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11 Ill. 85

Mason v. Piggott

Illinois Supreme Court

Decided December 15, 1849

Illinois Supreme Court · decided 1849-12-15

Bill in Chancery.—Upon the 17th day of May, A. D. 1849, the complainant filed his bill in the Jersey county Circuit Court, averring, that, on the 27th day of May, 1836, he made a contract (which is made an exhibit, marked u A35) with the defendants, for the purchase of certain real estate in the town of Grafton; that, at the time said contract was made, the spirit of wild speculation was at its zenith, and prices of real estate were ruinously high; that, at the time the…

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““As a general principle, in all cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunal which first obtains jurisdiction, of the subject-matter must proceed and finally dispose of it” Mason v. Piggott, 11 Ill. 88 .”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Foster v. Bank of Abingdon

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1849-12-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 15 later decisions — most recently October 1946

14 state decisions

6018491850186018701880189019001910192019301940decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Opinion by Treat, C. J.:

¶1We have no doubt about this case. It was decided in Mason vs. Wait, 4 Scammon, 127, that the sale of the Grafton lots was not binding on the ward; and that a purchaser might set up in defence of an action on the notes the inability of the guardian to convey a good title. It was held in Mason vs. Caldwell, 5 Gilman, 196, that it was competent for the ward, after she arrived at full age, and before a purchaser had avoided the contract by an offer to surrender the title bond, connected with a demand for the return of the notes, to adopt the contract, by executing and tendering a deed that would pass a good title, and demanding payment of the notes. It results from these decisions that a purchaser can defeat a recovery on the notes, on the ground of a failure of consideration, where the ward has done nothing to confirm the contract; or he may put an end to the contract by affirmative acts on his part, and thereby prevent the ward from ratifying and enforcing it. The complainant has, therefore, a complete defence to the action on the notes, unless there was a ratification of the contract on the part of the ward, prior to the commencement of the suit. Instead of making it in that action, he seeks to transfer the case to chancery; not because the defence cannot be successfully made at law, but on the ground that a Court of Equity has concurrent jurisdiction. It by no means follows becausé a Court of Equity has concurrent jurisdiction with a Court of law, that it will take cognizance of a case already pending in a Court of law, and oust it of jurisdiction. As a general principle, in all cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunal which first obtains jurisdiction of the subject matter, must proceed and finally dispose of it. A Court of Equity will not take jurisdiction where it has first been acquired by a Court of law, unless there is some equitable circumstance in the case which the party cannot avail himself of at law. Subject to this qualification, the rule is inflexible. Smith vs. McIver, 9 Wheaton, 532; Merrill vs. Lake, 16 Ohio, 373; Flournoy vs. Halcomb, 2 Munford, 34; Green vs. Robinson, 5 Howard’s Miss. R., 80. The allegations of the bill, if true, show that the complainant has a full and adequate defence at law, and he must there interpose it. No circumstance is alleged that demands the interference of a Court of Equity.

¶2The decree of the Circuit Court will be reversed, with costs, and the bill dismissed.

¶3Judgment reversed.

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