Volume 109 — United States Reports

<p>Internal Improvements — Municipal Bonds — Statutes.</p> <p>Application being made to open the judgment in this case in order to enable the court to consider the case of Traver v. Merrick County, decided by the Supreme Court of Nebraska, and the court nowhaving considered it: Meld, that that ease is an authority in support of the former ruling of this court in this ease.</p>

The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), were a group of five landmark cases in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments did not empower Congress to outlaw racial discrimination by private individuals. The holding that the Thirteenth Amendment did not empower the federal government to punish racist acts done by private citizens would be overturned by the Supreme Court in the 1968 case Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. The Fourteenth Amendment not applying to private entities, however, is still valid precedent to this day. Although the Fourteenth Amendment-related decision has never been overturned, in the 1964 case of Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.

<p>ON CERTIFICATE OF DIVISION IN OPINION BETWEEN THE JUDGES OF THE CIKOUIT COURT OF ' THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE.</p>

<p> Practice. </p> <p>A case will not be taken up out of its order simply because it is of great public importance.</p>

Indictment against inspector and clerk of Election District No. 8, Northern District of Florida, for removal of ballots cast by electors at an election for representative in Congress, and substitution of different ballots. Mr. Solicitor-General Phillips for the plaintiffs. No appearance for defendants.

<p>Motion to use printed record without paying clerk’s fee.</p>

Held: under the provisions of §§ 11 and 14 of the act of July 4th, 1836,' . 5 Stat. 121 , 123, that the right acquired by M. was only that of a licensee ; that the instrument of license did not carry such right to any one but him personally ; and that such right did not, on his death, pass to his administrator, so as to authorize a suit at law, founded on the license, to be brought in the name of the grantor, for the use…

.Amicable suit by an assignee of a bankrupt to recover pur-. chase-money of real estate of the bankrupt sold at public sale; the object of such suit being to determine whether the right-of the bankrupt’s wife to dower passed at'the sale.

Suit in equity to have an agreement respecting the transfer of an interest under a patent set aside and cancelled, as made under amístate, and all suits at.law thereon stayed and enjoined. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Held: That this description does not show a patentable invention. 2. The court will take judicial notice of matters of common knowledge, and 9f things in common use.

<p>Burden of Proof — Equity—Evidence.</p> <p>In a serious conflict of testimony, a bill in equity may be dismissed on the ground that the complainant fails to establish the facts on which he claims relief.</p>

<p>Appeal — Jurisdiction-r-Pmctice.</p> <p>A brought suit against B upon bond's aggregating $34,000, on which over $5,000 interest was claimed as overdue. Before trial A, by leave of court, amended so as to include only 90 of the coupons originally sued on. He took judgment for less than $5j 000. Eeld, that the amendment was within the discretion of the Court below, and this court has no jurisdiction.</p>

Held: That to enforce the contract as one continuing during the time claimed would be highly inequitable ; and, as against the insurers of the cargo, the ' right of the tugs to compensation must be regarded as having terminated when the ship and cargo were raised, and the tugs must be regarded as having been then discharged. • , The decree of the Circuit Court was entered May 24th, 1880.

ter ERROR TO THE circuit court of the UNITED states for the 'southern district of new tore. .This action was brought to recover money alleged to have been illegally exacted by the collector pi customs at the port of New Ñork, and paid under protest. There was a verdict and judgment in favor of the defendant below, to reverse .which this writ of error is prosecuted.

Held: that the specific duty by weight is to be calculated on the same number of pounds in each case, and is to be twice the amount for washed wool that it is for unwashed; and that the ad valorem duty on washed wool is to be twice the ad valorem duty op. the same number of .pounds of unwashed wool.

The appellee, Fisher, held the office of -Chief Justice of the Territory of Wyoming, from February 14th, 1876, to November 26th,' 1879. Up to and including June 30th, 18,77, he was paid his salary at the rate of $3,000 per annum. From June 30th, 1877, up to and including November 26th, 1879, he was paid and received, without protest,1 compensation as such chief justice, at the rate of $2,600 per annum.

Held: that Congress had expressed its purpose to reduce for the .time being the salaries of interpreters, and that the claimant could not recover. This was a suit by the appellee, Charles Mitchell, to recover a balance which he claimed to be due him as Indian interpreter at the Santee agency in thé State of Nebraska, under section 2070, title XXIII., of the Revised Statutes.

