Volume 11 — United States Reports

ON the first day of the term, Harper moved for, .and obtained a rule to show cause why this case, which was decided at February term 1810, should not be reheard. facts which was filed. The motion was grounded upon a statement March 12th. , When* this rule was mentioned again by Harper he was informed

THIS was an appeal from the decree of the Cir-c«it Court for the district of New York, sitting in chan-, eery, entered by consent pro fornta to bring the case be- The material facts as stated by Washington, justice, in delivering the opinion of the Court Were as follows.: For the purpose of securing, certain of his creditors, Robert Morris, on the 14th of February,, 1798, conveyed to the appellants, as trustees for those creditors, a certain tract of land lying in Ontario…

THIS was an appeal from a sentence of the Cireuit court which'affirmed that of the District Court of Connecticut, restoring the Cargo but condemning the brig James Wells, an American registered1 vessel, for a violation of the 5d section of the embargo act of Januayy ¿g08, in making a voyage to St. Bartholomews under a clearance for the port of - SL Mary's, in the state: 0j Qeorgia. The excuse suggested by the claimant of vessel was stress of weather.

<p>The discharge omtheiiliability, in fiase of taking go, not authopoUcy%e-e pends) not on any supposed increase of risk, but whoiiy oñ the de■Fnañre'd from.6 the contact Theconse-8' quences of of the extract are immaterial The discharge to,¡ts legal ef11 ^ charge ofithe underwriters; attLhesnoimporuñee to - tary deviation, ^“s^sanc [¡0°„ ¿ deviation in any case; muftbe strictly com- ‘ major proLe-Wit.</p>

United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that Congress must first enact a constitutional law criminalizing an activity, attach a penalty, and give the federal courts jurisdiction over the offense in order for the court to render a conviction. In other words, there is no federal common law of crimes.

district of Georgia, hy- Shirr as. and others original Complainants, against Caig and Mitchel, original Defendants, in-a.3uit in equity to foreclose a mortgage'of a lot, houses, and wharf in Savannah, called Gairdner’s wharf, which were in the possession of tlie-Defendalits. r .

The schooner Faulina and cargo wex’e seized and libelled by the collector of the port of Newport, alleging ^iat .cargo was laden on board, within the district of Newport, between the 1st of June and the last of July 'n ^1*5 year 1808, in the night.season, without a permit ’ from the' collector, and without the inspection qf the proper revenue officers, and contrary to the 2d section of the. “ ac^ Congress, entitled '« An act in addition to the « act entitled an act laying an…

whose agent he was, upon James B. Murray, in London, and indorsed by the Complainant, Nathaniel Russell, upon the faith of two letters written to him by Clark and Nightingale, ih the following words : Providence, 20£/i January, 1796. “ Nathaniel RusseU, Esq. Dear sie, Our friends, Messrs.

<p>If the counsel j^tne^S to theSatementof the points qf the case, the dumped?1</p>

<p>The rule to disíiiiss a writ of error for not the transcript of the record within the first six days of the term, does'not apply to cases where the transcript shall have been filed before thelmqtion to dismisé/</p>

THIS was an appeal from the sentence,of the Circuit Court of the District of Connecticut which af-.

THIS was an appeal from the sentence of the District. Court, át New Orleans, condemning the Brig Claiborne, for violating a law of the United States. Hare, Moved for a certiorari upon a suggestion of diminution of the record, in not sending up the tlejlositions of the witnesseses.

THIS was an action of debt brought originally in the District Court, for the District of Pennsylvania, by the States, against John Goodwin, for 15,000 dollars, as a penalty for not entering goods agreeably to the jirime cost, at the place of exportation, with intent to dereyenue- The judgment,of the District Court, which was in favor of the United States, was, upon ai wri^ Error’ reversed in the Circuit Court ,* andthereUpbn the United States sued out the present writ of…

<p>THIS cause standing so late on the docket that it was hot-likely to be called for trial at this term, Dauras, for the United States, suggested the propriety of assigning a" particular day for the hearing, as it was a case of importance, and involved a question of jurisdiction, viz : whether a seizure of a vessel^ on waters navigable from sea^or vessels of ten and moré tons burthen,, for breach of a law of the United States, uvas to be tried by a jury. This question was said to be important because the judge of the district of Pennsylvania had refused to try any cases of that kind, until the. question was finaisettled by.this Court.</p> <p>The Court accordingly assigned a day for bearing that question, but intimated an opinion that it was already decided in the cases of the Vengeance 3. Dall. 297.-The Betsy and Charlotte. 4. Cranch, 443. and Yeaton v. United States, 5. Cranch, 281.</p>

THIS was an appeal from the sentence of the Circuit ;Court for the district of Delaware, which affirmed that of the district Court which dismissed the libel, and ordered the vessel to be restored.

<p>The titieto land can be acquired and lost only in the htóniaér. prescribed by thé law o£ jj place where-. s.uch lani * s,t'4ate'</p>

The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), is a United States Supreme Court case on the jurisdiction of federal courts over a claim against a friendly foreign military vessel visiting an American port. The court interpreted customary international law to determine that there was no jurisdiction.

