Volume 11 — South Carolina Reports

Before Reed, J., Charleston, March, 1875. Stephen Shrewsbury died in 1815, leaving of force a last will, which was admitted to probate in the same year. That clause of his will which the court construes in this case, is set out in full in the Circuit decree and again in the opinion of the Chief J ustice.

Before Ellis G. Graydon, Esq., Presiding Judge by special appointment, Abbeville, September Term, 1877. John M. Mackay, Sr., of New York, contracted with James N. Cochran for the purchase of some lands and mills in Abbe-ville county, for the price of $14,250, part of which ivas paid in -cash and balance secured by bond and mortgage.

Before Northrop, J., Newberry, October, 1876. By order of tbe Court of Common Pleas for Newberry county, all issues in this cause were referred to Thomas Thomson, Esq., whose report fully states all the facts of the case. It is as follows: Daniel Hughey, late of tbe county of Newberry, died intestate on September 22d, 1868.

<p>Before Mackey, J., at Chester, September Term, 1876.</p> <p>The allegations of the complaint and answers are sufficiently set forth in the opinion of the court. The deed is an indenture, and recites as follows:</p> <p>“Witnesseth: That the said Mary F. Davie, party of the first part, for and in consideration of the natural love and affection that she bears to her nephew, Churchill B. Jones, and Sarah, his wife, and their children,” naming them, “ and for and in consideration of the sum of five dollars to her in hand paid by the said Frederick E. Fraser, party of the second part aforesaid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, hath this day bargained, sold, &c., * * * to have and to hold the said bargained premises unto the said Frederick E. Fraser, his heirs, executors and administrators, upon the following trusts and conditions: In trust for the use of the said Churchill B. Jones and Sarah, his wife,” &c. The deed concludes in due form and is signed by Mary F. Davie, and Frederick E. Fraser, whose seals are annexed to their respective signatures, in presence of two subscribing witnesses, one of whom makes probate in usual form of the signing, sealing and delivery of the deed.</p> <p>Frederick E. Fraser testified that he was a nephew of Mrs. Mary F. Davie, and had been her general business agent since 1850; Mary F. Davie held a judgment against C. B. Jones for $4285.74, which, with interest, amounted in January, 1869, to about $6300; said Jones proposed in 1868 to compromise said debt by paying $500 in cash, and $1000 in one, two and three years, with interest at eighteen per centum per annum, to be secured by a mortgage of two tracts of land which he had purchased a year before, and which were included in the trust deed to me ;■ Jones had deeds executed by the sheriff of Chester county to Mrs. Davie for these two tracts, paid her $500 in cash, and Mrs. Davie reconveyed the two tracts to me in trust for said Jones and his wife and children; according to my understanding this deed was not to take effect until the balance of $1000 and interest was paid ; Jones has paid Mrs. D. nothing but the $500; in November, 1873, she purchased through her attorney, Maj. S. P. Hamilton, under an execution in favor of C. B. Jones, a tract of land, which, after paying costs, left a credit to Jones of $701.40, which was applied to Mrs. Dfs judgment against Jones ; Jones had a credit entered on her judgment against him for $2475, purchase money of two tracts of land covered by deed of trust, leaving about $4878- still due Mrs. Davie; as soon as trust deed was executed it was sent to either Jones or Maj. Hamilton ; the existence of the deed had passed entirely out of my mind until reminded of it by Maj. Hamilton, who in 1874 found it among his papers, and handed it to me; the deed was not recorded because, as I understood, it was not to be recorded until all the conditions of the compromise had been complied with ; Jones called upon me in 1874 to have the deed recorded; Mrs. D. objected, because Jones had not carried out the terms of his compromise; Jones insisted, and by the advice of my counsel I commenced these proceedings.</p> <p>Cross-examination. — Do not remember whether sheriff’s deed was in possession of or known to Mrs. D. at time of execution of trust deed; did not direct Hamilton in the matter, as he had charge of business as legal adviser of Mrs. D.; trust deed is in Maj. H.’s handwriting, and I paid him $25 for Mrs. D. for professional services in arranging compromise with Mrs. D.; Jones wrote to me early in 1868 proposing compromise, as stated in my direct examination, which. I submitted to Mrs. D., and by her directions placed the matter in Maj. H.’s hands; in February, 1868, I wrote to Jones saying Mrs. D. would accept the offer, but would not assign judgment until the whole amount was paid.</p> <p>Mrs. Mary F. Davie testified as follows: I am seventy-four years old; am aunt of plaintiff, and I married uncle of C. B. Jones; am no relation to any of the other parties; I executed a •deed in 1869 to F. E. Fraser in trust for C. B. Jones and his family; Jones then owed me about $6000 by judgment; he desired to compromise it on the following terms : $1500 — $500 •cash and $1000 in one and two years ; I agreed to the compromise, and he paid the first $500, but has never paid anything since; this was the consideration of said deed; he now owes me about $5000 ; I never knew that Jones had bid in land for me and credited the bid on my judgment; I never authorized him to do so; Jones never informed me that he had done so; plaintiff has been my business agent since 1850.</p> <p>Cross-examination. — I am aunt of Henry D. Fraser and Jane M. Fraser, the witnesses to the trust deed; Mr. Hamilton was my lawyer in Chester, but cannot remember what lawyer represented me in the judgment in my favor against Jones, as F. E. Fraser attended to all these matters for me; I think C. B. Jones was present when trust deed was executed, but am not certain; I know nothing about two deeds from Sheriff Walker — they were never in my possession.</p> <p>S. P. Hamilton, Esq., testified: Was counsel of Mrs. Davie directly after the war; was employed to manage her business here, and particularly her judgment against Jones; was from time to time Jones’ attorney; not much concerned with attempted settlement, but Mr. J. made me acquainted with this matter; J. held judgment against Beckham, under which two tracts of land were sold and purchased by J.; in 1868 the two deeds were put on record; they were given to me by J.; it was agreed between J. and myself that I should give him credit for purchase price of land, $2475; terms of agreement, J. to pay $500 cash and $1000 on some credit; I drew the deed; must have been before September 26th, 1868; balance of $1000 to be paid in one and two years — judgment meantime to remain open ; drew deed under instructions of J.; Fraser gave me no instructions; I sent deed to Mr. F., January 7th, 1869, by letter, by direction of, I think, Mr. J.; Mr. J. returned me the deed with two others ; he directed me to have the other two deeds recorded and not to record trust deed; it lay in my office until this controversy commenced, when J. came to me and said I had it; I had forgotten, but found it; corresponded with Mr. F. in reference to Mrs. D.’s business; informed F. of the terms of the deed; in this I was acting as Mrs. D.’s attorney; did not leave the deed with the clerk; put credit on execution as attorney of Mrs. D.; think J. asked me to give him the deed — told him I thought it belonged to F.; saw F. afterwards in Charleston; said he had forgotten deed — asked me to send it to him to let him look at it; did so; he did not return it.</p> <p>J. M. Brawley, county auditor, testified that since execution of the deeds by the sheriff to Mrs. Davie, J. has returned the two tracts conveyed by those deeds in Mrs. D.’s name, and has paid the taxes upon them as such.</p> <p>C. B. Jones’ answer, by agreement, was received as, evidence; its statements are as follows: That the defendant, C. B. Jones, having bought at sheriff’s sale the lands embraced in the trust deed under an execution in his own favor, at Chester C. H., entered into an arrangement with Mary F. Davie, whereby C. B. J. paid over to said M. F. D. $500 in cash, and assigned the bids for the said land to said M. F. D., so that she, by the agreement and arrangement referred to, could make said trust deed to said plantiff for the uses and purposes therein mentioned, which arrangement was agreed to and carried out by the said M. F. D.; that everything was done that was required between the parties to make the deed perfect, and the deed was understood to be complete and perfect at the time of its execution, and each and every allegation of the complaint to the contrary is untrue; that C. B. J. knows that the said deed was sent to the clerk’s office for Chester county to be there recorded, and if it was not done, it was not on account of anything to be done by him under the agreement referred to between him and M. F. D., but must be OAving to negligence of plaintiff or M. F. D., whose duty it Avas to have the deed recorded; and it Avas intended at the time by all parties to be placed on record, and Avas intended to be recognized as such by M. F. D. and by plaintiff, avIio was trustee, and by all the persons interested in the same.</p> <p>In a letter of Churchill B. Jones to F. E. Fraser, put in evidence by Mrs. Davie, Jones makes the folloAving statement: In the early part of 1868 I proposed to Aunt Davie a compromise, which she consented to — it was as follows: I would pay her $500 cash and $1000 on time — one, two and three years — interest at eighteen per cent.; after this $1500 Avas paid the balance of the claim she held against me she Avas to settle on my family; my business did not call me to Charleston until the early part of 1869; before going to- Charleston I had the sheriff to execute titles to Aunt Davie for the two tracts of land, which I took with me; on my Avay down I requested Hamilton to draw up a trust deed for-the same; he sent it by express to F. E. Fraser; it arrived too late to be executed before I left Charleston; Aunt Davie knew nothing of trust deed lauds at the time of the proposition in 1868; Avhile I Avas in Charleston I showed the trust deeds from the sheriff to Aunt Davie, when the folloAving second and last arrangement Avas entered into; I was to pay Aunt Davie $500 cash; upon doing so. Aunt D. was to sign the trust deed for the same, and F. E. F. was to forward it, with the two sheriff’s deeds, to me to be recorded; and on my paying Aunt D. $1000 more, the same in one, two and three years, with eighteen per cent, interest, Aunt D. would then settle what balance remained on her claim against me on my family in the same way as the trust deed lands ; I paid Aunt D. the $500 and returned home; F. E. F. forwarded to me the two deeds from the sheriff, also the trust deed, signed, witnessed and proven ; the first time I went to Chester I took the three deeds with me to have them recorded; I left them with Hamilton, requesting him to hand them to the clerk to be recorded, which he promised to do; the first time I was at Chester after that, H. informed me that the sheriff’s deeds were recorded but the trust deed was not, and gave the reason why it was not; I then requested him to keep the trust deed until I called for it.</p> <p>In a letter from C. B. Jones to S. P. Hamilton, also put in evidence by Mrs. Davie, Jones says: You informed me * * * that the two sheriff’s deeds were recorded, but the trust deed had been refused record for the lack of revenue stamps; that the law required it should be stamped before it could be recorded, and that I would have to have it done.</p> <p>The Circuit judge, after an elaborate review of the points at issue, decreed as follows: After due consideration of the law, the facts in the premises and of all the equities of the parties complaining and interpleading herein, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed that the deed of trust described in the complaint herein, was duly executed by the defendant, Mary F. Davie, the settlor thereof, and by Frederick E. Fraser, the grantee named therein, and that the said deed was absolutely and unconditionally delivered by the said settlor to the said grantee, and did vest in the said grantee the legal estate in the lands described in the said deed, and did convey to Churchill B. Jones and Sarah, his wife, and the other eestuis que trust therein designated, the equitable title and beneficial interest in the said lands.</p> <p>It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the said deed of trust be forthwith recorded in the office of the register of mesne conveyances in and for the county of Chester.</p> <p>It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the plaintiff, F. E. Fraser, do pay his own costs in this action; and that the defendant, Mary E. Davie, do pay the costs and disbursements of the defendants, C. B. Jones and Sarah, his wife, and their co-defendants, the cestuis que trust interpleading herein.</p> <p>Mary F. Davie and Frederick E. Fraser appealed from this decree to the Supreme Court.</p> <p>The deed purports to be a voluntaiy conveyance — one in consideration of natural love and affection. From the evidence, it docs not appear that Mrs. Davie bears such a relation to the beneficiaries under the deed as would support such a consideration. 2 Black. 297. But if a voluntary deed, equity will not aid Jones and his family, for there is no equity to enforce an imperfect gift. 6 Ves. 662; 18 Ves. 140; 1 Fonb. Eq.2>4B. See same doctrine recognized in 2 Desaus. 191; 3 Desaus. 1; and in 1 Johns. Ch. 336. Voluntary agreement will not be completed or assisted by a court of equity in cases of mere gift; if anything be wanting to complete the title of the donee, a court of equity will not assist him in obtaining it. 4 De G., F. & J. 263, 519; 2 Molloy 257.</p> <p>But this was not a voluntary deed; there was a consideration different from that expressed in its recital, which may be proven. 7 Bro. R. C. 74; 3 T. R. 474; 3 Ad. & El. 649; May’s note to § 26, 13i/i ed. of Greenl. Eh.; 2 Tau/nt. 141; 5 Barn. & Aid. 606; 18 Fes. 483; 1 Atk. 352; 2ÍM404; 1 McC. 514; Riley Eq. 131; Best on Eh. (Am. ed., 1875,) 398, note; Sug. on V & R. 153, note; Whart. on Ev., § 1048; 12 Eng. R. 236, note; 16 Wend. 460; 5 Barb. 455.</p> <p>Mrs. Davie is not bound by compromise which she, ten years ago, generously agreed to, but of which Jones did not avail himself, and has put her to all this litigation. 2 Strob. 20; 3 Strob. 25.</p> <p>Mrs. Jones and her children cannot take free from the agreement of Jones and unaffected by his conduct in the matter. 4 Mar. 222; L. B., 8 Ch. App. 383; 5 Eng. B. 607.</p> <p>As to the delivery of the deed. It may be shown that the deed was, in fact, not executed, or that its execution ivas only conditional. Whart. on Ev., §§ 927, 930, 1054; 24 W. B. 159, 33 L. T. 672; 4 Barn. & Aid. 440; ’2 Barn. & Or. 82; 5 Barn. & Or. 671; 11 M. & W. 128.</p> <p>We are met by the technical rule that a deed delivered to a party in interest cannot be considered as escrow. But the deed was in Hamilton’s hands, Mrs. Davis’ agent, and the testimony shows was put there by agreement of all parties.</p> <p>If sealed instruments are sacred, is it not upon the principle of estoppel — a principle not favored at law ? 5 Barn. & Aid. 606. But deed was drawn under Jones’ directions, and if she is thereby estopped, he is still more estopped by his sworn returns to the auditor that the land belonged to Mrs. Davie.</p> <p>Fraser is not liable for the costs of the action. Perry on Trusts, §§ 433, 892; 5 Be G., M. & G. 258; 1 McO. 251. An appeal relating to costs alone will not be sustained. But where the decree is found to be erroneous on other points, the court is to adjudge the costs upon the principles of the decree as reformed. 2 Strob. Eq. 166.</p> <p>The question is, is the deed of January 9th, 1869, a perfect and complete deed of conveyance?</p> <p>If executed upon condition that it was “not to be put on record until a complete settlement,” &c., it would still be a valid deed. 3 McO. 205; 2 Black. 307; 4 Kent 454.</p> <p>The delivery to the grantee makes it absolute. 8 Bich. L. 325; 4 Strob. 46; 10 Smed. & M. 9; Smith on Cont. 10; 2 Stark. Ev. 477; 4 Com. Big., tit. “ Fait,” A, 5; 13 Vin. Ab., “Faü,” M, 8; 6 Mod. 218.</p> <p>The prima facies is surely in favor of the deed, and it can be avoided only by plenary proof, and the attesting witnesses must be called. 1 Phil. Ev. 425; 4 East 53. In his sworn complaint, plaintiff says the deed was executed and delivered; by this he is bound. 1 Qreenl. Eh., §§ 27, 205, 551; 3 Qreenl. Eh., § 275. Mrs. Davie admits this under oath; she, too, is bound. Ibid. A promise by Jones to pay $1000, unperformed, cannot affect the rights of the eestuis que trust. 4 Kent 130. There can be no vendor’s lien. 2 8. O. á6. If habendum in a deed repugnant to the premises, which are complete, is void, much more should verbal condition annexed to delivery be void, when repugnant to both premises and habendum. Harp. 492; 4 MoG. 12, 198.</p>