Held: That though the receiver was not party to the suit, he was principal party to a side issue which had arisen in it, which was appealable, and that the judgment upon it was final, and the appeal was properly taken. 2. That under the rules and practice of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, the suspensive force of the appeal in E’s case was not operative until the filing of the bond. 3.

Held: That the general rule that a purchaser of overdue bonds, after judgment rendered that the bonds are void, is bound by that judgment, applies here. O. That when a mandamus is refused on grounds that are conclusive against the right of the plaintiff to recover in any action whatever, the judgment is conclusive of that fact. 3.

OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE • DISTRICT OF INDIANA. The facts appear in the opinion of the court. The points presented in the briefs were mainly on the facts.

INDIANA. On the 2d July, 1879, "William H, Guión, claiming to have an interest in the bonds of the appellee which were the subject of controversy in the suit of The Indiana Southern Railroad Company v. The Liverpool, London, & Globe Insurance Company, just reported, filed his petition in that suit in the court below, asking to be admitted as a party to the suit for his own protection. This petition was denied.

Held: that the writ of supersedeas should issue. The facts appear in tbe

Held: That the decree appealed from was final as to all the relief prayed for in the bill. 2. When a decree decides the right to and possession of the property in contest,, and the party is entitled to have it immediately carried into execution, it is a final decree, although the court below retains possession of so much of the decree as may be necessary for adjusting accounts between the parties.

This suit was commenced in a court of the State of New York, and was removed by the defendant into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of NewYorkby a writ of certiorari. * The defendant- was a collector of internal revenue, and exacted and collected from the plaintiff at various •times in the years 1866, 1867 and 1868 sums of money amounting in all to $61.30, as a tax of 3 per centum on the gross amounts of the plaintiff’s receipts from his…

This suit was brought in a State court of Louisiana, by the appellant, a tobacco manufacturer, against the appellee, a collector of internal revenue, to obtain an injunction-restraining the appellee from seizing and selling the property of the appellant to pay two assessments of taxes against him, made by the commissioner of internal revenue, and to have the assessments declared void.- An injunction having been granted ex parte, the. appellee removed the suit, by certiorari,…

Held: that the declaration showed no cause of action, even under art. 1890 of the Civil Code, and art. 85 of the Code of Practice of Louisiana. Á judgment, rendered on default, upon a declaration setting forth no cause of action, may be reversed on writ of error, and the case remanded with directions that judgment be arrested. These two cases were argued together.

Held: that the United States through its officers was bound to point out to bidders the' parts of the walls which were to enter into the new structure, and that this was done by the.act of dismantling a-portion and leaving the rest of the wall to stand. 3. Payments under the contract were to be made in instalments and the balance when the work should be entirely completed. The contract also contemplated extra work.

<p>IN. error to the circuit court of THE UNITED states FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.</p> <p>The facts appear in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: That the agreement was not a mortgage; that to constitute a mortgage there\ must be a present purpose to pledge the estate, and that there was no such purpose at the time of the agreement. ■ In equity.

Held: That in proceedings in the State courts of Michigan against the marshal, the process is sufficient to protect him if the property seized under it was liable to be attached in that suit. This was a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State ■ of Michigan.

The long record in this case presents no subject of general interest outside of the important special issues involved in the suit. The facts upon which the decision rests are fully set forth in the opinion of the court.

<p>Appeal — Bankruptcy.</p> <p>When a claim, presented, for proof in bankruptcy as a debt against the bankrupt’s' estate is rejected by the district court, an appeal from the decision ' to'the circuit court is incomplete and invalid, if the appellant fails to give to the assignee the ¡notice thereof -which the statute requires, within ten days after the decision — even though such notice may have been given to the objecting creditor.</p>

<p>On the question of the fact as to whether the proceeds of certain cotton had been recovered and received from the United States as part of the proceeds of cotton recovered for in the court of claims, this court reversed the de. cree of the circuit court.</p>

<p>IN error to the circuit court oe the united states .for the SOUTHERN-DISTRICT OE NEW'YORK. , ,</p> <p>The facts appear in the opinion of the court.</p>

Held: 1 That the right of exemption from taxation did not pass from the A. & F. Co. to the P. & L. Co. by the sale under the mortgage. ■8. That the language of the act of 1877 was broad enough to create that right anew, if the legislative grant was valid; but that 3.

