Capshaw v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “is not fatal unless the defendant could not have anticipated from the [information] what evidence would be presented at trial or unless the conviction based on an [information] would not bar a subsequent prosecution.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. HULSY v. State · Rawle v. State

2. “Finally, we offer this additional suggestion for the trial courts so as to deter similar potentially fatal errors from occurring in future cases. © As noted above, as a general rule, admission of evidence that a codefendant or conspirator has pleaded guilty or been found guilty is not admissible in the trial of another codefendant or conspirator. If such evidence is introduced by the prosecution, it is error. Recently, we were compelled to reverse a conviction on these very grounds because the prosecution improperly used evidence of guilty pleas by co-defendants. Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 581, 585-541 (Wyo.2000). If no objection is interposed by the defense, we will review such an error under the plain error standard. Likewise, if an objection is made, the error is subject to review for harmless error. In either event, a clear and comprehensive instruction to the jury (whether requested by the defense or given by the trial court sua sponte) may have a salutary effect in either a plain error analysis or a harmless error analysis. Trial courts should be alert to this potential pitfall when a code-fendant or conspirator is called as a witness for the prosecution under cireum-stances similar to the instant case. The prosecution should be cautioned about introducing the subject of a guilty plea or conviction into another defendant's trial, and the trial court should be alert to properly instruct the jury to disregard any such testimony should it be called to the jury's attention. ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Williams v. State

3. “We have long held that “when two persons are indicted for separate offenses growing out of the same circumstances, the fact that one has pleaded guilty is inadmissible against the other.” Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Wyo.1979). The vitality of this rule is amply demonstrated by Kwallek . There, when a contemporaneous objection was lodged with respect to a conspirator’s testimony, this Court had no difficulty holding that admission of that guilty plea evidence constituted prejudicial error presaging reversal of Mr. Kwallek’s conviction and remand for a new trial. Kwallek, 596 P.2d at 1376 . As Capshaw points out, Mr. Justice Jackson clearly explained the basis for this unequivocal rule: It is difficult for the individual to make his own ease stand on its own merits in the minds of jurors who are ready to believe that birds of a feather are flocked together. If he is silent, he is taken to admit it and if, as often happens, co-defendants can be prodded into accusing or contradicting each other, they convict each other. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 454 , 69 S.Ct. 716, 723 , 93 L.Ed. 790, 800 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in judgment and opinion). In short, there can be no doubt that the appellant’s right to a fair trial embraces his right not to be convicted, in whole or in part, upon the guilty pleas of his conspirators. Ross v. State, 930 P.2d 965, 968 (Wyo.1996).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hall v. State