Williams v. Poulos’s Empirical Analysis
11 F.3d 271 · 1993
Citation profile
80 federal appellate · 30 district · 14 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 156 later decisions — most recently June 2021 · most notably Forsyth v. Barr (1994), Data General Corporation v. Grumman Systems Support Corporation (1994)
80 federal appellate · 30 district · 14 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986)
Relies on Anderson v. City of Bessemer City · City of Los Angeles v. Lyons · United States v. Calandra · Nix v. Williams · Beacon Theaters Inc v. C Westover
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 156 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“a strong, unyielding belief that a mistake has been made.”
6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State.”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Insofar as the parties are challenging determinations made by the [lower] court prior to and in conjunction with the bench trial, our standard of review is familiar. Claimed errors of law are, of course, reviewed de novo.... Findings of fact, however, will not be set aside unless they are demonstrated to be clearly erroneous.... The clearly erro neous standard also ordinarily applies when we review a trial court’s resolution of mixed questions of law and fact.... In such situations, however, we are obligated to determine whether the court’s resolution was infected by legal error .... And, “ ‘if a trial court bases its findings upon a mistaken impression of applicable legal principles, the reviewing court is not bound by the clearly erroneous standard.’ ” .... In a recent case, we explained our review standard for mixed questions in a slightly different manner: “The standard of review applicable to mixed questions usually depends upon where they fall along [a] degree-of-deference continuum: the more fact dominated the question, the more likely it is that the trier’s resolution will be accepted unless shown to be clearly erroneous.””
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.