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110 F.2d 554

Docket No. 7536.

Williams v. United States

District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided Feb. 26, 1940.

District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1940-02-26

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““Although this case was argued on the theory that appellant was charged with the offense of common prostitution, the fact is otherwise. She is charged under a statute which makes it an offense to invite, entice, or persuade a person in or upon a public street in the District of Columbia to accompany her to her residence for the purpose of prostitution or any other immoral or lewd purpose. She is not charged with the offense of prostitution. Perhaps a more common designation of the offense charged would be ‘street-walking,’ which is ordinarily punished as disorderly conduct or indecent behavior on the public highway.” Id. at 307 .”

quoted by 1 later decision, including In re Appeal No. 180

“[T]here was no proof that defendant’s purpose was among those which the statute prohibits. The government’s evidence was that she approached a policeman’s car on a certain street and "asked him if he wanted a date;’’ that he answered yes; that she asked if she should get in the car, and he answered yes; that she got in the car and asked “if he wanted to drive and talk." Defendant’s purpose was at worst ambiguous. There was no evidence that the parties were strangers to each other; and even if they were, the proposed “date" did not necessarily include prostitution.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Ford v. United States

Relies on United States v. Hess · Bailey v. United States · 1 App. D.C. 518 - Ainsworth v. United States

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1940-02-26

How this case has been cited

Cited by 18 later decisions — most recently November 1987

3 federal appellate · 15 state decisions

7019401950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Myron G. Ehrlich, of Washington, D. C., for plaintiff in error.

¶2David A. Pine, U. S. Atty., and Albert Goldstein, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Washington, D. C., for defendant in error.

¶3Before STEPHENS, EDGERTON, and RUTLEDGE, Associate Justices.

¶4EDGERTON, Associate Justice.

¶5The Code forbids “any person to invite … any person … in or upon any avenue, street, road, highway, open space, alley, public square, or inclosure in the District of Columbia, to accompany … her … for the purpose of prostitution, or any other immoral or lewd purpose.”1 This condemns solicitation in places of certain sorts.2 Defendant was convicted on an information which does not charge that she acted in any such place, but charges merely that she did “unlawfully invite … for the purpose of prostitution” in the District of Columbia. Therefore it charges no crime. This defect cannot be cured by verdict. United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 8 S.Ct. 571, 31 L.Ed. 516. Cf. Ainsworth v. United States, 1 App.D.C. 518, 523.

¶6Even if the information were valid, the conviction would not be, for there was no proof that defendant’s purpose was among those which the statute prohibits. The government’s evidence was that she approached a policeman’s car on a certain street and “asked him if he wanted a date that he answered yes; that she asked if she should get in the car, and he answered yes; that she got in the car and asked “if he wanted to drive and talk.” Defendant’s purpose was at worst ambiguous. There was no evidence that the parties were strangers to each other; and even if they were, the proposed “date” did not necessarily include prostitution.

¶7Reversed.

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