In Re Klein’s Empirical Analysis

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The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The Legislative History, in Senate Report No. 95-989, states the following: “Only a creditor ... that does not have an interest materially adverse to the interest of general unsecured creditors ... may vote for a trustee_ The application of the standard requires a balancing of various factors, such as the nature of the adversity. A creditor with a very small equity position would not be excluded from voting solely because he holds a small equity in the debtor.” S.Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 5963, 6053. Thus, both the language of the Code as well as the Legislative History highlight the requirement of adversity to “creditors entitled to ... distribution” or, as the Legislative History puts it, “general unsecured creditors”, rather than material adversity to any individual creditor. [[Image here]] The cases thus make clear that material adversity is measured by the effect on the creditor body as a whole, particularly by whether the challenged creditor’s interest is such that it would tend to minimize distributions to the other creditors from the estate. Since merely opposing the claim of a single other creditor would not have the effect of minimizing distributions from the estate as a whole, it can fairly be concluded that such an interest does not qualify as materially adverse. Further, claims between creditors do not reduce the size of the estate and, therefore, also do not reduce the amount available for distribution to oth”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re Klein

2. “On June 1, 1988, USF & G obtained a judgment in the sum of $5,315,897.10 against Donna Jean Klein (“Ms. Klein”) in a case captioned United States Fideli ty and Guarantee Company v. Klein Corporation, et al, 86 CH 10115. The Trustee filed an adversary proceeding against Ms. Klein (87 A 0571) to recover, as a fraudulent conveyance, the property known as 637 Berkshire Court, Downers Grove, Illinois. Tr. at pg. 354. USF & G attempted to intervene in the adversary proceeding on June 5, 1988. Tr. at pg. 355. On February 21, 1989, USF & G withdrew its motion to intervene. Tr. at pg. 355. USF & G has since taken the position that the transfers of this property should only be set aside to the extent that title is returned to Ms. Klein, rather than to the debtor, who transferred his interest in the property to Ms. Klein shortly before she transferred her interest to a third party. Tr. at pg. 354-356. USF & G has maintained this position at all relevant times. Tr. at pg. 355-356.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re Klein

3. “Here, by means of the RICO cause of action, which USF & G most assuredly believes it has separate and apart from the Klein estate, USF & G is competing in a real and demonstratively dollars and cents fashion, with the Klein estate for recovery, regardless of theory, from the same limited fund, the defendants. Therefore, the required adversity exists to a material extent.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re Klein