¶1On September 5, 1990, after a nonjury triál following defendant’s appeal from his summary criminal conviction, we found defendant guilty of a violation of section 1543(b) of the Vehicle Code.
¶2Defendant argues that exhibit C-l was insufficiently proven to be the driving record applicable to this defendant. Defendant’s sole argument in that regard is that the exhibit lists an address in Exton, Pennsylvania and the citation lists an address in Malvern, Pennsylvania.
¶3*282The second point raised by defendant in his motion in arrest of judgment is that at the time of the offense in this case his driving privileges were under suspension for reasons other than the violations of Vehicle Code section 3731. That suspension does not come into effect until January 6, 2001. Therefore, defendant argues, subsection (b) of Vehicle Code section 1543 is not applicable. This precise issue has been addressed in the cases of Commonwealth v. Nuno, 385 Pa. Super. 6, 559 A.2d 949 (1989), and Commonwealth v. Yetsick, 402 Pa. Super. 615, 587 A.2d 788 (1991).
¶4“[T]his issue is governed by Commonwealth v. Nuno, 385 Pa. Super. 6, 559 A.2d 949 (1989), which held that an actor is subject to the penalties of section 1543(b) throughout any current suspension or revocation, whether DUI-related or not, if a DUI-related suspension or revocation has been imposed to begin at a future date. As the Nunocourt stated:
¶5“ ‘We hold that when a person receives notice that their operating privilege is or will be suspended or revoked for a DUI-related offense, that person is subject to the penalties of section 1543(b). That person will be subject to the penalties of section 1543(b) throughout any current suspension or revocation and any subsequent suspensions or revoca-r tions until the end of their DUI-related suspension or revocation.’ Id. at 9, 559 A.2d at 951.” Yetsick, supra.
¶6For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s post-trial motions must be denied and we therefore enter the following
¶7ORDER
¶8And now, June 25, 1991, upon consideration of defendant’s motion in arrest of judgment, defendant’s motion is denied. The court administrator is directed to schedule this matter for sentencing on the first available date.
¶9. “Any person who drives a motor vehicle on any highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth at a time when their [sic] operating privilege is suspended or revoked as a condition of acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition for a violation of section 3731 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) or because of a violation of section 1547(b)(1) (relating to suspension for refusal) or 3731 shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a summary offense and shall be sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 and to undergo imprisonment for a period of not less than 90 days.”
¶10. In this case we have no difficulty in finding that the driving record in question was proved beyond a reasonable doubt to be that of the defendant. But even if that were not so, it is questionable if defendant could use the allegedly incorrect address as any defense, since it is defendant’s obligation to keep PennDOT informed of his correct address. See Commonwealth v. Heckman, 404 Pa. Super. 335, 590 A.2d 1261 (1991).
¶11. Although not contained in the motion in arrest of judgment, in oral argument at the close of trial, before the verdict was rendered, defendant also made mention of the necessity of proving that defendant had actual notice of his suspension. See Commonwealth v. Kane, 460 Pa. 582, 333 A.2d 925 (1985). Counsel presumably concluded that there were sufficient additional factors in this case to permit the finding that defendant had actual notice of his suspension and, therefore, this issue was not raised in the post-trial motions. However, we note that in the Kanecase the only proof that the defendant had actual notice of his suspension was the statement in the defendant’s driving record that a notice of suspension had been mailed to the defendant. In this case defendant’s driving record does indeed contain that same information, indicating that official notice of the revocation of this defendant’s driving privileges for a violation of section 3731 of the Vehicle Code was mailed to the defendant July 14, 1988. However, in this case there is considerable additional evidence that appellant received notice of this suspension. “When notice is mailed to the [defendant] and additional evidence exists indicating that [defendant] received notice of suspension, then the evidence can be sufficient to prove actual notice.” Commonwealth v. Gray, 356 Pa. Super. 299, 514 A.2d 621 (1986) (emphasis supplied), citing Commonwealth v. Burkett, 300 Pa. Super. 72, 445 A.2d 1304 (1982). Among other things, at the time this defendant was stopped for this particular offense, he acknowledged to the arresting officer that his driver’s license was under suspension. Furthermore, Mr. Marrón was specifically aware of the suspension for a violation of Vehicle Code section 3731 because he stated to the arresting officer that the DUI-related suspension would not come into effect for several years, apparently anticipating the second point raised on behalf of defendant in these post-trial motions. *282Whatever the legal effect might be of the fact that the DUI-related suspension is not scheduled to go into effect until the year 2001, defendant’s statement is more than sufficient to prove that he had actual notice of the status of his driving record at the time he was operating a motor vehicle on November 21, 1989.
¶12. Although judgment of sentence was vacated in this case, it was for an error in sentencing procedures only and the conviction itself was upheld.