<p>Before Cooke, J., at Lexington, July, 1876.</p> <p>The facts of the case are fully stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Before Kershaw, J., at Spartanburg, April, 1878.</p> <p>The facts of the case are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.</p> <p>Upon the trial on appeal in the Circuit Court, the presiding judge signed the following order:</p> <p>■ The court finds as matter of fact, that the defendant had no lawful authority to levy upon the mule in dispute.</p> <p>And as matter of law, that the plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the said mule, now in his possession, under his replevin bond.</p> <p>It is therefore ordered and adjudged that the appeal herein be ■dismissed, with costs.</p> <p>The defendant appealed to this court, upon the grounds that his Honor erred:</p> <p>1. In holding that an execution issued on December 4th, 1869, upon a judgment rendered on December 1st, 1869, could not be renewed by the written consent of the defendant in execution, after the expiration of seven years from the original entry of the execution, without application to the court.</p> <p>2. In holding that the defendant had no lawful authority to levy on the mule in dispute, when the evidence showed that the defendant acted under an execution .regularly renewed by the written consent of the defendant in execution.</p> <p>The execution of 1869 was a lien upon all the property, real and personal, of J. P. Peace, and did not lose its lien by losing its active'energy. 1 Bay 295 ; 1 MeC. 414.</p> <p>The levy and sale by the constable could not divest the lien of a senior judgment of the Circuit Court, and therefore could confer no title to the purchaser. The trial justice’s execution of 1878 did not constitute a lien until actual levy. 1 Hill 277 ; 1 ■Hill 286.</p> <p>After the expiration of its active energy, an execution may be renewed by consent of the defendant in execution without application to the court by seire facias. Harp. 457.</p> <p>If execution was irregularly- renewed, objection cannot be made by third persons. 2 Strob. 220; 1 Bail. 513 ; 1 Nott & McC. 408.</p> <p>Even if the sheriff’s second execution had been properly issued, he would have had no right to levy it upon the mule bought by respondent. The Code, § 316, and its amendments (15 8tat. 872) provide that an execution should create no lien on personal property except by levy. If the mule had been Peace’s before the passage of the code (and the onus of proving that was on appellant) Cash’s execution would be a lien. But the change in the law was a mere change in the remedy — that lien should date fro.m levy and not from entry — and does not impair the obligation of the contract. Sedg. 8tat. and Cons. L., pp. 635, 644; note 350, 659.</p> <p>If there was lien, it may well be doubted w'hether constable’s levy would not have divested it. Dud. 358.</p> <p>The execution upon which the levy was made by respondent was issued without authority of law. Code, § 306; 15 Stat. 872; Sedg. Cons. & Stat. L. 31, note a.</p>

