¶1I dissent.
¶2I have serious reservations as to the propriety of the trial court’s order admitting evidence that, 21 months before his encounter with the alleged victim (Ms. D) in this case, appellant had forced another woman (Ms. L) to engage in oral copulation in similar circumstances. My colleagues conclude that evidence of the attacks on Ms. L was admissible for either of two purposes: to prove appellant’s criminal intent with respect to Ms. D and to corroborate Ms. D’s testimony. My perception of the record in this case, and of the language of Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), as construed generally by our Supreme Court, leads me to disagree with my colleagues as to the first proposed predicate for admissibility; the instructions given by the trial court preclude consideration of the second predicate.
¶3Intent
¶4Where the People seek to prove the criminal intent of the alleged perpetrator of a sex crime by evidence that on other occasions he acted similarly and with the requisite intent (cf., Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b); People v. Kelley (1967) 66 Cal.2d 232, 240 [57 Cal.Rptr. 363, 424 P.2d 947]; cf. also People v. Thomas (1978) 20 Cal.3d 457, 465 [143 Cal.Rptr. 215, 573 P.2d 433]), the law instructs the trial court to receive the tendered evidence only with “extreme caution.” (Cf., e.g., People v. Kelley, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 239.) Evidence of other crimes necessarily “has a ‘highly inflammatory and prejudicial effect’ on the trier of fact” (People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 314 [165 Cal.Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883]); this concern is particularly pressing in sex cases because “charges of sex offenses are often unreliable and particularly difficult to disprove.” (People v. Kelley, supra,66 Cal.2d at p. 240.) It follows that, in sex cases even more than in other criminal cases, if the connection of evidence of other similar crimes “with the crime charged is not clearly perceived, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.” (Id., at p. 239.)
¶5“Thus, admission of other crimes evidence cannot be justified merely by asserting an admissible purpose. Such evidence may only be admitted if it ‘(a) “tends logically, naturally and by reasonable inference” to prove the issue upon which it is offered; (b) is offered upon an issue which will ultimately prove to be material to the People’s case; and (c) is not merely cumulative with respect to other evidence which the People may use to prove the same issue.’” (People v. Guerrero (1976) 16 *572Cal.3d 719, 724 [129 Cal.Rptr. 166, 548 P.2d 366], quoting from People v. Schader (1969) 71 Cal.2d 761, 775 [80 Cal.Rptr. 1, 457 P.2d 841].) In short, evidence of a defendant’s criminal conduct on other occasions should be admitted only: “when the probative value of such evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. [Citations.] This balancing test is necessarily particularistic, depending not upon mechanically automatic rules, but upon the trial court’s consideration of the unique facts and issues of each case ....” (People v. Schader, supra,71 Cal.2d at pp. 773-774.)
¶6Aside from these balancing rules, the law plainly proscribes any attempt to prove the elements of a crime charged against a defendant by way of his criminal disposition or propensity as arguably inferred from his criminal conduct on other occasions: Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), states the general rule that “evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his character (... in the form of... evidence of specific instances of his conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his conduct on a specified occasion.” Our Supreme Court has newly observed that “Subdivision (a) does not permit a court to balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect. The inference of a criminal disposition may not be used to establish any link in the chain of logic connecting the uncharged offense with a material fact. If no theory of relevancy can be established without this pitfall, the evidence of the uncharged offense is simply inadmissible.” (People v. Thompson, supra,27 Cal.3d at p. 317.)
¶7In all the circumstances of the case before us I conclude that evidence of appellant’s attack upon Ms. L could have been probative of his intent with respect to Ms. D only by way of an impermissible inference that he was predisposed to commit forcible oral copulation, and therefore that such evidence should not have been received to prove intent.
¶8Neither of the crimes charged required proof of a specific intent: in addition to the physical act connoted by each crime it was incumbent upon the People to prove that Ms. D did not consent and that appellant had a general criminal intent to commit the act without regard to whether Ms. D. consented. (Cf., Pen. Code, §§ 261, 288a; People v. Franklin (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 18, 27 [128 Cal.Rptr. 94]; People v. Avanzi (1938) 25 Cal.App.2d 301, 302 [77 P.2d 237]; People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 765 [114 Cal.Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267], disapproved as to an unrelated issue in People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 685, fn. 13 [160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1]; People v. May*573berry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 155 [125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542 P.2d 1337].) The only direct evidence of the crimes was provided by Ms. D, who testified that she awoke to find appellant standing over her, covering her face and nose with a towel and holding long scissors, that she struggled with him briefly, but that she then submitted to oral copulation and sexual intercourse because she was afraid and that she did not voluntarily consent to the acts. If accepted as true Ms. D’s account amply supported an inference that appellant harbored the requisite general intent. Appellant did not testify and presented no other evidence. Appellant’s attorney advised the court at the outset that “consensual sex is the issue in this case,” but then, by cross-examination and summation, launched a broadcast attack upon Ms. D’s credibility, going so far as to suggest to the jurors, in summation, that they might choose to disbelieve that sexual acts had occurred at all. Counsel focused on the question whether Ms. D had consented, an issue essentially distinct from the matter of appellant’s criminal intent (cf., People v. Hunt (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 190, 200 [139 Cal.Rptr. 675]) and as to which evidence that on another occasion another woman had not consented would be wholly irrelevant.
