11 Md. App. 694 - Dawson v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1971
Citation profile
65 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 66 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently February 2008 · most notably Franks v. Delaware (1978), 24 Md. App. 128 - Andresen v. State (1975)
65 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Aguilar v. Texas · Spinelli v. United States · Jones v. United States · United States v. Ventresca · Johnson v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 66 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"[I]n dealing with a named source, the very naming of the source and the relationship of the source to the observed information may go a long way (or even be sufficient unto itself), under the facts of a particular case, to establish the credibility of that source or the reliability of his information. Kapler v. State, 194 Md. 580 ; Ward v. State, 9 Md.App. 583, 591-592 ; Grimm v. State, 6 Md.App. 321, 328 . See also Taylor v. State, 238 Md. 424 ; Jones v. State, 242 Md. 95 ; Knight v. State, 7 Md.App. 282 .””
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“"In determining the existence vel non of probable cause, the magistrate must make two distinct determinations. The number and the nature of these determinations do not vary, whether the specimen being analyzed is direct observation or hearsay information. He must: "(1) Evaluate the truthfulness of the source of the information; and "(2) Evaluate the adequacy of the factual premises furnished by that source to support the validity of the source's conclusion. "In the first instance, he is judging the integrity of a person. In the second instance, he is judging the logic of a proposition. These functions are distinct. They are the direct analogues of those other two functions performed by the ultimate finder of fact who 1) assesses the credibility of a witness and 2) then assesses the weight to be given the testimony of that witness.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“"If the informant himself is offering not direct observation but hearsay twice compounded, the entire evaluation process must begin again at a second level of remoteness. The primary informant must then pass along sufficient data in sufficient detail so that the magistrate may again judge for himself 1) the credibility of the secondary informant and 2) the worth of that secondary informant’s information. If, in some extreme hypothetical situation, the secondary informant should be a mere conduit for hearsay thrice compounded from a tertiary informant, the evaluation process is escalated to yet another level of remoteness and so on ad infinitum. Spinelli , at 416 (majority opinion by Harlan, J.) and 423-425 (concurring opinion by White, J.). Ultimately, the magistrate must have the benefit of someone’s first-hand observation in order to evaluate the worth of the information and must have also satisfactory proof of the credibility of every person involved in the chain of transmission of the information from the initial observer to the magistrate himself.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.