<p>Before Shaw, J., at Marlborough, March Term, 1876.</p> <p>Governor Barnabas K. Henagan, of Marlborough district, died, in 1854, leaving of force a last will and testament, of which John W. Henagan, J. H. Henagan and J. J. Harllee were appointed executors; the two last named qualified, and James H. Henagan, who was a son of testator, was the chief acting executor. The opinion of the court states so much of the will as is necessary to a proper understanding of the points involved in this case.</p> <p>The testator left him surviving his widow, four sons, James H., Robert Y., Andrew B. and Samuel F. G., and two daughters, Mary and Alice. Mary afterwards intermarried with Abraham G. Johnson, and Alice intermarried with John T. Northrup. The widow of testator died before action brought.</p> <p>The executors cultivated the lands of testator before the war and made crops, under the directions of the will. They sold the Grove place (devised to R. Y. Henagan) under a power in the will, to pay debts with. When the war commenced, Harllee removed to Arkansas, wdiere he remained until his death in 1866. J. H. Henagan went into the army. R. Y. Henagan took out letters of administration durante absentia, earlyin 1862, and, the executor having been killed in battle in July, 1862, administered cu/m testamento annexo de bonis non on the estate of B. K. Henagan, in May, 1863, and also became administrator of the estate of J. H. Henagan. The heirs-at-law of J. H. Henagan were his surviving brothers and sisters.</p> <p>R. Y. Henagan then cultivated crops upon the lands of his father’s estate until the end of 1867, after which the devisees took possession of the lands and cultivated them. The administrator sold, in 1868, the Creek place devised to him.</p> <p>J. H. Henagan, executor, sold six negroes of the estate, with which to pay a large and pressing debt. Subsequently he purchased from C. D. Evans, commissioner in equity, other negroes for the estate, which were worked as estate negroes; and he gave a bond for the amount of their purchase money, upon which payments were afterwards made. R. Y. H., after he administered, purchased a brood mare for the estate.</p> <p>The two daughters of testator, with their husbands, brought this action in May, 1870, against R. Y. Henagan, as administrator own testamento annexo of the estate of B. K. Henagan, and as administrator of the estate of J. H. Henagan, for an account of his administration of the two estates, and A. B. Henagan and S. F. G. Henagan were made parties defendant. Before judgment was obtained, Samuel F. G. Henagan died.</p> <p>The accounting was taken before D. D. McCall, Esq., to whom, as special referee, it was referred. His report is as follows:</p> <p>D. I). McCall, -to whom it was referred as special referee in the above-stated action, to inquire and report upon the actings and doings of R. Y. Henagan, as administrator de bonis non of B. K. Henagan, deceased, with will annexed, would respectfully report:</p> <p>That during the latter portion of 1870, and also during 1871 and the present year, he has held various references in said action, as will be shown by the testimony taken, wbich references were for the most part at the instance of the plaintiffs, and related to the crops and expenditures of the plantation known as the “Cannon place” during the years 1863, 1864, and since then up to the present year. The number of references and great amount of testimony taken have been owing in a great measure to the failure of administrator to file with his answer an account current, and from failure to make annual returns for any of the nine years covered by his administration, except 1866, and this return related only to transactions of 1863 and 1864, although made and filed on June 25th, 1866. The referee finds that the estate has been managed in a reckless and negligent manner from the beginning, by the administrator; that at the time the administrator took charge of estate, it only owed one debt — tlm bond to W. H. Evans, trustee — and that on this debt only $4000 has been paid by administrator, including the $2000 paid on May 1st, 1873 — the day letters of administration were granted to the administrator; while on the other hand large sums were paid out by the administrator upon the debts of J. H. Henagan,. for which the estate of B. K. Henagan was in no way responsible ; and the result is, that the whole real estate of B. K. Henagan has been sold, and the whole personal property disposed of by the administrator and others, with a heavy judgment still unsettled. The plaintiffs, by their counsel, urged that the seventy bales of cotton sold by the administrator to Johnson & Breeden, on the 11th day of July, 1863, for $13,846.91 (confederate money), should be charged to the administrator as on hand at the close - of the war, claiming the conversion of cotton into depreciating confederate currency to be unwarranted. The balance of the cotton not sold by the administrator was saved at the close of the war, and the sale made by the administrator to Johnson & Breeden, viewed by the light of subsequent events, was a very unfortunate one for the estate, not a dollar of the large amount received from this cotton being applied to the debt due by the estate, being refused by the holder of the bond. The referee is disposed to think that the administrator in this sale acted in good faith, and, as he supposed, for the best interest of the estate, and therefore charges him with confederate currency received.</p> <p>The administrator, in the account current hied by him on the last reference, and also' in the return made in 1866, charges himself with fourteen hundred and fifteen bushels corn sold to different persons in the year 1863. There are no dates attached to any of these sales, nor any proven on reference. The referee therefore charges these items in part on March 15th and on November 1st, being govérned to some extent by the prices obtained. The same want of dates occurs in regard to sales of corn made in 1864, and referee charges in same manner, and scales accordingly, although by so doing the price of corn in good money is as low as nine cents per bushel.</p> <p>The plaintiffs introduced testimony to show that the amount of corn sold during the years 1863 and 1864 greatly exceeded the amount charged; but the evidence was conjectural and uncertain, and the referee has adopted the amount charged in annual return made in 1866.</p> <p>The referee has, with a great deal of trouble, prepared an account current covering the transactions of said administrator, which is intended as a part of this report, by reference to which ■will be seen the various items of credit allowed to said administrator. The account of C. Graham, for which the administrator claims credit in 1866, and to which plaintiffs object, the referee allows so much thereof as from the character of the items appears to have been for the plaintiffs or the plantation. The account of E. M. Emanuel, which the administrator claims to have been for the plantation, the referee rejects, except $15, which is allowed for bagging and rope. The items of this account, among which is quite a large one for bagging purchased in the fall of 1865, the estate could have had no use for; and when it is remembered that the administrator says that the items of the account were for the estate, and wishes credit therefor, and at the same time says that the estate for the year 1865 had only from three to five acres in cotton, the referee cannot understand the use the estate would have in November, 1865, for two hundred and seventy yards of bagging and large quantities of rope. For such reasons as this, the amount is not allowed, except as above.</p> <p>As to the amount of cotton made on the Cannon place in 1866 1867, theré appears to be considerable difference of opinion-H. H. Tart, who superintended this plantation in 1866, but not remain until the crop was prepared for market, says in testimony that A. B. Henagan reported the cotton made in at one hundred and seven bales, and in 1867 at one hun- and eleven bales, and that the administrator agreed to these statements, but that he, Tart, did not rely on these reports. This witness, in the opinion of the referee, is one whose veracity can-be questioned, and who is more intimately acquainted with place than any one else, having been overseer on it from</p> <p>1854 to 1859, then in 1861 and 1866. He says that eighty-six bales of cotton were the smallest number ever made on the place within his knowledge, and in going over the crop in the summer of 1867 for the purpose of ascertaining how much it would make, at the request of J. H. Baggett, estimated the cotton at eighty-live bales, and wrote to Baggett accordingly. The administrator, on examination as witness, says that sixty-five bales were made in 1866, which were sent to Baggett, and A. B. Henagan thinks the crop of 1866 sixty or sixty-odd bales, and crop of 1867 about the same.</p> <p>The administrator says that the crop of 1867 was sixty bales, sold by Baggett and Kirkpatrick. Now, it appears from the testimony of the administrator that the crop of 1866 was five bales more than that of 1867, which, according to the estimate of Mr. Tart of the crop of 1867, would make that of 1866 amount to ninety bales. The administrator, in his testimony, says that all of the items in the estate account of Baggett & Co. were for the estate. In looking over this account the referee finds that on September 20th, 1866, the estate is charged with bill bagging, rope, &c., to amount of $277.64, and on February 2d, 1867, to one bale bagging of five hundred and seventeen yards, amounting to $144.-76. The proof before the referee, as to the number of yards of bagging necessary to pack a bale of cotton, taken in connection with the above testimony of the'administrator, would lead to the conclusion that the one hundred and seven bales admitted by administrator to Mr. Tart in 1866 (which is denied by him in his evidence, and also by A. B. Henagan) were really below the correct amount. The referee, in view of all the facts of the case, estimates the crop of 1866 at eighty bales, and charges the administrator accordingly. According to the testimony of administrator, six hundred and forty yards of bagging were purchased for the crop of 1867, which would pack at least one hundred bales cotton, and for this year the referee charges the administrator with seventy bales of cotton. In making up the account of 1867, the referee charges the administrator with interest allowed him by J. H. Baggett &• Co. on the account, but which is omitted in the account current submitted by the administrator.</p> <p>By the will of B. K. Henagan, under which the administrator acted, the plantation was to be worked and debts paid from proceeds of crops; but the administrator claims to have ceased working the plantation for the benefit of the estate after the year 1867, being unable to run same, and charges himself with $300 as rent for 1868, 1869, 1870, and 1871, during which years the lands, stdck, &c., were divided out between himself and brothers and cultivated in separate crops. The plantation was not offered to the highest bidder, nor, in the opinion of the referee, attempted to be rented to any one, although the administrator in his testimony speaks of offering to rent to N. S. Rogers, who was examined as a witness in this casé, and from whose testimony it might be inferred had already more lands than he could successfully manage, which was no doubt known to the administrator. The plaintiffs claimed that the entire crops of those years should be charged to the administrator, and he failing to show that he was entitled to any credits could not be allowed any.