This was an action at law on an administrator’s bond. The bond was..made by Charlotte L. Ames- and Cunningham Hazlett, as administrators of the estate of Horatio L. Ames, deceased, with Frederick P; Sawyer and the defendant in error, David Walker, sureties.

<p>IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT- COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI.</p> <p>Action upon a sealed instrument.</p> <p>Tbe plaintiff in error, Patrick Gr. Meatb, who was tbe plaintiff below, brought tbis suit, on December 21st, 1878, against tbe Board of Mississippi Levee' Commissioners. It was founded on a contract in writing, under seal, between Meatb and tbe defendants, dated April 13tb, 1869, by wbicb Meatb covenanted to construct certain levees in tbe State of Mississippi on or before April 1st, 1871, and tbe defendants covenanted to pay bim a specified price per cubic yard in coupon bonds of tbe board of levee commissioners maturing on January 1st, 1876. .</p> <p>Tbe declaration averred that tbe plaintiff expended large sums of money in tbe purchase of tools, etc., for tbe performance of said work, and whileihe was actually engaged therein, and with ample means to accolnplish it, tbe defendants, on January 10th, 1870, without any fault or negligence of plaintiff, ordered and coerced him to desist from work on said levees until further orders from them; that he ivas ready, able, and willing to go' on with the work, and remained awaiting the orders of the defendants until April 1st, 1871, and was prevented from resuming the work by the wrongful acts of the defendants.</p> <p>The declaration further averred that “ on March 26th, 1877, plaintiff brought his suit in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Mississippi on said contract, and the same was tried on or about April 5th, 1878, and was defeated for matter of form, in this, to wit, because though it appeared in the evidence that one Thomas Boyle had purchased, for the sole use and benefit of plaintiff, the said claim under said covenant against defendants^ at a sale thereof made by plaintiff’s assignee in bankruptcy, the formal assignment made by lfim to plaintiff had not in fact been executed and delivered until after the bringing of said action, though antedated to conform to the fact, and, therefore, that the said action should have been brought in the name of the said Boyle, for plaintiff’s use.”</p> <p>The plaintiff claimed in the present action the sum of $70,000 as due him for. work done and accepted under' said contract, and a large sum for damages, because he was not permitted to complete the work.</p> <p>The defendant-filed eight pleas, but as the judgment of the court below was based exclusively on the sixth and seventh pleas, the others need not be noticed. The sixth plea averred that “ the several supposed causes of action in said declaration mentioned, if any such there were or still are, did not, nor did any or either of them, accrue to the said plaintiff at any time witMn seven years next preceding' the commencement of this suit.”</p> <p>The seventh plea set out the facts in regard to such former suit, begun March 26th, 1877, referred to in the declaration, demed that it was decided against the plaintiff for matter of form-only, and averred that it was so decided on matter of substance; and concluded by averring that “ the present action was not brought witMn seven years after the cause of action accrued,” and was, therefore, barred by the statute.</p> <p>The plaintiff demurred to these pleas, and his demurrer was overruled. Thereupon he filed his replication taking issue.</p> <p>The parties waived a jury and submitted the issues of fact to. the court by the following agreement:</p> <p>“In this cause a jury is waived, and it is agreed to submit the cause to the court in' lieu of a jury, to be decided on the law and the evidence, and separate findings thereof to be rendered by the court, so that the decision may be finally reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States. The court having, in the decision of the questions arising upon the demurrers to sixth and seventh pleas filed, expressed the opinion that the pending of the former suit could not be' availed of to prevent the bat of the statute of limitations, and that this action is barred by limitation, it is agreed that the sole question shall be presented upon the pleadings and proof, and that only such evidence as in the judgment of the court bears upon that issue shall be incorporated in its findings and presented to the Supreme Court of the United States ; and that the record for said court shall consist of the pleadings and exhibits, the orders of the court, the findings of fact and law in the cause,' and this agreement.' And it is further agreed that should the supreme court differ in opinion with and reverse the circuit court, the cause shall be remanded for trial on its merits on all the other questions in the ease.”</p> <p>The cause was tried under this agreement and the court made both a general and special finding of facts. The general finding was aS follows:</p> <p>“The court having heard the evidence upon the sixth and seventh pleas-of the defendant, and replications thereto, &c., finds said issues in favor of defendants, and that said plaintiff’s right of action when this suit was brought was barred by the statute of limitations.”'</p> <p>The court found, by its special findings, as follows:'the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued in this case on April 1st, 1871, and, what the record also Showed, this action was brought December 21st, 1878; on March 26th, 1877, the plaintiff brought -an action against the defendant on the contract set out in and exhibited with the declaration in this cause; the defendant pleaded a transfer of all interest in said contract to an assignee in bankruptcy under the bankrupt law; to said plea the plaintiff replied that his assignee in bankruptcy had sold the said contract to one Boyle, who purchased it for the plaintiff, and assigned it to him some time in January, 1877'; issue was joined on this replication; this issue was 'submitted to the court for trial; on the trial it was shown that the assignment by Boyle to Meath was made on January 28th, 1878; on this state of facts the court found that the plaintiff did not have the legal title to the claim sued on when the action was commenced ; and judgment therein was rendered in that suit for the defendants.</p> <p>Upon the general and special findings, the court found, as matter of law, that this action was barred by the limitation of seven years, and rendered judgment for the defendants. To this conclusion of law the plaintiff excepted, and sued out the present writ of error.</p>