¶9In this posture of the record the jury’s attention was directed to the issue of appellant’s intent only in the general sense that all elements of the crime had been put in issue by appellant’s not guilty pleas: appellant’s intent was not singled out, and there was no apparent need for the People to present additional evidence on that issue as distinct from any other issue in the case. Obviously the critical question raised by counsel and unmistakably presented to the jury was Ms. D’s credibility: had appellant behaved in the way which Ms. D described? If he had, then a finding of the requisite intent would be a simple second step. If he had not, then Ms. D’s admitted subsequent acquiescence was explicable only in terms of voluntary consent and appellant would be guilty of neither crime. Thus in the circumstances of this case the preemptive impact of proof of appellant’s prior attack on Ms. L would be to lend credence to Ms. D’s testimony by way of a finding that appellant had a propensity or disposition to employ force upon sleeping women as a prelude to oral copulation. Once it was established that appellant had approached Ms. D in the manner which she described, an inference of the requisite intent would logically arise. But as construed in Thompsonsubdivision (a) of section 1101 forbids use of an inference of criminal propensity or disposition “to establish any link in the chain of logic connecting the uncharged offense with a material fact.” (People v. Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 317.) And quite apart from the Thompsonanalysis, in my *574view the likelihood that the jury would misuse the evidence of appellant’s conduct with Ms. L simply as evidence of appellant’s conduct with Ms. D, to appellant’s manifest prejudice, was too great to be outweighed by the problematic probative value of the prior offense on the narrow issue of intent.
¶10Corroboration
¶11The alternative theory to support admission of the other crimes evidence is that it provided corroboration of the prosecuting witness’ version of events. Application of that theory was not argued by the People at trial nor was it suggested by the Attorney General in his briefs here.
¶12As an original proposition, proof of appellant’s prior attack on Ms. L would have no tendency in logic to corroborate Ms. D’s testimony as to her own thoughts and actions or as to her observations of the acts of third persons: such proof could only tend to corroborate Ms. D’s description of appellant’s conduct, and would do so only by virtue of an inference that if appellant attacked Ms. L in a certain way in 1977 he probably attacked Ms. D in a similar way in 1978. Subdivision (a) of section 1101 appears to me flatly to prohibit such use of prior conduct. (Cf., People v. St. Andrew (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 450, 464 [161 Cal.Rptr. 634].) Nevertheless our Supreme Court has relatively recently declared that sufficiently similar conduct on another occasion can be admitted to corroborate the victim’s testimony in a sex case. (People v. Pendleton (1979) 25 Cal.3d 371, 378 [158 Cal.Rptr. 343, 599 P.2d 649]; People v. Thomas (1978) 20 Cal.3d 457, 468 [143 Cal.Rptr. 215, 573 P.2d 433]; cf., also, People v. Kazee (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 593, 596 [121 Cal.Rptr. 221].) Surely the attack on Ms. L and that reported by Ms. D are sufficiently similar: the rule declared in Pendletonand Thomasappears applicable, and my colleagues and I are bound by it. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937].)
¶13Had the trial court instructed the jury that they could use the evidence of defendant’s prior criminal conduct to corroborate the present victim’s testimony the rule of Pendletonand Thomaswould be applicable. But that instruction was not given. Instead the jury was clearly instructed to consider the evidence of the attack on Ms. L “only for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to show. . . intent...” and was told that “[y]ou are not permitted to consider such evidence for *575any other purpose.” It is therefore understandable that the Attorney General did not argue here that the jury could use the evidence for corroboration: they were told not to.
¶14Since it was error to use this evidence for proving intent and because the jury under the instructions given was allowed to use this evidence only for that improper purpose, it is irrelevant that instructions could have been given which would have allowed its use for corroboration.
¶15The prejudicial nature of the erroneously admitted evidence is obvious. (People v. Kelley, supra,66 Cal.2d 232, 245 [57 Cal.Rptr. 363, 424 P.2d 947]; People v. Guerrero, supra,16 Cal.3d 719, 730 [129 Cal.Rptr. 166, 548 P.2d 366]; People v. Thomas, supra,20 Cal.3d 457, 470 [143 Cal.Rptr. 215, 573 P.2d 433].) Appellant deserves a new trial on relevant, nonprejudicial evidence accompanied by proper instructions.
¶16Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied November 19, 1980. Bird, C. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.