</p> <p>The testimony of several witnesses examined in this case shows that the usual rent of land in this county is one-fourth cotton and one-third of corn; and Mr. Taft, in estimating what proportion of the crops made on this place should be profits after paying expenses, says that since the war thinks that one-third of the entire crop would pay the expenses, and that two-thirds of each crop ought to be clear. The referee has charged the administrator with one-third of the crops of lint cotton, and one-third of corn made on place during these years, for the use of the plantation, horses, mules, implements, &c., giving to him all the cotton seed, fodder, peas, oats, &c., made, and at the same time takes the estimate of cotton from the testimony of administrator. The $500 worth of goods claimed by administrator to have been turned over to plantation about first 1867, the referee allows, but rejects the amount claimed to have been sold to hands by store in 1866, on the testimony of Northrop and Tart. The referee allows credit for all such items on the account of Baggett & Co., as he considered were for the benefit of the estate. Commissions are not allowed the administrator except for 1866.</p> <p>The referee charges the administrator with three head of cattle given away by A. B. Henagan in' 1871, and with the stock of mules and horses carried from the plantation into Darlington by the administrator and A. B. Henagan, except tbe two mules and wagon purchased by A. B. Henagan, and estimates these horses and mules at $500, including the implements, &c., belonging to estate.</p> <p>The referee finds, that on January 1st, 1872, Robert Y. Henagan, as adminstrator de bonis non of B. Eh Henagan, deceased, was indebted to said estate, as balance in his hands, in the sum of $22,289.23.</p> <p>To this report exceptions were taken by the plaintiffs, and also by the defendant, R. Y. Henagan, as follows:</p> <p>The plaintiffs except to the report of H. D. McCall, Esq., referee, filed September 4th, 1872, ©n the following grounds:</p> <p>1. Because the referee has sanctioned the sale of seventy bales of cotton in 1863 for confederate money, whereas it is respectfully submitted that such sale was altogether unwarranted, and that the administrator in making such sale exceeded the limits within which his discretion could lawfully be exercised.</p> <p>2. Because the referee has ignored the fact which is admitted in R. Y. Henagan’s answer and established by the proof, that he was in fact appointed administrator early in 1862, instead of in May, 1863, and has failed to charge said administrator with the crop of 1862.</p> <p>3. Because the referee has not charged the administrator with the full amount of the crops of corn made in 1863 and 1864 — ■ five thousand bushels each year — and has only charged him with the amount which he represents himself to have sold in those years.</p> <p>,. 4. Because the referee has failed to charge the administrator with the twenty-five bales cotton proved to have been on hand in the spring of 1865, after the passage of Gen. Sherman’s army.</p> <p>5. Because the referee has failed to charge the administrator with the full amount of the cotton crops for the years 1866 and 1867, which, according to the testimony, should have been at least eighty-six bales in each year, and which, according to the admission of the administrator, should have been one hundred and seven bales in 1866, and one hundred and eleven bales in 1867.</p> <p>6. Because tbe referee in estimating the amount of the crops for the years subsequent to 1867, has been governed entirely by the testimony of the administrator himself, ignoring the testimony of other and disinterested witnesses.</p> <p>7. Because the referee failed to charge the administrator with the full value of the stock, farming implements, &c., which he carried off himself and permitted others to carry off from the “ Cannon place.”</p> <p>8.- Because the referee has failed to charge the administrator with the cotton seed of the crop of 1871.</p> <p>The following exceptions are made to the report of D. D. McCall, Esq., the special referee in the above-stated case, by the ■defendant, R. Y. Henagan, administrator:</p> <p>1. The item of $268 was put in the inventory and appraisement by mistake, and ought not to be charged in the account of the administrator.</p> <p>2. $11,846.91 of the money received from Johnson & Breeden for cotton, ought to be charged on the 21st, instead of the 11th day of July, 1863.</p> <p>3. The $850 for the hire of carpenter Sam, and the $135 for the hire of the blacksmith, ought to be charged on January 1st, 1864, instead of the days on which they are charged.</p> <p>4. The payments made on the bond of J. H. Henagan to C. D. Evans, commissioner, dated April 2d, 1860, which, in 1863, amounted in the aggregate to $5277.13, under the evidence, . ought to be allowed as credits.</p> <p>5. The payments made on notes of J. H. Henagan to W. S. Ellerbee, R. C. Emanuel, Simeon Emanuel, R. C. Hamer, C. Graham, Ambrose & Delaney, J. D. McCulloch, S. Emanuel, ag’t, and on the accounts of the same to Harris & Harrell, and on a judgment against the same for $421.32, ought to be allowed ■ as credits to R. Y. Henagan, as administrator of B. K. Henagan.</p> <p>6. The referee erred in not allowing R. Y. Henagan wages from the time he took charge of the Cannon place, 1861, till the time he took out letters of administration on the estate of his father, in 1863, a period of about two years.</p> <p>7. The referee erred in charging the administrator with a thousand bushels of corn, and sixteen thousand pounds of fodder on November 1st, 1864, the evidence being that there was really no sale of the same made, though there were some pledges made to the government for the same.</p> <p>8. The referee erred in not allowing the administrator in the accounts of 1864 credits for $125, paid by him to M. Iseman for a suit of clothes for himself; for $85 to S. Emanuel, for his sisters, Alice and Mary; for $300 to .J. W. Henagan, for board fot Alice and Mary; for $1500 to R. C. McIntyre, for brood mare for the estate; for $150 paid dentist in Raleigh, for work on Mary Henagan’s teeth.</p> <p>9. The referee erred in not allowing the fee of $1000 paid Gen. W. W. Harllee, in February, 1865.</p> <p>10. The referee erred.in charging R. Y. Henagan, administrator, with three bales of cotton sold by Baggett & Co., on April 21st, 1866; and with six of the- twenty-one bales of cotton sold by C. Graham on May 24th, 1866, the three and the six out of’ twenty-one being the cotton of R. Y. Henagan individually, and not the cotton of the estate.</p> <p>11. The referee erred in not crediting the accounts of the administrator for 1866 with $457.53, the purchases made by J. H. Baggett & Co., in 1866, as appears by their account current made up to March 1st, 1868.</p> <p>12. The referee erred in not giving the administrator credit for the whole amount paid by him on the account of C. Graham,, Edwin Bates & Co., and Emanuel, in 1866, except for the items of cash paid A. B. Henagan.</p> <p>. 13. If the administrator is not allowed credit for the amounts-paid to Mowry & Co., L. D. Mowry & Co., C. Graham and others, because they were debts of J. H. Henagan and not of B. K. Henagan, it is respectfully submitted that the administrator ought to have credit for all the payments he made for the estate of B. K. Henagan with the money of the estate of S. II. Ilenegan.</p> <p>14. The referee erred in not allowing the payments made on the accounts of Neil Alford, Alexander Thomas, P. Epstein, and the one to Francis Murphy for $73.</p> <p>15. The referee erred in not allowing the administrator credit for $1024.19, the amount charged in plantation book in 1866 against laborers on plantation; or, if not allowing him that precise amount, he erred in not allowing him credit for one-third of the crop made that year, that being the share of the laborers, and the evidence being that they were paid and that the estate got the whole of the crop.</p> <p>16. The referee erred in not giving the administrator credit for one hundred and eighty bushels of corn purchased from Fladger in 1867, for $1.40 per bushel; and for fifteen bushels purchased from Hays, in the same year, at $1.50 per bushel, which were used by the estate.</p> <p>17. The referee erred in not giving the administrator credit for the amounts which he paid H. Tart, overseer’s wages for 1866.</p> <p>18. The referee erred in charging the administrator with $975.06, on account of interest on J. H. Baggett & Co.’s account current.</p> <p>19. The referee erred in not crediting the account of the administrator for 1867, with so much of the account of J. H. Baggett & Co. for that year as was allowed and paid by sales of cotton during the year, or by money in hand, he having credited the same in 1868.</p> <p>20. The referee is not supported by the evidence in charging the administrator with a crop of more than sixty-five bales of cotton in 1866, and a crop of more than sixty bales in 1867, the numbers with which the administrator charges himself.</p> <p>21. It is respectfully submitted that the referee is not sustained by the evidence in concluding that there were more than sixty-two bales made in 1868 on the Cannon place.</p> <p>22. The referee erred in charging the administrator, in the accounts of 1868, with $6283.14, for the purchase money of the Mill greek plantation: 1st. Because, as administrator de bonis non with the will -annexed of the estate, he had no legal right to make the sale; and 2d. If he had the authority to sell, he ought only to be charged with the real value of it, which was proved to be $2000 or less; and 3d. If there was enough money in his hands to pay the debts of the estate, or enough has been made since by rents, &c., he had the right to sell the property as his own, as he did do under the advice of counsel.</p> <p>23. It is respectfully submitted that the evidence does not authorize the referee to conclude that there were three hundred and seventy-five bushels of corn and more than seventy bales'of cotton made on the Cannon place in 1866.</p> <p>24. The evidence does not sustain the referee in charging one-third of the corn and cotton made on the Cannon plantation for rent for the years 1868,1869,1870,1871, and that he only should be charged with the value of the rent as proved.</p> <p>25. The referee erred, in continuing to charge the administrator interest on annual balances after the year 1868, instead of simple interest.</p> <p>26.' The referee erred in charging the rent of the plantation for 1868 in the accounts for 1868, and the same for 1869/1870 and 1871; and the rent of 1868 ought to be charged in 1869, and so on in all the different years, which is the general rule, and is supported by the evidence in this case.</p> <p>27. It is respectfully submitted that there can be no decree against the administrator until the personal representative of Samuel F. G. Henagan is before the court.</p> <p>28. It is respectfully submitted that there can be no decree against It. Y. Henagan, as the administrator of the estate of B. Eh Henagan, until there is an accounting on the estate of J. H. Henagan, who was an -acting executor of the will of B. K. Henagan, and who was a devisee and legatee under the will of B. K. Henagan, and the rights of his estate and those claiming the same, can be properly arranged in no other way than by closing up his estate first.</p> <p>29. It is respectfully submitted that the referee ought to have taken down and made a report of all the payments proved to have been made by R. Y. Henagan for the estate of J. H. Henagan and for A. B. Henagan, so they might be deducted from the amounts which he may find to be due to them respectively.</p> <p>30. It is respectfully submitted, that the referee ought to have made a separate account for the' rents and profits of such portion of the Cannon and other property of the estate of B. K. Henagan as were respectively in the possession of R. Y. Henagan, A. B. Henagan, and S. F. G. Henagan, in the years 1868, 1869, 1870 and 1871, so that B>. Y. Henagan might have the proper credit for the amounts found against the other brothers.</p> <p>31. It is respectfully submitted that B. Y. Henagan is, under the provisions of the will of his' father, B. K. Henagan, and in consequence of the sale of the Grove plantation for $4000, and the Mill Greek plantation for $6285.14, entitled to the whole balance in his hands, over and above the amount for which the Cannon plantation sold, and the outstanding indebtedness of his late father.