Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

11 Ala. 370

Pearson v. Howe

Supreme Court of Alabama

Decided January 15, 1847

Supreme Court of Alabama · decided 1847-01-15

Assumpsit by the defendant in error, as indorsee, against the plaintiff as acceptor of a bill of exchange. Upon the trial, the plaintiff produced the bill described in the declaration, accepted by Child, Hibler & Pearson, and proved, that the latter was a member of the firm, doing business in Mobile as commission merchants, at the time of the acceptance, and that some commission merchants were there in the habit of accepting bills for their customers.

Relies on Thompson v. Armstrong · Hibbler v. De Forest

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1847-01-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently April 2016

3 state decisions

10184718501860187018801890190019101920193019401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

ORMOND, J.

¶1The point attempted to be raised, upon the refusal of the court to permit the contents of certain advertisements and handbills to be proved, is not presented in such a manner, that the action of'the primary, court can be here reviewed. It is not stated what the advertisements and handbills contained, and without a knowledge of this fact, it is manifest it cannot be known whether the court acted cor*374rectly or not in rejecting them. For any thing shown in the bill of exceptions, the action of the court may have been strictly correct; we certainly cannot be expected to presume that it is not.

¶2The admission of the testimony to prove a custom in Mobile, that commission merchants were in the habit of accepting bills for their customers, may have been insufficient to prove a custom; but this, if an error, could not possibly prejudice the defendant, as such a power was inferrible as matter of law, from the nature of the partnership, as was held in reference to this firm in Hibler & Pearson v. De Forrest, Morris & Wilkins, 6 Ala. 92.

¶3When suspicion is cast upon a mercantile security, by proof that it was made without consideration, or has been fraudulently or improperly put into circulation, the holder, before he can recover, must prove that he gave value for it, and acquired it before it was dishonored. [Marston v. Forward, 5 Ala. R. 347; Thompson v. Armstrong, 7 Ala. 256; Heath v. Sansom & Evans, 2 Barn. & Al. 291.] That proof is very satisfactorily made in this cause, as it is shown to have been an arrangement between the drawee, and Child, one of the firm, to pay the private debt of Child with the effects of the firm in which he was a partner, without the knowledge or consent of his co-partners. But it is equally certain from the proof, that Field furnished his goods upon the faith of this acceptance, and without any knowledge of the improper conduct of Child, or of any fact calculated to put him on inquiry as to the character of the acceptance. He is therefore an innocent holder for value, and it results necessarily, that he imparted all his rights to the plaintiff, by his endorsement of the note to him. It is therefore unimportant to inquire in this case, as to the presumption from a blank indorsement, of the time when it was made.

¶4This is decisive of the entire case, and although some of the charges of the court may not be critically accurate, the defendant was not prejudiced thereby, as the court would have been justified in telling the jury, that upon the defendant’s evidénce, in connection with the note and indorsement, the plaintiff was entitled to recover.

¶5Let the judgment be affirmed.

/11/ala/370 · .json · Public domain