<p>mneBt°sent by a foreign merchant toa merchant in this country & not objected to fortw0year8j is deemed an account stated, * 8c/ throws the burden of «proof upoi). him. who rep ceivcd 8c tept it without ob* jection.</p>

« ^ . . An action of covenant was brought in that Court, in the .name of James Welsh, the Plaintitf, but really for the use and by the sole orders: of Allen Prior, against Mandeville and Jameson, upon a contract for the sale of land to them .by Welch.

Elizabeth, the wife of another of the Plaintiffs, in whose rights they sue, « were femes covert when the cause “ of action accrued, and have ever since continued “ femes covert”- — -« and «that Kitty Hunter,” one of the “ Plaintiffs was a feme covert,” and that the other PI 'ntiffs, in whose right the suit was brought, were infants at the time the cause of action accrued, and also at the commencement of the action.

Welch brought an action of assumpsit against Lindo, upon his indorsement of a promisory note. The declaration contained two counts. The 1st count stated, that one John'Kercheval, on the 25th~ of August, 1796, made and delivered a promisory note to Lindo, payable to his order on demand, for 246 dollars, for valued received.

<p>THIS case was submitted tp this Court, Upon a statement of facts, without argument.</p>

Riddle brought an action of assumpsit in the' court below against King.

.THIS case seems to be sufficiently stated in the following opinion, delivered by Makshah, Chi J. on the, 9th of. March.,..All the Judges being present. This jé an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court for the county of Alexandria, sitting in Chancery, by Which that; Court, set aside an award made between the parties, and directed an account The hill impeaches the award, because, l. The arbiters exceeded theirpower;. a.

Held: and “ propositions-for a compromise were made, touching the compensation and indemnification of him, the said Cleon,” « and it was then and there agreed by the “ said James, in consideration of the just claims of the “ said Cleon, to be compensated for the damage and « injury for the misconduct of the said James in the pre *f mises, and in consideration of the said James having “ procured and obtained a patent to he…

7, • • The transeripl of the record which was sent up, began by staling that “ Heretofore to wit, at rules held in the. clerk’s office of the said Court in the month of December, in the year 1807, Andrew Petit and Andrew Bayard, by Philip N. .Nicholas, gent, their attorney aPPeaved and filed their certain bill against Seth Barton and Tilomas Fisher, which bill is in the following words, to wit: United States, fifth Circuit, district of Virginia, to wit: Andrew Petit and…

THIS was an appeal.from the decree of the Circuit Court for tjie district of Columbia, which dismissed the Complainant’s bill in. equity. Wilson filed a bill in equity, in the nature of an attachment in chancery, against Koontz, surviving partne,> of Koontz and Ober, as principal debtor, and Thomas Irvine and Joseph Mandevilie as garnishees.

' Thjs was an action of debt on a joint bond given by j0]m Welch as principal obligor and the Defendant Moss as his surety. The suit abated as to Welch by the return of the marshal, that he was no inhabitant of the district.

