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11 F.3d 914

Docket No. 92-36906.

Brown v. Maass

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Argued and Submitted Nov. 4, 1993.

Decided Dec. 10, 1993.

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1993-12-10

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“the appropriate time to assess whether a prisoner has exhausted his state remedies is when the federal habeas petition is filed, not when it comes on for a hearing in the district court or court of appeals.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Burnsworth v. Lewis, Peter Gatlin v. Mk Madding Attorney General of the State of California

“the interests of comity and federalism would be better served”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Gary St. Hilaire v. Samuel A. Lewis, Director, Attorney General of the State of Arizona Maricopa County Sheriff's Office

Relies on Granberry v. Greer · Domaingue v. Butterworth · Francis v. Rison

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1993-12-10

How this case has been cited

Cited by 33 later decisions — most recently June 2011 · most notably Windham v. Merkle (1998), Bland v. California Department of Corrections (1994)

20 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

230199320002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Christopher J. Schatz, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Portland, OR, for petitioner-appellant.

¶2Ann Kelley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, OR, and David Lynn Larsen, Dept, of Justice Admin., Salem, OR, for respondent-appellee.

¶3Before: REINHARDT, BRUNETTI and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

¶4PER CURIAM:

¶5Kenneth William Brown, an Oregon state prisoner, appeals the dismissal of his federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court dismissed Brown’s petition because he had procedurally defaulted on his state court remedies by failing to present his federal claims to the Oregon Supreme Court for review. We reverse.

¶6Brown filed his federal habeas petition on January 24,1990. As of that date, he had not exhausted his state remedies. He could have filed a timely petition for review of his federal claims on January 24, and he could have requested an extension of time to file his petition for review at any time before the Oregon Court of Appeals Judgment against him became final on March 14, 1990. Since Brown had available state court remedies at the time he filed his federal habeas petition, the proper ground for dismissing the petition was failure to exhaust, not procedural default. See Matias v. Oshiro, 683 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir.1982). The state, however, did not raise the failure to exhaust defense in the district court.

¶7We have held that a state waives a procedural default when it fails to raise it in federal court and instead relies erroneously on a claim of failure to exhaust state remedies. Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir.1990). We see no reason to treat the reverse situation differently. By failing to raise it in the district court, Oregon waived its failure to exhaust defense to Brown’s federal habeas petition. Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134, 107 S.Ct. 1671, 1675, 95 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987). The state has shown no exceptional circumstance that prevented it from raising that defense. Nor do we see how the interests of comity and federalism would be better served by requiring that the Oregon Supreme Court now be asked to address the merits of Brown’s claim before it is heard in a federal court. Id.; see also Snyder v. Summer, 960 F.2d 1448, 1454 n. 3 (9th Cir.1992). Since the district court erred in finding that Brown procedurally defaulted on his federal claims, its order dismissing the petition must be reversed and *915the case must be remanded for resolution on the merits.

¶8We also find no merit in the argument that procedural default was an appropriate finding because of Brown’s later failure to pursue his state remedies. The appropriate time to assess whether a prisoner has exhausted his state remedies is when the federal habeas petition is filed, not when it comes on for a hearing in the district court or court of appeals. See White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir.1989); Matias, 683 F.2d at 321; accord Domaingue v. Butterworth, 641 F.2d 8, 14 (1st Cir.1981). Brown had not exhausted his state remedies when he filed his federal habeas petition. He could not have been in procedural default at that time.

¶9REVERSED and REMANDED.

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