Mcmdamus prayed for in the Supreme Court of Louisiana to the city authorities of New Orleans, to compel them to levy taxes and pay a judgment recovered by the relator. The prayer being denied, the decision was brought here on error for review, on the ground of repugnancy to the Constitution And laws of the United States. The facts appear in the opinion of the court.

<p>APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS.</p> <p>Bill in equity to compel the delivery of patents of public land in Texas. The facts appear fully in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>IN error to the supreme court or the STATE OF IOWA.</p> <p>Action to recover lands and quiet title. It was commenced iii the Humboldt District Court in the State of Iowa. The present plaintiffs by petition set forth that in May, 1856, Congress granted to the State of Iowa, for the purpose of aiding in constructing a railroad from Dubuque to Sioux City, every alternate section of land designated by odd numbers, for six sections in width, on each side-óf said road-; that this grant became vested' in the plaintiffs: and that the present defendants ■ had wrong- • fully procured from the land office an illegal certification to certain designated sections within the grant, Avhereby the plaintiff’s ’ title Avas disquieted, and they prayed judgment that the lands might be decreed to them.</p> <p>The answer set up that the lands in question were set apart prior to the act of 1856, as part of the lands granted to the State of IoAAra by the act of August 8th, 1846, and that the defendants had succeeded to the rights of the State under the latter grant, and were entitled to the lands in controversy.</p> <p>The district court gave judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The supreme court of the State on appeal, reversed that judgment. The cause Avas brought before this court, by writ of error. The facts necessary to the understanding of the issues involved appear in the opinion óf the court.</p>

<p>Constitutional Law — Courts-Martial—Executive.</p> <p>The president has the power to supersede or remove an officer of the army by appointing another in his place, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.</p> <p>Such power was not withdrawn by the provision in § 5 of the act of July 13th, 1866, c. 176 (14 Stat. 93), now embodied in § 1229 of the Revised Statutes, that “ no officer in the military or naval service shall, in time of peace, be dismissed from service, except upon and in pursuance of the sentence of a court-martial to that effect, or in commutation thereof.”</p> <p>Where a court-martial has cognizance of the charges made, and has jurisdiction of the. person of the accused, its sentence is valid, when questioned collaterally, although irregularities or errors are alleged to have occurred in its proceedings, in that the prosecutor was a member of the court and a . witness on the trial.</p> <p>No opinion is expressed as to the propriety of such proceedings.</p>

Held: as valid as if actually sealed before being issued, and will restrain the setting up of the want of seals in the action at law.

Held: in Merchants' Bank v. Bliss, 35 N. Y. 412 , that the three years’ statute of limitations applied under the following provision of .the code :' ‘ An action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture when the action is given to the party aggrieved.’ ” This decision is upon the precise point of the controversy in this case.

Bill in equity to abate a nuisance. On the 16tb of April, 1867, the legislature of New York passed an act creating a corporation by the name of the New York Bridge Company, for the purpose, of constructing and maintaining a permanent bridge over the East River, between the cities of New York and Brooklyn.