<p>ERROR to the Circuit Court for the district oí .Columbia sitting at Alexandria.</p> <p>This cause having been sent back to the Circuit Court, by the mandate of this Court, at February term 1810,† commanding that Court to render judgment for the Plaintiff pn his first count and to award a writ of enquiry of damages, upon executing that writ of enquiry the Plaintiff produced the, following note.</p> <p> “ Alexandria 17th July,180%. </p> <p>“‘Sixty days of ter.¿ate, I promise to pay to Mr. James “ Sjieehy, or order, six hundred and four dollars and « ninety qrie cents, for value received, negotiable in the «Bank of Alexandria.</p> <p>R. B. JAMESON’’</p> <p>, The noté was thds described in the declaration, «And « where as the skid Defendants under the name, firm and «style aforesaid, did bn the said 17th of July, ±80%,-«•make their certain note in .writing called a promissory f<iiote, subscribed by them under the name, style, title “and firm of Robert B. Jameson, bearing date the “ same day and year, and then and there delivered the “ said note to the Plaintiff, and by the said note, did, “ under their firm aforesaid, promise to pay to the said “Plaintiff, or to his order, six hundred and four dollars “and ninety one cents for value received, negotiable at “ the bank of Alexandria, by reason whereof and by “ virtue of the law in such cases made and provided, “the said Defendimts became liable to pay to the said “ Plaintiff the said sum contained in the said note ac- “ cording to the tenor and effect of said note,” and being “ so liable, &c.</p> <p>. Which note the Court below refused to suffer the Plaintiff to read in evidence to the jury, because it varied from that set forth in the. declaration, to this refusal the Plaintiff excepted. The Plaintiff then contended before the jury that the existence, the execution, the amount, and the validity of the note set out in the declaration, were determined by the judgment of the Court upon the demurrer, and claimed damages to the full amount of that note without producing it. But the Court, upon the motion of the Defendant, instructed the jury that it was necessary for the Plaintiff to produce the note, or sufficiently account for its non-production, otherwise the jury may and ought to presume that the note has been paid, or has been passed away by the Plaintiff to a third person for value received, and in such case ought to assess only nominal damages. To this instruction the Plaintiff also excepted.</p> <p>The Plaintiff, then, in order to rebut the presumption that the note mentioned in the declaration had been paid or passed away to a third person for a valuable consideration, produced and offered to show to the Court and jury the record and judgment on the Defendant’s first and second pleas, which had been adjudged- bad upon demurrer, and also the same note in the said pleas mentioned to have been the foundation of the suit and judgment set forth in the said pleas — (which was a separate suit and judgment against R. B. Jameson upon the same note as the .sole nóte of Jameson, and which judgment Mandevillo had pleaded in bar to the present action, averring the note to he the same — hut which ' plea was by this Court adjudged bad on demurrer,) and also the Jieri facias issued against Jameson' upon that judgment with the return of nulla bona; and also offered to prove by a competent witness that the promissory note produced to the jury, and in the said record of the suit against Jameson mentioned, is the same promissory note upon which the present declaration was founded, and the same which was intended to have been therein .set out and described, and that the omission to state in the declaration the time in which the said note was originally made payable, arose from a mere oversight of the attorney who drew the declaration, and that'there was no other note ever intended to have been described in that declaration or answering the description therein contained, but the' Court .rejected the whole of the said evidence as incompetent; to which the Plaintiff also excepted. ■</p> <p>The jury assessed the Plaintiff’s damages, and judgment was rendered accordingly at one cent only; where upon he brought his writ of error.</p> <p>It being the prime object of Courts to do justice, the Court wiil decide in favor of the Plaintiff if the justice of the case be with him, unless there be some technical rule so strong as to leave the Court no ground in his favor.</p> <p>i. The first question is whether there be any variance between toe note declared upon, and that produced before the jury on the execution of the writ of enquiry.</p> <p>What is, in law«,d variance ?. The rule is that the allegata and probata' must correspond in all material points,.</p> <p>The note produced was payable “sixty' days after date.'” The declaration does not state when it wás payable. There is therefore no repugnance, no inconsistency, between them. To have made it a variance; the declaration should have expressly averred that the note was payable on-demand. The omission to state a fact, without a direct averment of a diffei’ent fact, is not a variance, i. Bos. and Pul. 225.</p> <p>TKe declaration kaves.it uncertain when the note was payable; but the note itself renders that certain which had beeii left uncertain on the face of the declarafien. -</p> <p>An averment is positive ¿statement: and is used in opposition to argument, or inference. Cqwp. 683, 684,</p> <p>From the statement in the declaration, it is only matter of inference that the note was payable, on demand. But there is no variance between the assumpsit laid, and the note offered. The statement of the note in the declaration is only inducement, j — but in the assumpsit it does not say when the money1 jvas to be paid.</p> <p>In setting forth the matter of inducement, exact certainty is not required. 5. Com. Big, 35. C. 30.</p> <p>The declaration states what,, in law, is considered as a parol agreement — and the action is a general and not a special indebitatus assumpsit. Under the count of general indebitatus assumpsit, any evidence substantially corresponding with the cause of action set forth in the declaration,' may be given in evidence.</p> <p>There is no variance whenever the time or date is uncertainly set forth or omitted, It may he supplied by pleading, or by finding, and therefore in order to render, by finding, that certain which is omitted, or which does not correspond with the statementjm the narration, evidence must be heard. Cromwell v. Grumsden, 1. Lord Ray, 335. If a patent be pleaded without a date, and the ope produced has a daté, it is riot a variance. 5. Com. Dig. 395. Every thing,is form, without which the right of action appears to the Court. Bob. 233. — 5. Com. Big. 139. This suit was brought after the note became due, therefore the time of payment was"then not material to the Plaintiff’s right of action. The promise, for a valuable consideration gives the right of action. The time of payment was not material and could not have been put in issue. 5. Com. Dig. 27.</p> <p>The omission is cured by the statute of jeofails. Virg. Laws. 112. sect. 26,</p> <p>If after verdict the Plaintiff could not be required to show' such a note as is set forth in the declaration — so upon a judgment by confession, nil dicit, or non sum in* formatus, he is not bound to shew such a note;.</p> <p>2. If there be a variance, it is not a material one. 1. Wash. 72, Evans v. Smith. In the bond, in that case, the obligor was stated to be «of the-county of Essex”, which part of the description was emitted in the declaration, and it was held to be an immaterial variance.