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110 F.4th 791

Carson v. USAA Casualty Ins

U.S. Courts of Appeals

Decided August 6, 2024

U.S. Courts of Appeals · decided 2024-08-06

Relies on Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc. · Garris v. Cincinnati Insurance · Concrete Services, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.

Decided 2024-08-06

Case: 24-30014      Document: 37-1        Page: 1   Date Filed: 08/06/2024




        United States Court of Appeals
             for the Fifth Circuit                            United States Court of Appeals
                            ____________                               Fifth Circuit

                                                                     FILED
                             No. 24-30014                       August 6, 2024
                            ____________                        Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                     Clerk
Shannon Carson,

                                                       Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                  versus

USAA Casualty Insurance Company,

                                        Defendant—Appellee.
              ______________________________

              Appeal from the United States District Court
                 for the Western District of Louisiana
                         USDC No. 5:23-CV-1
              ______________________________

Before King, Stewart, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge:
      This appeal concerns one principal issue: whether South Carolina’s
prohibition on stacking underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage for Class
II insureds bars appellant Shannon Carson from recovering UIM benefits
under his personal automobile insurance policy. Concluding that South
Carolina law does not prevent such recovery, we VACATE and REMAND.
                                     I.
      This case arises out of a 2021 automobile accident in Bienville Parish,
Louisiana, in which Shannon Carson was injured. The following facts are
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                                       No. 24-30014


undisputed. Carson was driving an 18-wheeler truck owned by his employer
Senn Freight Lines, Inc. when another vehicle collided with the rear of
Carson’s truck. The accident was caused by the negligence of the other
driver, Jamarcea Washington, who died as a result of the collision.
        GEICO Casualty Insurance Company provided liability coverage on
Washington’s vehicle. 1 American Millenium Insurance Company insured
the Senn Freight 18-wheeler driven by Carson and provided $75,000 in UIM
coverage. 2 In addition, Carson had a personal automobile insurance policy
issued by USAA Casualty Insurance Company that covered Carson’s
personal vehicle, which was not involved in the accident, and provided
$50,000 in UIM coverage.
        Carson filed suit in Louisiana state court against GEICO, American
Millenium, and USAA; the defendants then removed the case to federal
court based on diversity jurisdiction. 3 Carson settled with both GEICO and
American Millenium for their policy limits. The parties agree that South
Carolina law governs this dispute. USAA moved for summary judgment,
arguing that Carson is a Class II insured under South Carolina law and that
he is prohibited from “stacking” his personal UIM insurance on top of the

        _____________________
        1
          The amount of the liability coverage does not appear in the record; however, no
parties contest that Washington qualified as an underinsured motorist.
        2
          Underinsured motorist coverage is a variant of uninsured motorist coverage:
“The concept is that the insured purchases a set limit of UIM, guaranteeing recovery for
injuries up to that amount; if the persons responsible for the victim’s injuries are insured
but for amounts lower than the victim’s UIM limits. The victim is able to collect the
difference under the UIM policy.” Underinsured Motorist (UIM) Insurance, Generally, 9
Couch on Ins. § 122:3.
        3
          According to the notice of removal, the parties are diverse: Carson is a citizen of
South Carolina, GEICO a citizen of Nebraska, American Millenium a citizen of New
Jersey, and USAA a citizen of Texas. Carson pleaded in his amended petition that the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.




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                                      No. 24-30014


American Millenium UIM coverage. The district court agreed and granted
summary judgment. Carson then filed a Rule 59(e) motion, arguing for the
first time that under South Carolina law, Carson was able to “port” his
personal UIM coverage and therefore he was entitled to recover UIM
benefits under his personal automobile coverage, in addition to the UIM
coverage provided by American Millenium. The district court entertained
the new arguments, but denied relief, concluding that this case turned on
stackability, not portability, and that Carson already received the statutory
limit for UIM coverage under South Carolina law. Carson timely appealed
the court’s order granting summary judgment and the order denying his
motion for reconsideration.
                                            II.
        The court below applied South Carolina law, which the parties agree
govern the dispute. 4 We review grants of summary judgment de novo.
Miller v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 
98 F.4th 211, 216
 (5th Cir. 2024). Rule 56(a)
provides that district courts “shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). While
we typically review district court denials of Rule 59(e) motions under an
abuse of discretion standard, that standard shifts to de novo review if the
district court considered new materials not previously submitted to the court.
Catalyst Strategic Advisors, L.L.C. v. Three Diamond Cap. Sbc, L.L.C., 93

        _____________________
        4
          A federal court sitting in diversity applies the choice-of-law provisions of the
forum state, here, Louisiana. Ellis v. Trustmark Builders, Inc., 
625 F.3d 222, 225
 (5th Cir.
2010); see also La. Civ. Code art. 3537 (setting forth the choice-of-law analysis for
conventional obligations, such as contracts). Because Carson is a resident of South Carolina
and the USAA policy was issued in South Carolina, the district court concluded that South
Carolina had a more substantial interest in applying its law than Louisiana, the state where
the accident occurred.