</p> <p>32. It is respectfully submitted that the evidence does not sustain the referee in charging the administrator with $500 for personal property taken off by him from the plantation.</p> <p>The referee submitted the following report on exceptions :</p> <p>D. D. McCall, as special referee in the above-stated action, having, on the 4th of September last, filed his report upon the accounts of B. Y. Henagan, as administrator de bonis non of B. E. Henagan, deceased, and having been served with exceptions to said report, both by plaintiffs and the defendant, B. Y. Henagan, administrator, would respectfully submit the following report upon said exceptions:</p> <p>1. As to the exceptions of said plaintiffs, he would overrule them, for the reasons given in his former report.</p> <p>2. As to the exceptions of the defendant, the administrator, the referee would respectfully report, that as to the first exception there was no testimony or allegation prior to the filing of the exceptions by the defendant, of any mistake in the inventory and appraisement.</p> <p>As to the second exception, the scaling of the confederate money received for the cotton was made upon the basis indicated as the correct one in said exceptions, although the referee follows the account current of the administrator as to the mere date used.</p> <p>As to the third exception, the administrator, in his account current, charges himself with said items in 1863, without giving a day or month; and the referee, by sealing same as of the last day of that year, gives to the defendant the most favorable day possible.</p> <p>As to the three foregoing exceptions, and also as to all the other exceptions of the defendant, the referee would respectfully report that after careful consideration he overrules each of them, for the reasons given in his former report, taken in connection with the testimony submitted.</p> <p>The Circuit decree on exceptions is as follows :</p> <p>This case came on to be heard upon exceptions to the report of the' referee. • .</p> <p>I shall not go behind the order of reference, although invited so to.do by some of the exceptions of the defendant. To the report of the referee the plaintiff filed eight exceptions, all of which are overruled. I would remark, on the second exception, that the complaint stated the date of the administration of the defendant to be in the year 1863; the answer of defendant admits simply that he administered, and the inventory is dated June 12th, 1863. I might also add, there was no evidence as to the crop'of 1862. To the report of the referee the defendant filed thirty-two exceptions, which I shall consider .out of their order. Some of the exceptions were abandoned at the hearing.</p> <p>The eighth exception charges error in the report of the referee in not allowing defendant credit for the sum of $1500, the price of a horse purchased by him from McIntyre.</p> <p>The defendant states in his evidence that this animal was purchased as a brood mare for the estate. There is no evidence which satisfies me that this statement is untrue, or which throws any reasonable doubt on it. He should be allowed credit for the sum of $1500, scaled according to the act.</p> <p>The ninth exception claims that the defendant should have credit for the sum of $1000, paid as a fee to Gen. Hardee. It is usual to allow administrators and executors ’ credit in their accounts for reasonable counsel fees. There is nothing in this case which takes this from under the usual rule. The defendant should be credited with the amount of $1000, reduced according to the scaling act.</p> <p>The eleventh exception charges error in not allowing defendant credit for certain amounts paid for the estate to Baggett & Co.</p> <p>The administrator is charged with the whole cotton crop of</p> <p>1866. My judgment is, that he should be charged with two-*thirds of. the crops for the years 1866 and 1867, and he should be credited with the amount paid Baggett & Co. for bagging and ties purchased for the year 1866; the amount is $277.64. The defendant should pay for the bacon out of his one-third of the crop.</p> <p>The twenty-second exception will be considered in connection with the thirty-first.</p> <p>The twenty-fifth exception charges error in the calculation of interest. The rule, as I understand it, is this: The administrator is to be charged with interest on whatever balance appears against him at the end of each year. I observe a charge for interest in the accounts for 1864; the first charge for interest should be in the account for 1865, for the year 1864; the balance against the administrator appearing on the first day of January, 1864, carried interest for that year.</p> <p>Thirty-first exception claims, in substance, that the administrator, in accounting in this case, is entitled to retain an amount equal to the amount of sales of the Grove and Mill creek plantations. In my judgment, the mention of the Mill creek .plantation only leads to unnecessary complication. There should be-no charge against the administrator for the amount of the proceeds of Mill creek, for the reason that he held it under the will of the testator, subject only to sale for payment of debts; and if sold for that purpose, he had a right to re-imbursement out of the personal estate, over and above his distributive share. He paid a portion of the proceeds to Baggett & Co., for the benefit of the estate, and has been credited with that amount. The fact that the sum paid Baggett & Co. for estate was proceeds of sale of Mill creek, is entirely immaterial to this litigation.</p> <p>The Grove plantation was also devised by testator to defendant, subject to same conditions. It was sold by the executor for the payment of the debts of the estate; and my judgment is,, that the defendant, as against the estate in this litigation, is entitled to retain the amount for which the Grove plantation was sold, with interest thereon from the date of the sale.</p> <p>The other exceptions of the defendant are overruled.</p> <p>It is ordered and decreed that this case be recommitted to the-referee, for the purpose of making a report according to the principles of this decree.</p> <p>I have filed herewith an explanatory statement to be taken as a part of this decree.</p> <p>I think it proper to state that the delay in filing my decree in this case has been occasioned by the very complicated character ■of the case, and my continued ill health since the hearing.</p> <p>John'T. Green.</p> <p>May 5th, 1873.</p> <p>The referee afterwards reported as follows:</p> <p>The above-stated case having been recommitted to the undersigned as referee, for the purpose of making a report in accordance with the principles of the decree of his Honor Judge Green, made in said action—</p> <p>The said referee would respectfully report, that in adjusting said accounting, as directed by said decree, and allowing the credits thereby directed, he finds the balance in the hands of the said Robert Y. Henagan, as administrator of B. E. Henagan, deceased, on this day, to be $1716.16.</p> <p>The referee would further report, that the Grove plantation Avas sold and conveyed by the executors of B. E. Henagan on September 4th, 1857, from which time interest has been computed on the amount realized from said sale.</p> <p>The referee having computed the explanatory statement, filed by his Honor Judge Green, with his decree, refers to same as an exhibit to this report.</p> <p>The defendants refused to enter up judgment on this report, when the following order was obtained from Judge Shaw, March 8th, 1876:</p> <p>The special referee in this action having filed his report of January 10th, 1874, upon the accounts of Robert Y. Henagan, as administrator, in which a certain amount is found against the said administrator and in favor of the plaintiffs, Avhich said amount they allege to be much less than they claim to be justly due and owing by said administrator; and the said plaintiffs having given notice to the defendants that they would apply to this court for leave to enter up judgment in this action, in accordance with the findings of said referee and the decretal order on which the same is based, with a view to appeal therefrom, the defendants having refused and neglected so to do; and argument of counsel having been heard for and against said motion: It is,, on motion of plaintiffs’ counsel, ordered that said final report of the referee be confirmed and made the judgment of this court, without prejudice to the plaintiffs’ right to appeal therefrom to the Supreme Court.</p> <p>Judgment was accordingly entered up by plaintiffs March 18th, 1876.</p> <p>Both parties filed exceptions to this judgment as follows:</p> <p>The plaintiffs except to the judgment in this cause rendered,, and the rulings of Judge John T. Green in his decretal order of May 5th, 1873, on which the final judgment is based, in the-following particulars assigned as error:</p> <p>1. In that the judge in his decree of May 5th, 1873, erred in overruling the exceptions which the plaintiffs took to the referee’s-report of September 4th, 1872; and the final judgment in accordance with said decree is erroneous for the reasons set forth in said exceptions, which said exceptions are renewed as to said decree and final judgment.</p> <p>2. In that said decree of May 5th, 1873, is erroneous in sustaining the 8th, 9 th, 11th, 22d, 25th, and 31st exceptions of the defendant, B. Y. Henagan, to the referee’s report of September 4th, 1872, which said exceptions, it is submitted, should havebeen entirely overruled, and the referee sustained in these points, and the final judgment conforming to said decree in this respect is erroneous.</p> <p>3. In that the explanatory statement accompanying and forming part of said decree and constituting the basis of the final judgment, is erroneous, being contrary to the principles governing the mode of stating the accounts of administrators, in calculating interest on annual balances, especially where annual returns are not made and no regular accounts kept.</p> <p>4. In that said decree and final judgment should have been in accordance with the rulings and findings of the referee in his report of September 4th, 1872, modified only in those particulars claimed by the plaintiffs in their exceptions thereto, which said report, corrected upon the basis of said exceptions, should have been made the judgment in the cause, and it was error to have held otherwise.</p> <p>The defendant, Robert Y. Henagan, excepts to' the judgment rendered by Judge A. J. Shaw, on the 18th day of March, 1876, in this, that he gives the plaintiffs judgment upon their own order, and that without any prejudice to their right to appeal from the same; and he also excepts to the rulings of Judge John T. Green, in his decretal order of May 5th, 1873, on which the final judgment is based in the following particulars assigned as errors:</p> <p>1. In that the judge, in his decree of May 5th, 1873, erred in not sustaining the 27th and 28th exceptions of the defendant, R. Y. Henagan, to the report of the referee of September 4th, 1872, which exceptions are renewed to said decree and final judgment.</p> <p>2. In that the judge, in his decree of May 5th, 1873, erred in overruling all the exceptions which the defendants took to the referee’s report of Sept. 4th, 1872, except the 8th, 9th, 11th, 22d, 25th and 31st, and the final judgment in-accordance with said decree, for the reasons assigned in the overruled exceptions; which last-named exceptions are renewed as to said decree and final judgment.</p> <p>3. In that the judge, in his decree of May 5th, 1873, erred in overruling the whole of the defendant’s 8th exception, except the item of $1500 paid R. C. McIntyre for a brood mare; which exception, except so far as was sustained by his Honor, is renewed as to said decree and final judgment.</p> <p>4. In that the judge, in his decree of May 5th, 1873, erred in overruling the exceptions of the defendant to the report of the referee of Sept. 4th, 1872, except so far only as the exceptions were sustained by the decree; and with that exception they, are now renewed.</p> <p>The plaintiffs and Robert Y. Henagan’appealed to the Supreme Court upon the grounds set forth in their several exceptions.</p>