</p> <p>It is omy necessary to prove substantially the cause of action declared upon. 1. Wash. 199, M'Williams v. Willis. In that, case the agreement was made by Willis, “as treasurer of the jockey~club.” The declaration omitted this description, and it was holden no variance. The reason was that he was equally liable whether he contracted as treasurer or not. . So in this case the Defendant was equally liable whether the note was payable in sixty days or on demand, the sixty days'having expired before the suit was brought.</p> <p>In the case of Peter v. Cocke, 1 Wash. 257, the suit was upon a bond given to U. P. “of the county of Surrey, on account of Messrs. G. and P. merchants in Glasgow.” The declaration stated the bond to be given to W. P., without stating on whose account; yet it was holden no variance.</p> <p>In the case of Wroc v. Washington and others, 1 Wash. 357, the declaration stated an agreement by which the Appellant was to rent and furnish a,house in Lecdstown, and entertain one of the Appellees, two of their storekeepers and a servant with meat and drink for one year, for which the Appellees agreed to pay him for the three first 251. each, and for the last 8L</p> <p>The evidence offered did not show any agreement respecting the renting of a house at Leedstown; but it showed an agreement to pay 83L in gross. Held ne variance,</p> <p>The date of a deed is not of its substance, 2 Co. 5. fa) Goddard’s case, Upon the same principle the time iif payment is not of the substance of a contract,</p> <p>A variance between the date of the bond declared upon, and that cited in the award, is not fatal, if they agree in every other particular. 3 Call. Ross v. Overton. 3 Hen. and Mun. 237, Lyons v. Gregory.</p> <p>In the case of Baptiste v. Cobbold, 1 Bos. and Pul, 7, the contract stated in the declaration was for 152 10 0 for ssnni-money; the evidence was a note by which the Defendant agreed (o allow the Plaintiff the above sum ; together with a pint of rum per day — and held no variance.</p> <p>The grounds upon which the law requires that the probata should agree with the allegata, are 1. To apprize the Defendant of the nature of the charge •, and, 2, To enable him, by a reference to the record itself, to plead the judgment in bar of another action for the same cause. The declaration in this case did apprize the Defendant of the nature of the charge; for lie appeared and pleaded to the action, and by his plea identified the note. The second object is obtained by the record, by which it. appears that the note offered in evidence is that which was declared upon. If this note had been received in evidence, it would have been filed and formed a part of the proceedings which the clerk is bound, by the statuce of Virginia, to retain.</p> <p>If the. reason of the rule requiring the allegata and probata to correspond, is attained in this case, and if there was no danger of a second suit being maintained' upon the same cause of action agáinst the Defendant, the variance cannot be material.</p> <p>3. The Plaintiff was not bound to produce, upon the execution of the writ of enquiry, the note or the evidence of the debt.</p> <p>Where there is judgment -by default in an action upon the case on a promissory.note, the court, will (without a jury) direct the clerk to ascertain the damages, 1 H. Bl. 252, 529, 541. These cases were decided upon the .ground that the amount claimed in the declaration is admitted tn the same manner as if the action was, debt; because a sum certain is demanded, and- it is not like the case where the canse of action sounds in damages, and not in contract, ascertaining on its face the amount claimed..</p> <p>Upon executing a writ of enquiry, the Plaintiff is not bound to prove his cause of action, because it is admitted as laid. Gro. Jac. 220,</p> <p>If the cause of action is admitted, and the note not required to be. proved, and. it is to be produced for no other purpose than to see whether there is any credit on it, and there should be a difference in the date; yet it is not a variance, because a variance can exist only' where proof is to be made.</p> <p>The case of Green v. Hearne, 3 T. R. 301, shows that upon a writ of enquiry, it is not necessary to prove the bill of exchange; that a variance between that declared upon, and'that produced is not material, and that evidence de/iors. the bill is admissable to prove that the bill produced is that which was declared upon. Bayley on bills, appendix No. 7, p. 74, Mills v. Lyne. Kyd, on bills, 155. 2 W. Bl. 748. 2 Stra. 1149. Bayley 66, 67, Bevis v. Lindsell. All these cases show that after judgment by default a promissory note sgt out in á declaration need not be produced. Sayer, on Damages, 112, 113, says where there is judgment upon demurrer, the justices may award damages; the amount of the damages laid in the declaration is admitted.</p> <p>4. The Court erred in 'directing the jury that tljey were bound to presume from the, non-production of the note declared upon, that it was paid or had been assigned away by the Plaintiff to a third person for a valuable consideration, unless the non-production wras sufficiently accounted for.</p> <p>The non-production of the note was only a circumstance to be left to the jury to draw such inference from as they should think proper, under the whole of the circumstances attending the case. The Court undertook to decide on the weight and effect of this negative kind of evidence. Presumptive evidence is always left to the jury. Hull v. Horner, Cowp. 109.</p> <p>5. The Court ought to have admitted the evidence offered to. show that this was the noté intended by the ■ description in the declaration — especially the Defendant’s own pleas, in which he affirms the note described in the declaration to be the same note upon which judgment was obtained against Jameson, which is the same note which was produced to the jury in the execution of this writ of enquiry.</p> <p>In the former opinion, the Court admitted the principle that it was competent for the Plaintiff to account for the non-production of such a note as is described in the declaration; and yet when the Plaintiff offers evidence to account for its non-production, the Court reject it.</p> <p>A finding by a special verdict, or an admission in former pleadings is good evidence, unless the contrary appears. Lee v. Booth, 1 Keble, 720, pl. 50.</p> <p>No time of payment being mentioned in the note, it is to be taken as a note payable on demand. The note produced was payable at 60 days. Such a variance is fatal upon an issue. 3 Sehvyn’s Nisi Frrus, 999..</p> <p>The principal question is, whether it be necessary to produce the note on the execution of a writ of enquiry.</p> <p>The practice in Virginia is to produce the note. Such also is the practice in England. Esp. JV*. F. 180, Tit. assumpsit, Str. 1149.</p> <p>The cases from Baylcy, &c. only show that the note need not be proved; this we admit; but still we content} it ought to he produced. The judgment upon the demurrer does not admit the amount of the damages.</p> <p>1. There was no material variance. The description of the note in the declaration, as far as it goes, is cor-, rect. The time and mode of payment are no part of the substance of the contract necessary to be set forth, ft is only necessary to set forth the legal effect of the note, and as the 60 days had expired before, the suit was brought, it "was in effect a mote payable on demand. Doug. 670, Bristow v. Wright.</p> <p>2. Upon such special counts, for a precise sum, it is not necessary to produce proof upon the writ of enquiry. The judgment by default confesses the whole sum as well as '.the- cause of action, lu debt, and indebitatus assumpsit, you could not recover less- than the precise. sum stated in the declaration; and therefore a judgment by default confessed the whole. And although the Courts have relaxed as to those counts, and you may now recover less, yet when the declaration is. for a precise sum,, a judgment by default carries the whole.</p> <p>The rule to produce the note is only a matter of disretion — a mere rule of practice intended to prevent inustice.</p>