<p>IN ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP TENNESSEE.</p> <p>The facts and the contentions of the parties are stated in the' opinion of the court.</p>

Held: that a holder of such bonds who had due *402 notice, and opportunity to act, and who neither assented to nor dissented from the plan within the time, was bound by its terms as fully as if he had expressly assented to it. Suit to recover interest on coupons of mortgage bonds. Judgment in the State court for the defendants. The facts and the alleged causes of error are stated in the

<p> Patent. </p> <p>Claim 4 of reissued letters patent No. 1527, granted to John Richards, August 15th, 1863, for a “ guide and support for scroll-saws,” the original patent, No. 35,390, having been granted to him, May 25th, 1863, for an “improved guide and support for scroll-saws,” namely, “4. An anti-friction guide which is adjustable so as to accommodate different thicknesses of saw-blades, and to compensate for wear, in combination with the upper portion of a web saw-blade, substantially as set forth,” does not cover an arrangement in which a band-saw is used, passing over wheels, and running constantly in one direction, towards the table on which the stuff lies, and having a tension over the peripheries of the wheels.</p> <p>Claim 5 of said reissue, namely, “ 5.' The combination of the anti-friction saw-support and guide, or the equivalent thereof, with an adjustable guard, or its equivalent, substantially as and for the purpose set forth,” is not infringed by an arrangement in which such a band-saw is used, and the guard does not hold down the stuff against the upward lifting action of the saw, because the saw is constantly passing downward.</p> <p>The claim of letters patent No. 78,880, granted to J. A. Fay & Co., June 16th, 1868, for an “improvement in guides for band-saws,” on the invention of John Lemman, namely, “ The combination of the roller b with fixed lateral guides, cao, one or more, arranged and operated substantially in the manner and for the purposes specified,” is for the combination of an anti-friction smooth faced wheel to support the back or thin edge of the saw, and to have lateral adjustment, presenting different points to wear, with the fixed guides, and is not infringed by an arrangement in which the wheel has two grooves in it, in one of which the saw runs, and in the other of which it can be made to run by lateral adjustment.</p> <p>Claim 1 of letters patent No. 120,949, granted to J. A. Fay & Co., November 14th, 1871, for an “improvement in band-sawing machines,” on the invention of William H. Doane and William P. McKee, namely, “1. The frame A, A', A", in combination with the lower arbor-bearing,' said frame being constructed as herein described, with a depression, A'", permitting the ready removal of the arbor, as explained,” is not infringed by an arrangement in which the depression does not leave exposed a seat which is entirely open upward; and the arbor-bearing cannot be removed without detaching the pulley from the arbor.</p> <p>Claim 2, namely, “2. The arrangement of frame A A' A" A"', and of the horizontally and vertically adjustable arbor-bearing O, D, .D', E, E', G-, II, A,” is not infringed by an arrangement which does not have the frame and depression of claim 1, or the elements D D', or the same or equivalent means of adjusting’such arbor-bearing either horizontally or vertically.</p> <p>Claim 3, namely, “3. The arrangement of step or saddle it and its contained box or bearing L L',” covers, as an element of the arrangement, among other things, a spring which carries the weight of the saddle, and gives an elastic tension to the saw, and is not infringed by an arrangement in which there is a rigid saddle and no spring.</p> <p>Claim 4, namely, “4. In combination with the upper arbor, L', the lower arbor-bearing, E,.adjustable both vertically and horizontally, as shown and described and for; the purpose set forth,” in not infringed by an arrangement which does not infringe claims 2 and 3.</p>

Suit against a United States marshal and his sureties on his.-, official bond to recover fpr an alleged illegal seizure of goods.' The action Avas originally brought by. Nathan Feibelman, since deceased, and revived by Ms administrator, the plaintiff in error, by petition filed April 24th, 1873, in the .Fourth District Court for the Parish of Orleans, in the State of Louisiana.

Held: That, although the second suit was begun more than seven years after the . cause of action arose, it was within the saving clause of article 2755 of the Code of Tennessee, providing that: “If the action is commenced within the time limited, but the judgment or decree is rendered against ■ the plaintiff and upon any ground not concluding his right of action, or where the judgment or decree is rendered against the…

Held: solely and exclusively responsible in laAV for the payment of the money to that person, and its consequent loss to the claimants.