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                                   No. 24-
30014 F.4th 870
, 875 (5th Cir. 2024). While Carson did not provide new materials
to the district court, he raised new legal arguments, which the court
considered. Because the sole question before us is a legal one, whether a de
novo or an abuse of discretion standard applies is immaterial. See Highmark
Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 
572 U.S. 559
, 564 n.2 (2014) (“A
district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an
erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the
evidence.” (citation omitted)).
                                       III.
       The sole question before us is whether Carson can recover UIM
benefits from his personal automobile insurance policy with USAA, in
addition to the UIM benefits he received from American Millenium, which
insured the 18-wheeler truck Carson was driving at the time of the accident.
USAA contends that South Carolina’s prohibition on “stacking” UIM
coverage prevents this recovery, while Carson counters that stacking is not
implicated in this case.
       “Stacking is the insured’s recovery of damages under more than one
policy until the insured satisfies all of his damages or exhausts the limits of all
available policies.” Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Ladue, No. 21-1680, 
2023 WL 5289365
, at *3 (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 2023). Whether an insured may stack UIM
coverages turns on whether he is classified as either a Class I or a Class II
insured:
       The two classes of insureds are: (1) the named insured, his
       spouse and relatives residing in his household; and (2) any
       person using, with the consent of the named insured, the motor
       vehicle to which the policy applies and a guest in the motor
       vehicle. The right to stack is available only to a Class I.
Concrete Servs., Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 
498 S.E.2d 865, 866
 (1998)
(internal citations omitted). Section 38-77-160 of the South Carolina Code




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                                      No. 24-30014


provides the relevant framework when more than one policy or coverage is
implicated:
        If, however, an insured or named insured is protected by
        uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage in excess of the
        basic limits, the policy shall provide that the insured or named
        insured is protected only to the extent of the coverage he has
        on the vehicle involved in the accident. If none of the insured’s
        or named insured’s vehicles is involved in the accident,
        coverage is available only to the extent of coverage on any one
        of the vehicles with the excess or underinsured coverage.
S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-160
.
        To summarize, Class II insureds cannot stack UIM coverage and are
only entitled to the UIM benefits of the highest of the available UIM policy
limits on a single vehicle. The district court concluded, and the parties both
now agree, that Carson is a Class II insured. 5 Because the American
Millenium UIM policy limit ($75,000) is higher than the UIM limits of
Carson’s USAA policy ($50,000), the district court determined that Carson
is not entitled to any more than the $75,000 in UIM benefits he already
received.
        While that may appear to end our analysis (and comprised the entirety
of the arguments on the motion for summary judgement below), Carson
changed course when he filed his Rule 59 motion. Carson contended this case
does not implicate stacking, but instead only involves Carson’s right to
“port” his personal UIM policy. The South Carolina Court of Appeals has
explained that “portability refers to a person’s ability to use his coverage on
a vehicle not involved in an accident as a basis for recovery of damages

        _____________________
        5
         Carson originally argued that there was a genuine question of material fact as to
whether he was a Class I or Class II insured.




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                                   No. 24-30014


sustained in the accident.” Nakatsu v. Encompass Indem. Co., 
700 S.E.2d 283, 288
 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010). Because South Carolina law allows Carson to port
his personal insurance policy, Carson contends he is entitled to UIM
coverage under his USAA policy.
       Portability and stacking are not mutually exclusive theories but
distinct concepts that address how insurance benefits should be apportioned.
While portability provides a basis for a person to recover under his personal
insurance policy when none of their covered vehicles was involved in an
accident, it does not necessarily follow that because a policy is portable, that
insurance policy circumvents stacking rules. Portability is simply a
prerequisite for an insured injured in a car accident not involving his vehicle
to be able to recover under his own UIM policy. See Ladue, 
2023 WL 5289365
, at *3.
       The question Carson really poses is whether stacking, and § 38-77-160
of the Code, become relevant when an insured attempts to stack multiple
polices that he holds, but not when he attempts to recover UIM benefits as to
only one vehicle under his own policy, in addition to UIM benefits received
from a third-party insurer. Therefore, the question before us is whether the
second phrase of the pertinent language of § 38-77-160—below—refers to
any and all UIM coverage that may be available to an injured insured,
including from third parties, or whether that sentence only refers to the
coverages held by a specific insured.
       If none of the insured’s or named insured’s vehicles is involved
       in the accident, coverage is available only to the extent of coverage
       on any one of the vehicles with the excess or underinsured coverage.
S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-160
 (emphasis added). USAA contends this
language governs all available UIM coverage, while Carson argues that it is
limited to coverage held by a single insured.




