIA
could have reasonably concluded that the Angolan government was not
involved in the murders of her family because the government would not
impose punishment for crimes that the government itself committed or
condoned” and that “the secret trial could have indicated a rift between
official factions.” But “[w]e may only affirm the BIA based on its stated
rationale.” Argueta-Hernandez v. Garland, 87 F.4th 698, 707 (5th Cir. 2023)
(emphasis added). This type of post hoc rationalizing is impermissible on our
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appellate review of the BIA’s decision and cannot support the majority’s
affirmance.
I find further support for legal error in the cases cited by the
Government. For example, in Matter of D-R-, the BIA stated that “[a]n
Immigration Judge is not required to accept a respondent’s assertions, even
if plausible, where there are other permissible views of the evidence based on
the record.” 25 I&N Dec. 445, 455 (BIA 2011). But it is unclear what an
alternative permissible view of the evidence might be in this case. The only
evidence the Government points to is that the Angolan government
sentenced the two men who murdered L. N.’s family to prison time. But this
fact does not undermine the plausible, and frankly probable, inference that
the persecutors were government actors based on the evidence outlined
above. Accordingly, “[a]lthough the original record does not contain direct
evidence that” the Angolan government were L. N.’s persecutors, “that
inference is unavoidable in light of [L. N.’s] credited, uncontroverted
testimony,” and the other record evidence before us. Zhao,
404 F.3d at 309.
This error is compounded by the fact that the BIA and IJ made
statements expressly denying the existence of crucial record evidence. We
have remanded where the BIA makes a statement that “appears to deny the
existence of evidence that clearly exists in the record.” Ndifon v. Garland,
49 F.4th 986, 990 (5th Cir. 2022) (remanding where BIA stated that
petitioner “points to no other objective evidence to support his claim” despite
the existence of evidence regarding country conditions) (emphases added).
In Ndifon, we further held that the BIA’s error was not cured even though
the IJ expressly considered the evidence it ignored.
Id. at 990-91.
Here, neither the BIA nor the IJ engaged with the additional evidence
presented by L. N.. Instead, the BIA stated that she “did not provide
evidence connecting the individuals she fears with the Angolan government
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or evidence that they were acting on behalf of the government,” and the IJ
stated that L. N. “has not substantiated her claim that government actors
carried out the murder of her family.” These statements make clear that L.
N. “did not receive ‘meaningful consideration of the relevant substantial
evidence supporting’” her claims. Ndifon, 49 F.4th at 991 (quoting Abdel-Masieh,
73 F.3d at 585). As the ample evidence put forth by L. N.
demonstrates, these statements “deny the existence of evidence that clearly
exists in the record,” and require remand. Id. at 990.
B
L. N. next argues that when properly viewed, no reasonable factfinder
would conclude that the evidence shows that the Angolan state was willing
and able to protect her. Instead, the evidence suggests that the authorities
demonstrated that they condoned her persecution by refusing to act and by
pressuring her to stop seeking protection at all. Because substantial evidence
does not support the BIA’s conclusion, she requests remand to allow the
agency to fully address arguments supporting past persecution. 1 The
Government counters that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
determination that L. N. failed to meet her burden, pointing to the Angolan
government’s arrest and sentence of the individuals charged with murder of
her family and that the police responded to the incident where shots were
fired at her home.
“When private actors are concerned, the applicant must show that the
government condoned the private violence ‘or at least demonstrated a
complete helplessness to protect [the applicant].” Bertrand, 36 F.4th at 631-
32. In this case, the police not only showed inaction, but they actively
_____________________
1
Notably, the BIA did not consider evidence of past persecution because it
determined that L. N. did not carry her burden to show that she was persecuted by Angolan
authorities.
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discouraged L. N. from seeking protection. The fact that they prosecuted the
two men who murdered her entire family does not detract from the evidence
of their unwillingness to help at every juncture since then.
The cases the Government relies upon to show that the Angolan
government “responded to an applicant’s requests and evinced an interest
and willingness to help” are easily distinguishable from the instant matter.
For example, in Saldana v. Lynch, the government was found to be willing
and able to protect where police acted on the complaint and continued to
investigate the matter. 820 F.3d 970, 976-77 (8th Cir. 2016). This differs
from the police response here, where they did not investigate the matter
further and discouraged L. N. from reporting to them. Moreover, in
Nahrvani v. Gonzales, the police took reports and made reasonable efforts to
investigate and were therefore not unwilling or unable to protect the
applicant even though they could not solve the crime.
399 F.3d 1148, 1154
(9th Cir. 2005). Again, this is different than here, where the police made no
efforts to investigate. Furthermore, in Ritonga v. Holder, the police
“investigated the assault and apprehended the criminals.”
633 F.3d 971, 977-
78 (10th Cir. 2011). Nothing of the sort happened in response to L. N.’s calls
for help. Confusingly, the majority accepts the utter lack of response as
sufficient, despite the great weight of precedent against this conclusion,
including that put forth by the Government.
Although the Government, like the BIA, points to the Angolan
government’s current efforts to prevent corruption in a global sense, the
Government itself admits that the “Angolan government continues to
encounter difficulties in their efforts to control and curb general criminality,
while still combatting corruption,” as supported by country report evidence.
Moreover, the BIA has specifically recognized instances where state
authorities were unable or unwilling to control private persecutors in similar
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scenarios. For example, in Matter of O-Z- & I-Z-, the BIA found that police
“[taking] no action beyond writing a report” demonstrated that the
Ukrainian government was unable or unwilling to control the applicant’s
persecutors. 22 I&N Dec. 23, 26 (BIA 1998). We have also stated that “the
failure to do anything beyond writing reports is stronger evidence of an
unwillingness to help.” Bertrand,
36 F.4th at 633, n.6. Here, it is unclear if
the police ever even wrote a report.
But importantly, in this case, there is a clear statement by authorities
that they were unwilling to act to protect L. N.. The authorities specifically
told L. N. to stop seeking protection. After her house was shot up, the police
instructed her to be quiet: “You know, people disappear here every day. You
have no one. You should be quiet.” They suggested she might be
“disappeared” but offered no protection. When she pushed for action, they
treated her in a derogatory manner and refused to act. After her home was
burned down in 2017, the police told her to “find a husband” and again
refused to act. We have held that the BIA improperly concluded that a
petitioner failed to establish government acquiescence because the
government acknowledged that the petitioner was no longer safe in his
country, asked that he sign a liability waiver, and placed him in a taxi to
another county. Argueta-Hernandez, 87 F.4th at 714. Similarly, here, L. N.
provided sufficient evidence to compel the conclusion that the Angolan
government is unwilling and unable to protect her and was unwilling to do so
in each instance that she contacted them. Furthermore, current efforts to
curb corruption in Angola do not undermine such a conclusion. Like the legal
errors outlined above, the lack of substantial evidence supporting the BIA’s
conclusion warrants remand.
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III
The majority errs in providing post hoc rationalizations for the BIA
and compounds the BIA’s errors by downplaying the severity of the harms
L. N. has suffered. Each applicant for asylum relief deserves to have their
claims heard and any subsequent denial of a petition adequately explained.
“Although we owe deference to the BIA, that deference is not blind.”
Argueta-Hernandez, 87 F.4th at 703. From the record, it is clear that the BIA
legally erred in considering the evidence before it and that substantial
evidence supports the conclusion that the Angolan government was unable
and unwilling to protect L. N.. The BIA’s poorly reasoned decision, and the
majority’s affirmance, leaves L. N. in peril. Accordingly, I dissent.
26