Held: that the act eontem *441 plates that this expenditure is to be made for the common, benefit, and that one enjoying a mining right defined by metes and bounds does not, by expending money upon a flume which passes over adjoining.iand and deposits the waste from his mine on that land without benefit to such adjoining land, and without other evidence of a claim to it, thereby make an expenditure upon it within the…

Held: that the facts in the bill show that the State is so interested in the property that final relief cannot bo granted without making it a party, and the court is without jurisdiction. 2. Whenever it is clearly seen that a Stato is an indispensable party to enable the court, according to the rules which govern its procedure, to grant the relief sought, it will refuse to take jurisdiction. 3.

- Bill in equity to restrain tbe prosecution of an action in tbe State courts of Michigan, against ‘the assignee of a bankrupt and tbe marshal of tbe -Eastern District of Michigan, for entering on tbe premises of Leroux and removing goods claimed by tbe assignee to be the property of tbe bankrupt, and to quiet tbe title to said goods in the assignee.

Held: that there was no such proof of fault on the part of the railroad corporation, in the construction and arrangement of the switch, as would support an action against it for the injury.

Held: was not entitled to file such a bill, for he could bring his action of ejectment, and-.thus had his remedy at law ;• although such a bill would be entertained jif not objected to, or if there were any impediments to the proper trial of the merits on such an action. Bootle v. Blundell, 19 Ves. Jr. Ch. R. 494.

Held: That B had no rights in the premises as against innocent bona fide encumbrancers and purchasers without notice of her claim. 2. That the joint occupation of the premises by A and B, under the eircumstances, was no constructive notice of B's claim of right. 3.

United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513 (1883), is an important decision by the United States Supreme Court which provides the power to take private property for public uses, in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, to the government of the United States. However, once the government exercises of the right of eminent domain and after a fair determination of the amount of compensation, any unforeseen damage to the property as a result of activities prior to the purchase but realized only afterwards is to be compensated by the government per any legislative decree.

at,t. : nr error to the circuit court of the united states for . THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. Suits (commenced in the Supreme Court of the State of New York and removed to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York), by holders of mortgage bonds of the Canada Southern Railway Company, and of extension bonds, to recover on their extension bonds and on the interest coupons: on their mortgage bonds.

<p>Mineral Lands — Pleading—Statutes.</p> <p>A demurrer admits all facts well pleaded.</p> <p>Tnder the Colorado Code of Civil Procedure, as at common law, facts may be pleaded according to their legal effect, without setting out the particulars that lead to it; and necessary circulnstances implied by law need not be • expressed in the plea.</p> <p>In an action by the patentee of a placer claim to recover possession of a vein or lode within its boundaries, an answer alleging that the vein or lode was known to the patentee to exist at the time of applying for the patent, and was not included in his application, well pleads the fact which, under § 2333 of the Revised Statutes, precludes him from having any right of possession of the vein or lode.</p>

Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that followed the death of one member of a Native American tribe at the hands of another on reservation land. Crow Dog was a member of the Brulé band of the Lakota Sioux. On August 5, 1881 he shot and killed Spotted Tail, a Lakota chief; there are different accounts of the background to the killing. The tribal council dealt with the incident according to Sioux tradition, and Crow Dog paid restitution to the dead man's family. However, the U.S. authorities then prosecuted Crow Dog for murder in a federal court. He was found guilty and sentenced to hang.

Held: that the certificate must stand against a mere conflict of evidence as to whether she willingly signed, sealed, and delivered the deed, or had its contents explained to her by the officer, or was examined privily and apart from her husband ; and that even if it be only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, it cannot be impeached, in respect to those facts, except upon proof which clearly and fully shows…

Held: that said proceedings, properly pleaded and verified, superseded the actions in other courts, and that it was error to proceed further therein. 5. , Action in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts by the Hill Manufacturing Company, a corporation established under the laws of Maine, having a place of business in Boston, against the Providence & New York Steamship Company, a corporar tion established by the laws…

Held: that the defendants were not estopped from setting up an adverse superior title. . Suit to recover possession of 'a tract of land in the city of Washington. Mr. J. G. Bigelow for the plaintiffs in error. Mr. Samuel B. Paul for the defendants in error.

