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← 110 F.3d 1269 - Valance v. Wisel

Valance v. Wisel’s Empirical Analysis

110 F.3d 1269 · 1997

Citation profile

85
cited by 85 later decisions
2
states following
October 2019
most recently cited

38 federal appellate · 7 district · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 85 later decisions — most recently October 2019 · most notably State v. Ladson (1999), United States of America v. Tommie T. Childs (2002)

38 federal appellate · 7 district · 3 state decisions

310199720002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 922 (Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · Terry v. Ohio · Harlow v. Fitzgerald · Anderson v. Creighton · Schneckloth v. Bustamonte

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 85 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “current belief is somewhat inconsistent with the statements he made to Officer Wisel at the time of the stop. According to the officer, Valance indicated that he was tired and that he could understand how he may have gone left of center. Valance does not deny that this is what he told Wisel when stopped. Although he cannot remember precisely what was said, Valance admits to implying that he was groggy and that he may not have been paying attention. It is thus undisputed that Valance indicated to Wisel that he really did not know whether he had crossed the center line but that he could understand how he may have done so. Yet he now is insisting that he does not believe he ever crossed the center line. We think a reasonable jury could only take from all of this that Valance really does not know one way or the other. Thus, his evidence does not rebut that proffered by the officer.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “In Ruggiero, for example, the Second Circuit observed that although a warrantless search generally is considered presumptively unreasonable, “[t]he operation of this presumption ... cannot serve to place on the defendant the burden of proving that the official action was reasonable.” 928 F.2d at 563 . The court concluded that at most, the presumption may require the defendant to produce evidence of consent or of some other recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Id. Yet once the defendant has done so, “the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion must remain squarely on the plaintiff in accordance with established principles governing civil trials.” Id. (citing Fed.R.Evid. 301). We generally agree with Ruggiero’s formulation of the proper allocation of the parties’ burdens in a section 1983 action alleging a Fourth Amendment violation.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a reasonable officer in the defendant’s position would not have believed that a crime suspect was in [the plaintiffs] home [i.e., the “hot pursuit” exception to the warrant requirement].”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.