<p>rf A a*a"ce thereupon convey'intrust to convey the should fait to * *e.mQ’ "stona cer-1 tamday — and pay’the mo™" ney on the the trustees0* convey the ja”hasnoeqñ¡ly cfredempt,on'</p>

uit. The declaration after having, been several times .amended, contained nine counts.

Held: that the subsequent petitioners who claimed under the same title, were only bound to prove their descent. C. Lee, contra. The issue in Susan Davis’s case is, in fact, whether she was born free. And the case of Shelton v. Barbour, & Wash. 64, shows that the verdict is conclusive as to all claiming under the same title. Wood’s title Was the same as Swann’s — and that of the petitioners the same as that of Susan Davis.

. ERROR'to the Circuit Court for the district of Columbia sitting in Washington, In ah action of assumpsit brought by Reintzel against Morgan upon a promissory- note made by Morgan payable to Reintzel, or order.

<p>x nE Columbian Turnpike Company obtained a rule uPon the Plaintiffs in error, Wise and Lynn, to show, cause why this writ of error should not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, the matter in dispute being less than 100 dollars, and. the writ of error being to the Circuit Court for the district of Columbia,</p>

CALDWELL, the clerk of this Court, obtained a ru|e against Jackson,to show cause why an attachment should not issue for toon-payment of his fees in the suit of Winchester against Jackson, which had been disjnissed on tlie motion of Jackson, "w#h posts, at a former term. ' Mixnor, now shewed cause, and contended, that Jackson was not liable to the clerk for' his fees, inasmuch as Jackson was the Defendant in error, and the writ of error had- been dismissed with costs.

, The Court below liad issued a writ of habere facias possessionem to enforce tfcg decree The writ of error was too late to a SLlpcr sedeas to the decree., now moved to quash the writ of habere facias as irregular,- and contended that the Court below, sitting as a Court of Chancery, lsn¿er j|)c ]awi! 0f Tennessee, could only enforce by execution decrees for the payment of money, and cited Tennessee Laws, Ed. 1807, p, 158. § 2.

THIS was a case certified from the Circuit Court for the district of Kentucky, in which the opinions of the Judges'were opposed. Ac the July adjourned term of the Court below, in the year 1808, MfKvm, a citizen oí Maryland, recover-0f ed a judgment in ejectment against Voorhies, a citizen of Kentucky, for the undivided third part of a watermill, with its appurtenances, in the county of Franklin, in the state of Kentucky.

This was an action of debt brought at the instance and for the use of Thomas Corcoran against Thomas Beatty upon the administration bond of Mrs. Doyle, administratrix,' with the will annexed, of Alexander Doyle. 'The Defendant was one of her sureties in that bond.

<p>THIS case having been submitted without argument—</p>

THIS was an action of debt brought in the District Court of the United States for the district of Virginia, upon an embargo-band, dated the 2d of November, 1808, conditioned to reland the cargo of the Essex, in some port of the United States, the danger of the seas only excePted- The Defendants, among other things, pleaded following plea, viz.; «And the said Defendants for further plea why the United States ought not to have and maintain the said action, say, that the said…

fa. issued UP0T1 former judgment recovered by Petit and Bay-against Barton,-which judgment was reversed at the last term of this Court, contended, that recoi°P f(,rmer judgment being referred to in the condition of the bond, was to be considered as part 0f tills record s and that the Court could judicially take notice that it. w7as the same which was reversed by this Court at the last term, the . transcript of which record now remains with the clerk of this Court.

Mima Queen and Child v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290 (1813), was a United States Supreme Court case, affirming a denial of a petition for freedom. By refusing to create a new exception to the hearsay rule, which would admit second-hand testimony of an ancestor's freedom into evidence, the case had important implications for the law of evidence and the American antislavery movement.

