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11 N.Y. 177

Fassett v. Dorr

New York Supreme Court

Decided March 15, 1834

New York Supreme Court · decided 1834-03-15

The declaration was served in this case, on the eighth day of August, 1833. On the sixteenth, the defendant obtained an order for a bill of particulars, or that the plaintiff show cause on the twenty-fourth- of August, and that in the mean time all proceedings stay. On the day appointed, the plaintiff’s attorney appeared before the judge to show cause ; no one appeared for the defendant, and no peremptory order for a bill of particulars was granted.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1834-03-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently March 1930

4 state decisions

2018341840185018601870188018901900191019201930decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1By the Court,

Savage, Ch. J.

¶2So far as the defendant relies on irregularity, he fails. The order of the sixteenth of August, to stay proceedings, was spent the twenty fourth, as it was not continued by a peremptory order. Andrews v. Cleveland, 3 Wendell, 437. It is true that the peremptory order need not be served for any purpose but to non-pros the plaintiff, but still it must be obtained ; the defendant must show that he is in earnest in his application for the bill of particulars; *and that it is not made merely for delay. Here the plaintiff attended before the judge prepared to show cause, but no application was made for a peremptory order. The case of Rowan v. Merritt, 9 Wendell, 443, does not conflict with Andrews v. Cleveland. The court say, in Rowan v. Merritt, that the portion of the original order, staying proceedings, is operative until the delivery of the bill of particulars, provided a peremptory order be granted ; a peremptory order was obtained, in that case although it was not served. Here no such order was obtained, and consequently the original order ceased on the twenty fourth to be a stay. The defendant is, however, entitled to relief on the merits. The chief justice acccordingly directed a rule to be entered, permiting the defendant to plead on terms.

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