¶1specially concurring:
¶2My reluctant concurrence in the above case stems from the fact that, as stated in the case of Franklin v. Wellco Co., 5 Ill.App.3d 731, 283 N.E.2d 913, “The statute states that reasonable attorney’s fees shall be taxed when the employer refuses to pay the award.” I recognize that a deliberate delay may amount to refusal and that this becomes essentially a question of fact for determination by the circuit court as a trier of fact. I believe it is necessary, however, to emphasize that not every delay in and of itself could be construed to amount to a refusal to pay. A good faith delay would certainly not fall into this category. This cause is determined on the basis that the circuit court found that the delay was tantamount to a refusal. It does not mean, and should not mean, that any delay should be a basis for a finding that penalties invoked for vexatious delays and refusals to pay are available in all cases where payment is not made precisely in accordance with statutory provisions.