Held: that corporations could not do any thing without deed. 13. H, 8, 12__tb. II. 7, 6__7. II. 7, 9. Afterwards the rule seems to have been relaxed, and they were, for conveniency's sake, permitted to act in ordinary matters without deed •, as to retain a servant, cook, or butler. Plow. 91. b. — 2- Sand. 305. and gradually thi>? relaxation widened to embrace other objects» Bro, Corp. 51. — 3. Salk. 191-3. Lev. 107.

his life time, and prosecut®d against his executors,. after his decease, to recover from them five ninths of the amount of a judgment recovere Che declaration contained the usual money counts, and several Counts upon a special undertaking by Clark comPb Ihs contract between Greene and Barker and Carrington, which contract was averred to be to pay all debts contracted -by Carrington with Smith and Co. on account of the owners-of the ship Abigail, in the proportion in which…

” The ship proceeded to Barbadoes, and from to the port of Spain, in the island of Trinidad, being the only port of entry in the island. Having taken in part of her return cargo, she sailed from thence for Port Hyslop, in the same island, for the residue. In the way she was lost by the dangers of the seas. On the trial below, the opinion of the Court was ill favor of the Defendants, and the Plaintiff took his bill of exceptions, and brought the case up by writ of error.

THIS was an appeal from the decree of the Circuit Court for the-district of Columbia, sitting at Alexandria, in a suit in equity, brought by the Marine Insnranee Company of Alexandria against Hodgson, to enjoin so much of a judgment at law obtained by the against the former, as exceeded the value of the brig Hope as found by the jury in a special verdict np0J1 a valued policy. 1 x v jt was. contended in the bill that the age and tonnage of the vessel was misrepresented, and…

’ ' The libel contained 11 counts. The - 1st count charged that the goods between the 1st of June, 1808, and the day of filing the libel> at Boston, with intent to transport them to Baltimore, without a permit from the collector and naval officer of the port of Boston, were clandestinely laden on board the schooner Wendell, a Vessel enrolled and licensed according to statute, whose employment was not then confined to the navigation of bays, sounds, rivers and lakes within.…

THIS was an appeal from the sentence of the Circuit Court for the district of Maryland, which condemned the scho-.ner Good Catharine as a foreign vessel for a violation of'the 5th section of the act, of January 9th, 1808. supplementary to the embargo act, vol. 9, p. 13, which declares «« that if any foreign shij> or vessel shall .««take on board an> specie,' or any goods, wares or * . . • , . , _ , She was originally an American vessel, but had been efiptured and condemned…

Gabriel Christie, trading under the firm of Samuel Jay and Company, upon an account for mern di z e sold and delivered. The Defendant, Jay* the statute of limitations of Maryland, 1715, 2S’ w^'ch limits actions of assumpsit to three years after tiie cause ’of action shall have accrued.

'Ehe bill stated that Preston, the Complainant, had title to a tract of land in the state of Tennessee, but the Defendant, Tremble, fraudulently and deceitfully entered into it, and holds him out.

THIS was an appeal from the sentence of the Circuit Court of the district of Géorgia, which affirmed of the District Court, condemning the brig Penobscot, and her cárgo of salt, for a violation of the acts Congress, interdicting commercial intercourse with Great Britain and her dependencies, (via. the acts of March 1st, 1809, vol. 9, p. 243___May 1st, 1810, vol. 10, *86. — ,The President's proclamation of Nov. %d, 1810, and the act of Zd March, 1811, p. 346.J By the 4th…

In the Court below a case was agreed by the parties, which was in substance as follows. On the 28th of July, 1805, Mr. John Ifucornean,' Bordeaux, the agent of the Plaintiffs, shipped for them, there, on their account,' onboard the ship' Hamilton, which they, were owners, a cargo of the value of g> 22,986 on a voyage from Bordeaux to Mew York where the-Plaintiffs resided.

THIS was an appeal from the sentence of the Cir-¡suit Court for the district of Maryland, reversing that of the District Court, which condemned the schooner Jane for violation of the non-intercourse act... , . Contended that there ought to have been positive proof of the identity of the vessel, If these cases are,to be likened to criminal prosecutions, and if the same strictness be required, it will be impossible to execute the laws.

¿HÍS was an appeal, from the decree of the Circuu, Court for the district of Columbia, in a suit in Chance? fy, brought by Lee against Thomas Munroe, superin-, teodant of the city of Washington, and William Thornton, the survivor of the late board of commissioners for ^ía city. The object of the bill wasto obtain a discount of 3,000 dollars upon a judgment, Vhich Munroe, as superinténdant, had obtained against Lee upon his bond.

for the district of Columbia, sitting at Alexafidria, in a suit in Cliancéry brought by Richard Wren, and Susanna, his wife, who was the widow of Lewis Hipkins', deceased, and John and Westley Adams, her trustees, against W. Herberty T. Swann, R.,B. Lee, and W. B. Page, (trustees of Philip R. Fendall, deceased) and E. I. Lee, Jos. Deane and Ft Green.

Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813), involved a forfeiture statute that Congress passed with a condition. The 1809 Non-Intercourse Act, a trade prohibition against Great Britain, would be reinstated the following year unless the President declared that it was no longer violating the neutrality of the United States. The Court unanimously rejected arguments based on the nondelegation doctrine, "reviving the act [...] neither expressly or conditionally, as their judgment should direct."