Before Cooke, J., Richland, May, 1876. This was an action brought by the plaintiffs against the executors of Marshall Frazier, deceased, to recover a certain amount of money paid by plaintiffs under the following circumstances : In March, 1866, the house of Marshall, Beach & Co., of Charleston, received through Blakely & Copeland, of Columbia, two hundred and eleven bales of cotton, which belonged to Marshall Frazier, of Edgefield, Frazier, in person, delivering to Marshall,…

Before Nobthbop, J., at Union, March Term, 1877. This was a case in chancery brought by the plaintiff as administrator de bonis non of Clinton Wilson, deceased, against William Munro, as administrator of William J. Keenan, deceased, who during his lifetime had been administrator of the said estate of Clinton Wilson, and against the distributees of the said Wilson, praying an account by said William Munro of his intestate’s administration of said Wilson’s estate, and for a…

Refore Mackey, J., at Union, October Term, 1877. The seven causes above stated were heard together on Circuit and in this court, and they all involve the same questions. The Spartanburg, Union and Columbia Railroad Company is a common carrier; as such it had received at its two termini the goods for the recovery of the value of which the above-entitled actions were brought.

•Before Shaw, J., at Sumter, September, 1876. This was an action by Robert C. McFadden against Allen A. Gilbert and Francis E. Dingle to foreclose a mortgage of real estate given by the defendant, Allen A. Gilbert, to secure the payment of four sealed notes, dated March 30th, 1870.

Before Townsend, J., at Richland, October Term, 1877. Held: for special cases; and Sec. 10, Gen. Stat. 520, showing that there may be special sessions not requiring a jury. . The Indictment. — The five other grounds for the motion in arrest of judgment allege defects in the indictment. We take issue with appellant on each and every of these propositions, and submit— 1.

Before TowNSEND, J., at Richland, October Term, 1877. This was an indictment for bribery, committed by defendant, as a state senator, in December, 1872. True bill was found by the grand jury at October Term, 1877, of the Court of General Sessions for Richland county. The indictment contained five counts.

Before Wigg-IN, J., at Beaufort, July, 1877. The opinion of the court states all matters necessary to a full understanding of the case. The writ of prohibition was refused by the Circuit judge, and the relators appealed.

Before Northrop, J., at Union, June Term, 1876. The plaintiffs are the only children of Rosannah P. Renwick, who Avas the wife of W. W. Renwick, and daughter of John Rogers — all of Union county. John Rogers died January 27th, 1847, leaving of force a last will and testament, bearing date March, 1842; and he left surviving him one son and three daughters.

This was an original application to the Supreme Court, by Douglass & Jackson, for a rule requiring P. C. Gaillard, county treasurer for Charleston county, to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue to compel him, as county treasurer, to receive certain bills of the Bank of the State of South Carolina, tendered by them, in payment of their taxes.

Before Aldrich, J., at Edgefield, June Term, 1878. The defendant was indicted for murder. There was a deficiency of twenty jurors, and the “five-mile apartment” being exhausted the deficiency was ordered to be supplied from the “other apartments.” From the affidavit of the jury-commissioner, made after the trial, it appeared that the board in drawing from the other apartment did not confine themselves to the names of such persons as lived within five miles of the court-house.

Before Aldkich, J., at York, September Term, 1878. Susan J. Dunlap executed, in 1860, a sealed note, payable to W. J. Clawson, administrator of J. P. Dunlap, on January 1st, 1862. In 1863 she intermarried with A. E. Hutchinson. Suit was commenced on this note against Hutchinson and wife in February, 1867, by W. J. Clawson. In December, 1877, W. J. Clawson died, and his executors, Thomas W. Clawson and C. E. Spencer, by proper order, became the plaintiffs.

Before Kershaw, J., at Spartanburg, March Term, 1878. In the trial justice’s court, a verdict was rendered for plaintiff •July 5th, 1877, for “fifty' dollars for wagon and harness, or wagon and harness returned to plaintiff, and damages for plaintiff for retention of wagon and harness, twenty dollars.” The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.

Before Cooke, J., at Greenville, September Term, 1875. This was an action by J. Mims Sullivan against Mary W. Ware for partition of a tract of land, the greater part whereof was purchased by the plaintiff as the property of the defendant, at a sale made by the county treasurer on June 5th, 1872, for taxes due for the year 1871.

Before Northrop, J., at Union, June Term, 1876. The sheriff of Union county, in November, 1875, levied the execution in this case upon two bales of cotton and some seed cotton and corn, of value more than sufficient to satisfy the execution, as the property of the defendant in the execution, such defendant, being an agricultural laborer, owning no lands, and having less than $500 worth of personal property, including the property levied upon.

Before Mackey, J., at Oconee, March Term, 1878. The trial was brought in a trial justice’s court, and a verdict having been rendered for plaintiff, defendant appealed to the Circuit Court.

Before Cooke, J., at Oconee, March Term, 1877. At the preparation of a jury list for Oconee county, in January, 1877, oniy two persons besides the clerk and sheriff were present — the jury commissioner and the chairman of the board of county commissioners who were elected in November, 1874. The county commissioners elected in November, 1876, all qualified during December of that year.

Before Hudson, J., at Union, June Term, 1878. The facts of this case, and the clause of the will construed by the court, are sufficiently set forth in the decree of Judge Hudson, which reads as follows: James Hill, the father of the plaintiff, made his last will and testament on the 24th day of October, 1854. A few days after-wards he died, and his will was duly proved before the Ordinary of Union county on the 10th day of November, 1854.

Before Hudson, J., at Spartanburg, June Term, 1878. This was an indictment against the defendant for obstructing a public road. In the indictment it was called “a highway,” “a public highway,” “ a common highway,” and the indictment concluded contra formam statuti. The proof was, that it was a neighborhood road, connecting two public highways.

<p>Before Hudson, J., at York, March Term, 1878.</p> <p>This was an action brought by the plaintiffs against William C. Beatty and William H. McCorkle, executors of the will of Nancy Blair, and certain negroes mentioned in the second section of said will, and certain other persons named in this same section, who were to take the legacy and interest, if the negroes should not be permitted to enjoy the interest. The section of the will construed by the'court is set forth in the opinion. The negroes mentioned in the will were slaves of testatrix. Testatrix died in October, 1860, and her will was admitted to probate in York district in November of the same year. The William Wright and William H. McCorkle referred to in the second section were also appointed executors of the will, but William Wright having died before testatrix, she substituted, by a codicil, William C. Beatty as executor, but not as trustee.</p> <p>The Circuit judge held that the second section of the will was null and void, so far as it regards these negro slaves; and the. • negroes appealed to this court.*</p>

Before Kershaw, J., at Laurens, February Term, 1878. This was an action brought by the plaintiff in the Court of Common Pleas for Laurens county against W. H. Langston and the other defendants, his sureties on his official bond as judge of probate for said county, for certain moneys which said Langston,, as judge of probate, collected ior said plaintiff and never paid over to said plaintiff or to his successor in office.

Before Northrop, J., at Abbeville, September Term, 1877. H. S. Cason gave his bond as sheriff of Abbeville county in August, 1868, with Charles W. Cowan and others, his sureties. His term of office expired in November, 1872. In January, 1869, Cason sold a lot of land under execution, and received the payment therefor.

Before Beed, J., at Beaufort, November Term, 1877. The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court. The order for the sale of the stock, referred to in the opinion, together with the petition therefor, is as follows: State of South Carolina, Beaufort county. In the Circuit Court.

Before Kershaw, J., at Spartanburg, March Term, 1878. These were two actions upon two promissory notes; each complaint was upon a promissory note in the usual form. They described tbe note sued on as if given by defendant alone. The notes were dated Marcli 14th, 1877, and bore interest at rate of two per cent, after maturity, one of them being payable November 1st, and tbe other December 1st, next after their date. At tbe trial, the two actions were consolidated.

Before Mackey, J., at Greenville, April Term, 1878. The only point involved in this appeal is as to the liability of Wade H. Harrison, who affixed his name and seal to a single-bill as sqrety merely, he being, at the time, an infant. After he attained his majority, and before the single-bill became payable, he wrote a letter to the payee, the plaintiff, which, upon its face, purports to be a promise to pay the sealed note.