Suit to recover the price of a'wall built by the appellant around the National Cemetery, at Eort Harrison, Yirginia. The plaintiff contracted to construct the wall by a written agreement, of-which the following were the material parts: First, That the said A. W. Sweeney shall build a wall of brick at the National Military Cemetery at Fort Harrison, Yirginia, according to the plans and sDecifications attached to this contract. ... Fourth.

<p>Appeals — Kansas—Mandamus—Municipal Corporations — Statutes.</p> <p>A recovered judgment June 11th, 1881, against a.township in Cherokee County, Kansas, on bonds issued in payment of a subscription by the township to stock in a railway company. The township had no trustee then -or since. An alternative writ of mandamus having been sued out to compel the board of county commissioners for the county to levy a tax sufficient' to pay the judgment, and to compel the county clerk to extend the tax when levied, and to compel the county treasurer to collect it when extended, and to pay it to A when collected, judgment was entered for a peremptory writ in accordance therewith. On appeal by the county commissioners, Meld :</p> <p>1. That by the statutes of Kansas which were in force at that, time, it was made the duty of the board of county commissioners of Cherokee county in consequence of the vacancy in the office of trustee of the township, to levy a tax sufficient to pay the judgment recovered by A.</p> <p>12. That the alternative writ of mandamus was not issu.ed prematurely.</p> <p>8. That the clerk and treasurer having taken no appeal, the writ .of error brought up for review only the objections óf the board of commissioners.</p>

<p>IN error to the circuit court oe the united states eor THE DISTRICT OE KANSAS.</p>

Held: in the case of The Eagle, ubi supra, that all of the provisions of § 9 of the Judiciary Act of September 24th, 1789,-ch. 20, 1 Stat. 77 , which conferred admiralty and maritime jurisdiction upon the district courts were inoperative, except the 'simple clause giving to them “ exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” That decision is carried out by the enactment in §…

Held: that, in view of the state of the art, there was no invention in making the length and size of the valve opening greater or less in a reed-board of a given width, or where the reed-board was made wider or narrower, or had more or less sets of reeds in it, either full or partial'; and that the vibrating ends of the lowest and longest reeds in such prior organ were as near together as they were in the reed-boards of…

<p>APPEAL PROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND.</p>

<p>APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.</p>

<p>■Administration — Claims against the United States — Conflict of Jurisdiction— District of Columbia — Mandamus—Treasurer of the United States.</p> <p>For the purpose of founding administration, a simple contract debt is assets where the debtor resides, even if a bill of exchange or promissory note has been given for it, and without regard to the place where the bill or note is found or payable.</p> <p>Debts due from the United States are not local assets at the seat of government only.</p> <p>The treasurer of the United States cannot be compelled by writ of mandamus to pay to an administrator, appointed in the District of Columbia, of an inhabitant of one of the States of the Union, the amount of a draft payable to the intestate at the treasury out of an appropriation made by Congress, and held by such administrator.</p>

Action on a written contract to recover a commission agreed to be paid to the plaintiffs in tbe State court who are defendants here, for collecting a “ claim arising out of the capture of the ship Commonweath and her cargo by the armed rebel cruiser The Florida.” Judgment was rendered for plaintiffs. Defendants then brought the cause here by writ of error.

Bill in -equity to foreclose a'mortgage. The . suit was commenced in a State court, and was removed to the Circuit Court of the United States, where a foreclosure and sale were decreed. The defendants below appealed.

Held: That this raised a federal question sufficiently to lay the foundation for removing the cause from a State court to the Circuit Court of the United States. Mr. William, I. Royal and Mr. Wager Swayne for plaintiff in error.

Held: That the United States, as owners in fee of Water street in the city of Washington, were in the enjoyment of all the rights which were attached to that property by this compact and by this legislation, or which belonged or appertained to it , by virtue of general principles of law relating to riparian rights.

The following statement of the case was prepared by the court to precede its opinion.

Held: used, and enjoyed by him, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns forever, with the hope and trust, however, that he will not diminish the same to a greater extent than may be necessary for his comfortable support and maintenance, and that, at his death, the same, or so much thereof as he shall not have disposed of by devise or sale, shall descend to my three beloved nieces P. E. C., G-.