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109 Mass. 345

Commonwealth v. Killian

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · decided 1872-03-15

Indictment on the Gen. Sts. c. 63, § 107, averring that the defendant at West Roxbury in the county of Norfolk, on September 18, 1871, with force and arms, “ feloniously, wilfully and maliciously the engine and carriages of the property of the Boston and Providence Railroad Corporation, then and there lawfully passing over and along the railroad of said corporation, there located and situate, did obstruct, by then and there pulling the signal rope attached to and connected…

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“or endangers the safety of persons conveyed in or upon”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. UNITED BRICK & CLAY WKRS. UNION

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1872-03-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently April 1951

4 state decisions

20187218801890190019101920193019401950decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Colt, J.

¶1Punishment is provided by the Gen. Sts. c. 63, § 107, for whoever “ obstructs any engine or carriage passing upon a railroad, or endangers the safety of persons conveyed in or upon the same, or aids or assists therein.” The defendant is indicted for obstructing a train of cars by pulling the signal rope attached to a bell upon the engine, whereby the train was stopped and the safety of passengers endangered. There was evidence at the trial, that the defendant was a passenger at the time of committing the offence charged, and that pulling the bell-rope was ordinarily used as a danger signal, and as notice to the engineer to stop the train. In the opinion of a majority of the court, this evidence fails to prove a criminal obstruction of the train, within the reasonable meaning of the statute. •

¶2The law was not intended to apply to a case where the train is stopped by an engineer, or other person having control, in consequence of a false signal communicated in this manner by a passenger. That is a proper and a contemplated mode of stopping the train, to be used in case of accident or necessity, not only by officers in charge, but by passengers; and the act, however improper, and whatever may be its motive, cannot be regarded .as ordinarily or directly dangerous to any one. If the terms of the statute do not imply an actual physical obstruction, they at least require something more than the use of the agencies here employed.

¶3The case of The Queen v. Hadfield, Law Rep. 1 C. C. 252, relied upon by the government, was under the English St. of 24 & *34825 Yict. c. 97, §§ 35, 36. The prisoner unlawfully altered some railway signals at a railway station. The alteration caused a train, which would have passed the station without slackening speed, to slacken speed and to come to nearly a stand; and another train going in the same direction and on the same rails was due at the station in half an hour. This was held by a divided court to be an obstruction within the meaning of § 36, which enacts that whosoever by any unlawful act, &c., obstructs any engine or carriage using any railway, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. But § 35 of the same statute makes it felony to obstruct a train by certain unlawful acts there named, including the altering of signals, and it was thought that the acts specified were intended to be also included in § 36 by the phrase “ any unlawful acts.” The interpretation of our statute is not thus aided and it cannot be thus enlarged.

¶4Exceptions sustained.

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