THIS was an appeal from the-sentence of the: trict Court for the district of Orleans, (exercising the jurisdiction of a Circuit Court of the United States,) condemning the schooner Hoppet and her cargo as forfeited to the United States under the act of congress of Mart h 1, 1809, vol. 9, p. 243, entitled “ An act to “ interdict the commercial intercourse, between the Uni- « ted States and Great Britain and France and their « dependencies, and for other purposes.” The 4th…

<p>The. propriaéfs of buildmgs m Alexandria, insured by the society, thereact°ofd^ isembiy of ginia passed in subsequent018 regulations of pay San'etaád¡tionai puemiof hazard ac-newinreguia‘e lions of isos":</p>

The premises were publicly advertised, and set up at auotion-by a licensed auctioneer. On the day of sale, certain written articles, purporting to exhibit the terms, were read aloud by the auctioneer in the presence and hearing of the Defendant and others assembled upon that occasion, and the paper was also handed round and read by those present. Of those articles, only require notice. Art. 1st, declares that the highest bidder shall be the purchaser.

the assured to be an ^American bottom, proof of which to be required in « the United States only.” The former judgment of the Circuit Court, in this case’ having been reversed (see ante, vol. 6, p. 29,) and the cause remanded for a new trial, the verdict and judgmen:fc Wftt’e aSain in favor of the original Plaintiff.

Received of Wralter W. Harwood, as onfe of the ad* ministrators of William Eversfield Berry, deceased, in Paf,t of my claim against said estate, the three hogsheads of. crop tobacco as above, stated, to be allowed p. ct, ^10 six month’s credit price, at this place daring that time after the rescinding of the embargo.

■ ERROR to, the Circuit Court fin; the district of Maryland, in an action of covenant Upon a policy of insurance on ‘hides, which by the memorandum in the policy, are declared to be free from average, unless general. The policy contains the usual stipulation «that “ in case of-loss,or damage, the- assured shall labor, &c. “ for the preservation of the property, tó the 'expenses “ of which the assurers will contribute.” ' The voy was to Amsterdam.

Held: one year at least. 19 The act of 26 th March , 1804, vol. 7, p. 136, dispenses with the previous declaration of intention , &c. as to such aliens, 'being free white persons, as were residing 'within the limits, and under the jurisdiction of the United States, at any time between the 18th day of June, 1798, and the 14th day of April, 1802, and who have continued to reside within the same.' 20 The objection made by…

THIS was an appeal from the sentence of the Circuit Court for the district ef Pennsylvania, which dismissed the libel with costs.

<p>ERROR to the Circuit Court for the district of Maryland, in an action of covenant bn a policy of insuratlCC. '</p> <p>■ ”^ie j(!1T found a verdict “for. the Defendants, subject i° ^ie opinion of the Court on the points reserved” And judgment was thereupon rendered “for the Defendants accordingly.”</p> <p>^ie Plaintiffs, by their counsel, moved the Court be-,l°w that the points reserved (which the motion states, without stating the facts out Of which they arose) and the. opinion of the Court upon those points, should be entered on the record. .</p> <p>The Court did not act on this motion; and, ‘of course, the points do not appear, so as to enable this Court to take notice of them.</p> <p>The Defendants (it was said) would not agree to any arrangement by which the legal merits of the cause, as they appeared below, might come into discussion here,</p> <p>Contended that the verdict was imperfect,, contradict tory and void; and did not warrant'the judgment pro-, nounced upon it, nor any other judgment. 23 Vin. 397, pZ. 10. It is neither a general nor a special verdict.</p> <p>Admitted that it was in form an irregular proceed-. }ng, but he was instructed to insist on the judgment.</p> <p>it is a general verdict for the Defendants:, and by consent of parties it was referred to the Court; *and if they should be of opinion that the verdict should not Stand, they were to award a venire de ‘nevo. It was .the negligence of t[ie Plaintiffs in not having the facts, op the points andconsent, stated on the record.</p> <p>It is evident that what was doné was by consent, The Plaintiffs do not appear to. have wished to bring the case here; but were at the time contented to rely on the opinion of the Court below,</p>

THIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court for the, district of Massachusetts, in a suit in Chancery brought by Holker, and others, his assignees, against Parker, to set aside an award made under a rule of Court in a suit at law in the same Court between Holker and Parker, The case, as stated by Marsham, Ch. J. in delivering the opinion of the Court, was as follows: In the year 1782 John Holker, one of the Plaintiffs, in tlrs cause, DaniT Parker, the.

<p>descontó "in • Maryland ■ has not declared now an intestate estate shall descend, rived' to^the" mte^tate from his half brother» or from his brother of blood 'orfrom tis son or daughter, or buTsuch'e-6 ’ states are left £ lav.</p> <p>A infeSe mid ir he sha’u die of 2?’ and without issue, then to good"executory devise; and forithe'eon-’ t'ngencyhappe», it dehuTieirPauit so from tickCy iiappénf1 ^"u£|Ves.ls Wmouiywho can theumake B^he execulory devi es. at’iawof b. 5j9; *®e®.“cu‘ ^ <íeeVotving o» him, is pot tate, but on J^ievoh-a^to the npxt'heu-° ofB. One temon'eammt maintain eject^eo-tenanM without actual ouste’-’-</p>

* , At the trial the Defendant taok three bills of exceptions. The first stated*, that tiré Plaintiff produced in deiice, at the trial, a deed of bargain and sale from.!. C and Thomas Blount, to whom it was alleged the land had been granted by the state of North Carolina, while it was a part of that state. Tim deed from I. G. and T. Blount, was executed on the 9ih .of October, 1794, to David Allison.