<p>Before Townsend, J., at Marion, March Term, 1876.</p> <p>In this case Honorable William H. Wallace, judge of the seventh circuit, sat in the place of Associate Justice Mclver, who-had been one of the counsel in. the cause in the court below.</p> <p>The Circuit decree very fully states all the facts of the case. The order of Chancellor Dunkin passed February 20th, 1860, in the case of Fladger et ux. v. Hamer et ux., (mentioned in the Circuit decree and also in the opinion of this court,) so far as it affects the present issues, is as follows :</p> <p>The commissioners to whom a writ of partition was directed in this case, requiring them to make partition of the property named in the pleadings, having made their return to the writ, it is, on motion of Harllee & Graham, complainants’ solicitors, ordered that the said return and recommendations be confirmed, except as to vesting the share of Missouri, wife of John H. Hamer, the defendant, in the said Missouri. And it is ordered,, in respect to the portion of negroes allotted to the said Missouri, and the proceeds of land, hereafter directed to- be sold, that it be-■referred to the commissioners of this court to inquire and report as to who would be a fit and proper trustee on whom to settle said slaves and proceeds of sales of land to the use of the said Missouri; the terms of such settlement and the amount of bond to be given by said trustee.</p> <p>The Circuit decree is as follows :</p> <p>William S. Bethea died intestate on the day of March, 1857, leaving his widow, Sarah A. Bethea, and two children, Missouri Bethea and William H. Bethea, as his only heirs-at-law. Sarah A. Bethea administered upon his personal estate, and subsequently intermarried with C. J. Fladger, who, by reason of the marriage, became administrator with her; Missouri Hamer intermarried with John H. Hamer, after the death of her father,' and died intestate on the day of , 1862, leaving an infant son, Robert M. Hamer, and her husband as her only heirs-at-law.</p> <p>The intestate, William S. Bethea, in his lifetime, was joint owner with John C. Bethea of several tracts of land lying in Marion county, then district. On the 14th day of,February, 1859, after the death of W. S. Bethea, a bill of complaint was filed in the Court of Equity, for the partition of said lands, by John C. Bethea, against the heirs-at-law of intestate before named. The cause was heard on the 18th of February, 1859, and the court, after directing certain conveyances to be made to perfect the titles, &c., of the joint tenants, and the payment of a certain sum of money by the administratrix of W. S. Bethea, ordered a writ of partition to issue to divide the said lands between John C. Bethea and the heirs-at-law of W. S. Bethea. In December, 1859, the writ accordingly issued, and the commissioners therein named, and to whom it was directed, made their return to the Court of Equity in February, 1860, in which they valued all the lands at the sum, in the aggregate, of $5151, and recommended that the lands be set apart to John C. Bethea at that sum, who was to pay to the heirs-at-law of W. S. Bethea the one-half of said amount by the 1st day of January, 1861, with interest from the 1st day of March, 1860. The return was confirmed by an order of the court on the 17th day of February, 1860. John C. Bethea went into possession of the three tracts of land so set apart to him, and continued in possession up to the time of his death in January, 1863. By the terms of his will, of which B. B. Fiadger was one of the executors and duly qualified, his son, Edwin A. Bethea, as devisee, went into possession of the said lands, and is now in possession of them, with the exception of the “Clark” tract, which was conveyed by him to John F. Bethea in 1869, and a portion of which was sold by John F. Bethea to H. W. Bethea.</p> <p>The complaint in this action alleges that neither J. C. Bethea, in his lifetime, nor his executor, after his death, nor his son and devisee, nor J. F. Bethea or D. W. Bethea, as pretended owners of the “ Clark ” tract, ever paid to Missouri Hamer or her legal representatives, or to any other person authorized to receive the same, her share of the money assessed and decreed to be paid to her by John C. Bethea.</p> <p>That at the time of her death, Missouri Hamer was a minor and owed no debts, and there has been no administration upon her personal estate; that there is now due and owing to the plaintiffs, as heirs-at-law of Missouri Hamer, on account of her interest in the said lands, the sum of $1697.39, with interest from the 26th of May, 1873, being the one-third of the amount, with interest, as assessed to be paid by J. C. Bethea; and they are informed that a statutory mortgage or lien exists upon the lands for the payment of her share, and that the title of Edwin A. Bethea, J. F. Bethea and D. W. Bethea will not vest in the same until the said amount of money is paid to her, even if the other heirs-at-law of J. C. Bethea have been paid.</p> <p>The prayer of the complaint is for the foreclosure of the statutory mortgage, and for a sale of the said lands for the purpose of subjecting them to the payment of the amount due the plaintiffs.</p> <p>The defendants, in their answer, after admitting most of the allegations of the complaint, deny the fact stated, that the share of Missouri Hamer was never paid to her or her heirs by them or any of them. For further answer they allege that on the 17th day of December, 1859, C. J. Fiadger and wife, administrators of W. S. Bethea, filed their bill against John H. Hamer and wife and others, for partition and account, and that at the February Term of the Court of Equity, in 1860, it was ordered, among other things, “ that the said return be confirmed, with its recommendations, except as to the vesting of .the share of Missouri Hamer, wife of John H. Hamer, the defendant, in the said Missouri. And it is ordered, in respect to the portion of the negroes allotted to the said Missouri, and the proceeds of the land. hereafter directed to be sold, that it be referred to the commissioner of the court to inquire and report as to who would be a fit and proper trustee on whom to settle said slaves and proceeds of sales of land to the use of the said Missouri, the terms of said settlement and the amount of the bond to be given by the trustee. It is further ordered that the share of the negroes and proceeds of sale of land allotted to Missouri, wife of John H. Hamer, remain in the administrator’s hands until the further order of this court.”</p> <p>They further allege that the above order was made at the same term of the court, by the same Chancellor, and on the same day that the order referred to and granted in the complaint was made.</p> <p>They further allege that the money ordered to be paid by J. C. Bethea was a part of W. S. Bethea’s estate, and as such was •covered by the order of the court settling Missouri’s portion upon a trustee.</p> <p>The defendants' further allege that John C. Bethea, in his lifetime, paid the money ordered to be paid to the distributees of W. S. Bethea to C. J. Fladger, the administrator of "W. S. Bethea, and that said Fladger, as administrator, has accounted for the same. The defendants insist that said payment was a good payment, and a complete discharge of the statutory lien upon the lands, and plead said payment in bar of the plaintiffs’ action for foreclosure. The evidence of the payment of the money by J. C. Bethea to. the administrators of W. S. Bethea is a receipt, as follows:</p> <p>“ Received 26th August, 1861, of John C. Bethea, two thousand six hundred and sixteen 75-100 dollars, as above stated, which is in full of the portion of the estate of W. S. Bethea in the lands which were assigned the said John C. Bethea in partition under proceedings in the case above stated had in the Court of Equity for Marion District.”</p> <p>The title of the case in which the lands were assigned to J. C. Bethea appears above the receipt. The paper is in the handwriting of C. D. Evans, the then commissioner in equity for Marion district.</p> <p>At the hearing of the case there was oral and record testimony offered. The records and all the papers in the cases of J. G. Bethea v. Sarah A. Bethea, Adm’x, et ctL, and H. C. Fladger et ux. v. J. H. Hamer et al., were introduced. The testimony shows that Missouri Hamer was four years of age in 1860,* and died before attaining majority, without ever having had a guardian or trustee. John H. Hamer is now the guardian of the infant plaintiff. Edwin A. Bethea, as devisee, went into possession of the lands sought to be sold, about the close of the late war. At the hearing, a motion was made on the part of the defendants to make the other heirs at law of John C. Bethea besides Edwin A., parties to this proceeding. The reasons urged in support of it were that the amount decreed to be paid by J. C. Bethea is a general debt against his estate, and not a claim against one of his devisees on the lands in his possession, and that it is necessary for all the heirs-at-law to be made parties before complete justice can be done. The motion was resisted by the counsel for the plaintiffs.</p> <p>The record in the case of J. G. Bethea v. Sarah A• Bethea etal., proves the liability of J. C. Bethea to the plaintiffs for the share of Missouri Hamer in the amount decreed to be paid by him. It is incumbent on the defendants to show that this debt or liability has been discharged in some way, either by J. C. Bethea, in his lifetime, or by his executors or heirs since his death, in order to preclude the granting of the relief demanded in the complaint.</p> <p>The first position assumed by the defendants is, that the order of the court affirming the allotment of the lands to J. C. Bethea, and directing the payment of money by him to the distributees of W. S. Bethea, was a conversion of realty into personalty, and the claim was a mere money demand, secured by the judgment for its payment, which was a lien upon and enforcible against all the property of J. C. Bethea, and hence the administrators of W. :S. Bethea had a right to receive the fund and administer it.</p> <p>The doctrine of equitable conversion is thus laid down by Sir Thomas Sewell, in Fletcher v. Ashburner, found in Lead. Cas. ■in Fq., I, 777 : “That money directed to be employed in the purchase of land, and land directed to be sold and toned into money, are to be considered as that species of property into which they are directed to be converted ; and this in whatever manner the direction is given, whether by will, by way of contract, marriage articles, settlement, or otherwise; and whether the money is actually deposited or only covenanted to be paid; whether the land is actually conveyed or only agreed to be conveyed.” The direction to convert either money into land or land into money must be express and imperative; for if the conversion be optional, the property will be considered as real or personal according to the actual condition in which it is to be found.</p> <p>In the case of Steele v. Prince, 9 Monk Fq. R. 743, it is held: “ That if a conversion is rightfully made, whether by the court or a trustee, all the consequences of a conversion must follow.”</p> <p>In this state it has been held that proceeds of land ordered to be sold by a will, are treated as personalty. 8 Rich. Fq. 291.</p> <p>In the case of Arnold v. Dixon, 19 Eg. 113, Vol. IX., Amer. Law Reg., it was decided that in an administration suit wherein partition was asked, a sale was ordered, and after the decree, but before the sale, one of the parties entitled to a share died, that “ the real estate had been converted into personal and passed to the personal representative of the deceased beneficiary.”</p> <p>The ground of this doctrine is, as stated in Story’s Eq. Jur., § 791, p. 175, that it is to be presumed that the parties, in directing money to be invested in land, or land to be turned into money, intend that the property shall assume the very character of the property into which it is to be converted. The lands owned by John C. Bethea and W. S. Bethea, jointly, were partitioned after the death of the latter. His share descended to his heirs-at-law as real estate. His debts were inconsiderable, and there was no necessity for the sale of any of his lands for their payment; when the lands were allotted to J. C. Bethea, and he was decreed to pay the value of the share of W. S. Bethea to his distributees in money, it was for the purpose of partition, and not for the payment of debts. The money decreed to be paid represented the portion of the lands to which the distributees were entitled. There was no direction of the court for J. C. Bethea to pay to the administrators of W. S. Bethea the amount ordered to be paid for equality of partition. It cannot be successfully contended, then, that the administrators were entitled to receive this fund as the assets of the estate of W. S. Bethea for the payment of debts. If they had a right to receive it, it was only on the ground of a conversion, by the court, of real estate into personalty, to be distributed by them among the parties entitled.</p> <p>The order of the court directing the payment of money by J. C. Bethea, was express and imperative. The distributees of W. S. Bethea were designated as, the parties to whom it was to be paid. There could b.e no election to take the fund as land or money, for when an estate is directed to be sold and the money divided among several persons, none has a right to say that any part shall not be sold. The authority of the court to direct a conversion is unquestionable. A conversion, if directed by the court, was rightfully made.</p> <p>But it appears that, at the time the judgment of the court was made, Missouri Hamer, the mother of the infant plaintiff, and wife of John IT. Hamer, was but four years of age. The rule seems to be different when the real estate of an infant is sold: “ If the real estate of an infant be sold, the proceeds are to be deemed real estate until he ai’rives at majority, and descend to-his heirs as such. But on an infant arriving at majority, and obtaining possession of the proceeds of real estate sold, such proceeds are to be deemed personal property, and on his death thereafter descend to his personal representatives as such.” Farmer v. Marcet, 11 N. Y. 544, and other cases cited in Monk Fq. Il, Yol IX., 743.</p> <p>There can be no difference in the rule as applied to a case, where the real estate of an infant is allotted in a partition to another and money decreed to be paid to him for equality, and when a sale is directed for the purpose of a partition. It will be-seen that, in this case, one of the parties entitled in the partition to a share of the lands was a minor at the time the decree was made against J. C. Bethea; that the amount to which she was entitled was directed to be paid to her as a distributee; and that there was no necessity (or intention on the part of the court) for selling the lands for the payment of debts. Missouri’s share in the lands was her own real estate, and having been allotted to another, the proceeds, or equivalent of same in money, must be considered as real estate until she attained majority — and she never arrived at majority — and her share in the amount due by J. C. Bethea was never converted, and her interest should have descended to her heirs-at-law as real estate.</p> <p>I am of the opinion that the order of the court did not operate as a conversion of real into personal property, so far as Missouri was concerned, and the administrators were not entitled to receive her share as money, either for the purpose of distributing it, or for the payment of any debts of the intestate. The next position of the defendants is, that if the administrators had no right to •receive her share as personal property, they clearly had the power to do so by virtue of the order of Chancellor Dunkin, made on February 20th, 1860.</p> <p>The order was made in the proceeding for the partition and settlement of the estate of W. S. Bethea. In the first clause it directed,- “ that in respect to the portion of the negroes allotted to the said Missouri, and the proceeds of the land hereafter directed to be sold, it be referred to the commissioners in equity to inquire and report who would be a fit and proper trustee on whom to settle said slaves and proceeds of sales of land to the use of said Missouri.”</p> <p>In the second clause of the order, the lands mentioned in the return of the commissioners appointed to partition the real estate of W. S. Bethea, are directed to be sold.</p> <p>The last clause of this order directs, “ that the share of the negroes and proceeds of sale of lands allotted to Missouri, wife of J. H. Hamer, remain in the administrator’s hands until'the further order of the court.”</p> <p>This order was made at the same term of the court, and only two days after that, the order was granted allotting the lands to J. C. Bethea, and directing him to pay so much money to Missouri as one of the distributees of W. S. Bethea.</p> <p>There can be no question about the power of the administrators, under the order of February 20th, 1860, to receive the proceeds of the sale of the lands therein ordered to be sold to which Missouri was entitled. The Chancellor seems also to sustain the view already presented in the question of conversion, for he directs the proceeds of lands to be held, clearly indicating that it was a direction to secure real estate, and not personalty, by reason of a conversion consequent upon the sale.</p> <p>Did this order also include the amount ordered to be paid to Missouri by J. C. Bethea ?</p> <p>The terms of the order are general. The administrators are directed to hold the proceeds of sale of land allotted to Missouri. The amount J. C. Bethea was decreed to pay her was proceeds of lands allotted to her. These proceeds were allotted to her by the same Chancellor at the same term of the court, and only two days before. The court was certainly cognizant of this fact, and must have intended that the proceeds as well as all others should be embraced within the terms of the order.</p> <p>What was the object of this order, in so far as it related to Missouri ? Clearly to protect her share in her father’s estate from the debts of any future husband. As expressed in the order, the object is to settle her property upon a suitable trustee. If this was the object, why should not her entire property have been thus settled ? The court clearly never intended to settle only a part upon a trustee. It does seem that the purpose of the court was to settle all of the property, and if so, then the last clause of the order embraced the amount in controversy. This seems to have been the construction placed upon the order by the then commissioner in equity, for it is in proof that the receipt of the administrators to J. C. Bethea is in his handwriting. J. C. Bethea and the administrators appear to have so understood the order. All parties concerned seem to have acted upon such a construction. The administrators accounted in the settlement of the estate of W. S. Bethea for the fund so received by them.</p> <p>At the time this order was made no trustee had been appointed for Missouri. This seems to have been the reason for directing the administrators — one of whom was the mother, and the other the stepfather of Missouri — to hold the property. That the infant was protected by the court in same way when this direction was given, is to be presumed from the fact of the direction itself. The extraordinary prudence and caution of the Chancellor granting this order render its propriety and necessity unquestionable.</p> <p>If this order was intended to embrace the proceeds of the lands allotted to J. C. Bethea, to which Missouri was entitled, the administrators had the power to receive her share from J. C. Bethea, and to hold it until the further order of the court. That they did so receive her share is incontestably established by the receipt. It is now in their hands, and to them the plaintiffs must look. The fact of the insolvency of the administrators, or their bondsmen, cannot affect the question to be decided in this case. Considering the order of Chancellor Dunkin, and all the peculiar circumstances of this case, it would be a great hardship to require the heirs or devisees of J. C. Bethea to again pay this amount, when it was once paid under what was supposed to be the direction of the court.</p> <p>It is adjudged, ordered and decreed that the complaint be dismissed.</p> <p>July 1st, 1876. C. P. Townsend.</p> <p>From this decree the plaintiffs appealed to this court, upon the ground that the payment to the administrators of W. S. Bethea could not operate as a satisfaction of the amount J. C. Bethea was ordered to pay to Missouri Hamer, one of the distributees of William S. Bethea, under the order of February 17th, 1860.</p> <p>Upon the position that there was no equitable conversion, they cited 4 Bioh. Eq. 152; 2 IJill Oh. 644; 2 Bioh. Eq. 56; 1 Bro. O. O. 503; 2 N. & MoO. 149; 2 Bioh. Eq. 115 ; 4 Bioh. Eq. 503; 2 Hill Oh. 575.</p> <p>Cited 4 Bioh. Eq. 157, 160, 503; Spears Eq. 150; 2 Strob. Eq. 23; Dud. Eq. 56; Bail. Eq. 294; 9 Bioh. Eq. 478; Harm. Est., §§ 28, 43, 336.</p>

