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← 11 Ariz. App. 547 - Zelman v. Stauder

11 Ariz. App. 547 - Zelman v. Stauder’s Empirical Analysis

1970

Citation profile

31
cited by 31 later decisions
2
states following
September 2023
most recently cited

2 district · 28 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 31 later decisions — most recently September 2023 · most notably Maxwell v. Aetna Life Insurance (1984), Gibson v. Boyle (1983)

2 district · 28 state decisions

160197019801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on McDowell v. Davis · Herzberg v. White · Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co. v. Conwell · Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. Cornum · 1 Ariz. App. 510 - City of Phoenix v. Schroeder

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “A review of the Arizona cases reveals that their holdings are consistent with the position taken by Restatement (Second) of Torts, that where defendant's negligent course of conduct (as distinguished from the risk of harm created) actively continues up to the time the injury is sustained, then any outside force which is also a substantial factor in bringing about the injury is a concurrent cause of the injury and never an "intervening" force. Worthington v. Funk, 7 Ariz. App. 595 , 442 P.2d 153 (1968); Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 439 (1965). On the other hand, where the defendant's negligent course of conduct has terminated and only the risk of harm created by his prior negligent conduct is present at the time of injury then any outside force which is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury may be referred to as an intervening force. This distinction has variously been referred to in terms of "dynamic-static" negligence and "active-passive" negligence. Salt River Valley Water Users' Association v. Cornum, supra [ 49 Ariz. 1 , 63 P.2d 639 ]; Herzberg v. White, supra [ 49 Ariz. 313 , 66 P.2d 253 ]; Molloy, Jury Instructions in Negligence Cases, 6 Ariz.L.Rev. 27, 32 (1964). This conceptual distinction is more than one of semantics for the question of "superseding cause" arises only where the facts disclose that an intervening force is present. Thus, if under the facts of a case the outside force was a concurrent cause of the injury, the issue of "superseding cau”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““ * * * Where defendants’ negligent course of conduct (as distinguished from the risk of harm created) actively continues up to the time the injury is sustained, then any outside force which is also a substantial factor in bringing about the injury is a concurrent cause of the injury and never an ‘intervening’ force. Worthington v. Funk, 7 Ariz. App. 595 , 442 P.2d 153 (1968); Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 439 (1965).” Zelman v. Stauder, 11 Ariz. App. 547, 550 , 466 P.2d 766, 769 (1970).”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “[I]t is highly prejudicial and improper to read statutes to the jury which have been expressly held not applicable by the trial court____ To disregard the trial court’s ruling and read to the jury the stricken statute cannot be condoned.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.