Columbia in an action of debt upon a judgment of the Supreme Court of the state of New York, to which the Defendant below pleaded Nit debet, which plea; upon general demurrer, was adjudged bad. By the constitution Of the United States, art. 4, sect. 4, it is declared, that « full faith and credit shall be ((given, in each state, to the public acts, records and “judicial proceedings of every other state.

The case arose upon á policy, of insurance pn the snow Comet, “at and from Baltimore to Bar- “ cclona, and at and from Barcelona back to Balti- ,, more. ‘ She arrived at Barcelona on the 25th of July, 1807, and after remaining forty days under quarantine, went up to the city where she remained until the 8th of January, 1808.

Held: sold, or disposed of as slaves, or to be held to service or labor, in violation of a certain act of Congress of the United States, passed the second day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seven, entitled 'An act to prohibit the importation of slaves into any port or place within the jurisdiction of the U. States from and after the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one…

The case was now argued by Jones and Harper, for the Pla’intiff in error: and by F. S. Key and Morsell, the Defendant. ’ The fonher contended,. that Riggs was not to be con* sideretl as a joint contractor, but a sub-purchaser$ and that if the Defendants were jointly interested in the purchase, they were severally interested in the sales. In support of this position, they cited Watson on Partnership, 24. 1 Ve». 242. Cowp. 449. 2 H. BL 298. Doug. S7Í. Sr 1II.

THIS case came up from the Circuit Court for the ^strict of Ohio, upon a certificate stating that the judges of that Court were divided in opinion upon the question, Whether that Court had power to issue a writ bf mandamus to the register of % land-office in Ohio, commanding him to issue a final c ertificate of purchase to the-Plaintiff for.certain lands intha state? referred the Court to case of Marbury v. Madison, (ante vol. 1, p. 137.) The constitution of the United…

Ma ryland, in an action of covenant upon a policy- of ins» ranee (against capture only) upon tlie cargo of the ship Herkimer, « from. Guayaquil, or her last port of departure in South America, to New-York,” “ warranted Jhneri.can property, proof of which to be required in the United States only,” « and warranted free from seizure for illicit trade.” The declaration was on a loss by capture.

THIS was'an appeal from a decree of the Circuit ^’!ur^ f°*1 the District of Columbia; sitting in Alexandria, as a Court of .Equity. Young brought a bill in equity against Grundy f® be relieved from a judgment at law, obtained by Grundy against him on a promissory note given by him in Virfinia, to one William Chambers from whom it passed, y several intermediate indorsements, to Grundy.

E RROR to the Supremo Court of Errors of the state of Connecticut, in any action of assault and battery and false imprisonment, brought by Alien against Palmer, who was a deputy marshal of thq United States for the district of Connecticut and had served a process of attachment upon Allen,. and committed him to prison want of bail, without such a mittimus as is usual upon commitment on like process issuing from the state Courts.

The suit was brought by Young,' Deblois, and Law: rason, against Black to recover the proceeds of the sales of a cargo shipped by tlie-jMaintiffs to the West Indies, on board the brig Active, of which the Defendaut was master, and to. whom the cargo was conSigUCd. . The Plaintiffs, Young and Deblois, had each an interest of three eighths in the cargo, and the Plaintiff, rason, the other two eighths.

, THIS was an appeal from the sentence of the Circuit Court for the district of South Carolina, condemning the schooner Anne for violation of the non-intercourse law of March 1, 1809. § 6, vol. 9, p. 247. 1. The libel in this case is too imperfect to warrant a sentence of condemnation. It does not state what kind of goods were taken on board j it merely says certain articles prohibited by' law. If they were French goods it was lawful to take them on board.

<p>ERROR to the Circuit Court for the district of Kentucky.</p> <p>Tbis case was submitted to the Court without argliment, and</p>

<p>THIS was also a writ of error to the Circuit Court, for the district of Kentucky.</p>

Held: as parcel of the said- tract of land, by th* said Gravier .and those under whom ho held.

The case was this: Bacon, the Defendant1 in ,error, having obtained permission to import a cargo of flour from Baltimore into the port of Barnstable, arrived with his cargo at a place called the Mud-hole in the district and port of Barnstable on the 2d of October, 1808, and on the 3d obtained from Joseph Otis, the collector of the port, a permit to land the cargo. On the next day the vessel and cargo were seized by Simeon Crowell, the inspector of the port.

TRROR tp the Circuit Court for the district • iff: Columbia, sitting at Washington.

Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813), was a United States Supreme Court case arising out of the acquisition of lands originally granted by the British King Charles II (then in exile) in 1649 to Lord Fairfax in the Northern Neck and westward (all in what became the state of Virginia).