Before Townsend, J., at Richland, January Term, 1879. This was an action to recover a lot of land in the city of Columbia, formerly the property of Sarah Hane, a free woman of color. Plaintiff was devisee of Henry Lyons, and in support of his title offered in evidence a deed bearing date June 5th, 1855,, conveying the lot to Henry Lyons in consideration of $500. The deed was signed “Sarah + Hane,” and the names of I. D. Mordecai and C. S. Bedell were signed as witnesses.

<p>Before Cooke, J., at Greenville, January Term, 1878.</p> <p>The facts are mora fully stated in the opinion of the court than in the brief. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, whereupon defendants moved upon the minutes of the court for a new trial, upon the ground, substantially, that there was no evidence to sustain the verdict. The motion was refused, and defendants appealed.</p>

Before Aldrich, J., at Bichland, July Term, 1878. This case came up on appeal from an order of the Circuit judge,, confirming the report of Hon. C. P. Townsend, special referee, to whom it was referred to hear and determine the same; he having heard the cause while a Circuit judge, without a jury, by consent, and resigned his office before rendering a decision. The judgment was for the plaintiff. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court. 1.

This was an original proceeding in this court, praying a writ of mandamus, commanding the state treasurer, in accordance with the provisions of the appropriation act of December, 1878„ to pay to the relator interest maturing in 1879 on certain bonds,, reported to the legislature 'in February, 1878, by the bond commission to be valid obligations of the state, and specified in Schedule 5 of their report; and also to pay interest on certain bonds and stock issued under the act…

Before Wallace, J., at Cbarleston, February Term, 1878. Held: must be regarded as the lawful holder, coupled with an interest, and had the right to do with it all that was necessary to effectuate the purpose of his so holding, and as it appears that the certificate representing this stock was sold by him, he is entitled to the presumption that it was so sold by him to effectuate the purpose of…

Before Kershaw, J., at Pickens, June Term, 1878. This was an action for injury to personal property, brought by plaintiff against several defendants, demanding judgment for $350, her damages. The defendants all answered, denying that they had injured the property of plaintiff at all, or that she had been in any way damaged by them.

Before Wallace, J., at Charleston, March, 1878. This was an action brought by Adger & Co. against the widow and children of J. J. I. Pringle, certain persons claiming to be bond creditors of the deceased, and certain creditors of the widow and children. The facts are clearly set forth in the report of G. D. Bryan, Esq., special referee.

<p>Before Maojkey, J., at Oconee, March, 1878.</p> <p>The opinion of the court states the whole case.</p>

Before Townsend, J., at Marion, July, 1875. This was an action by A. Q. McDuffie, as assignee of R. H. Reaves, against R. C. McIntyre, Knight Gibson and his wife, Eliza. E., (formerly Eliza E. Black) and H. McClenaghan, administrator of C. H. Black, deceased. The case is fully stated in the Circuit decree, which is as follows: This is an action for the foreclosure or a mortgage.

Before Carpenter, J., at Edgefield, August, 1876. This action was commenced by bill in the court of equity for Edgefield district, in April, 1868, by James A. Lanier, trustee under marriage settlement, Margaret Cornelia Brunson (formerly Hollingsworth) and Robert D. Brunson, her husband, against James B. Griffin, her guardian, Julius Lay, a surety on the guardianship bond, John H. Hollingsworth and John H. Walker, executors of Liomede F. Hollingsworth, deceased, who was also…

Before Aldrioh, J., at York, September, 1878. Plaintiff was a passenger upon defendant’s train in November, 1877. While the train was crossing the south fork of Fishing creek, the trestle gave way, and the coach in which plaintiff sat was precipitated into the stream below. Plaintiff j umped through one of the windows, and his leg was broken, and he was otherwise bruised and injured.