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                                      No. 24-30014


        Carson relies primarily upon a district court decision from the District
of South Carolina to support his position. In Wojdyla v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance, the insured, Sally Wojdyla, was a passenger in Paula
Merten’s vehicle when it was struck by second vehicle, the driver of which
was at fault. 
487 F. Supp. 3d 482
, 484-85 (D.S.C. 2020). Wojdyla, like
Carson, was a Class II insured. Id. at 487. Again, like Carson, she received
the limits of the at-fault driver’s liability policy as well as the policy limits of
Merten’s UIM coverage. Id. at 484. Here the facts diverge: Wojdyla also
received $100,000 in UIM benefits from her own policy, which covered her
personal vehicle that was not involved in the accident. Id. Wojdyla then sued
attempting to obtain an additional $100,000 under her husband’s UIM
coverage. Id. While the question of whether Wojdyla should have received
UIM benefits from her own policy was not a live issue in that case, the district
court did explain that “portability is what allowed [Wojdyla] to receive the
$100,000 payment from Sally’s UIM coverage. But, to pay [Wojdyla] also
for the UIM coverage from [her husband’s] policy would be stacking,” which
was prohibited for Class II insureds under South Carolina law. Id. at 488 6
Neither the district court nor USAA addressed the Wojdyla decision.
        Instead, when considering Carson’s Rule 59(e) motion, the district
court rejected Carson’s portability argument and relied upon the Fourth
Circuit’s unpublished decision in Progressive Northern Ins. Co. v. Ladue to
support its conclusion that permitting Carson to recover under his USAA
policy would be stackingBut the reasoning in Progressive is not inconsistent

        _____________________
        6
           Carson also relies on two cases from the Supreme Court of South Carolina,
Burgess v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 
644 S.E.2d 40, 42
 (S.C. 2007), and Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Rhoden, 
728 S.E.2d 477, 480
 (S.C. 2012); however, each case is distinguishable.
In both cases, the vehicle involved in the accident lacked UM/UIM coverage and the
plaintiffs were not attempting to recover UIM benefits under more than one policy or
coverage, so stacking was not implicated.




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                                       No. 24-30014


with Carson’s position. In that case, the estate of the decedent, who had been
driving a city-owned vehicle during the fatal accident, recovered liability
limits from the at-fault driver and then attempted to recover UIM benefits
from both the decedent’s insurer and his mother’s insurer. 
2023 WL 5289365
 at *1. From the court’s opinion and the parties’ briefing, it is unclear
whether the decedent’s estate recovered UIM benefits from the city. The
Fourth Circuit explained that the case turned on stacking, not portability,
because portability was the prerequisite theory that allowed the decedent’s
estate to recover at all from his personal polices. Id. at *3. The court
determined that the estate’s attempt to recover UIM benefits from both the
decedent’s policy and his mother’s policy—beyond the UIM limit of
either—was stacking and prohibited under South Carolina law. Id.
        The Fourth Circuit in Ladue was not faced with a scenario that would
have answered the question before us: If the decedent’s estate had recovered
UIM benefits from a third party, the City’s insurance policy, would the
decedent have been able to recover UIM benefits from his own policy? The
district court in Wojdyla would say yes, and the South Carolina Supreme
Court appears to agree.
        In Garris v. Cincinnati Insurance, Thomas Garris died following an
automobile accident in which he was the passenger of a truck hit by a drunk
driver. 
311 S.E.2d 723
 (S.C. 1984). 7 Garris’s estate recovered the liability
limits of the at-fault driver’s policy. 
Id. at 725
. The truck in which Garris was
a passenger was covered by a Cincinnati Insurance policy that insured

        _____________________
        7
           The opinion involved three questions certified to the South Carolina Supreme
Court, including one—not relevant here—about the definition of an underinsured motorist
under South Carolina law. While that portion of the opinion was later superseded by
statute, see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Horry, 
403 S.E.2d 318, 319
 (1991), it does not
affect the portion of the court’s analysis regarding stacking.




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                                       No. 24-30014


seventeen vehicles. 
Id.
 In addition, Garris had his own insurance policy with
Allstate that covered four personal vehicles (none of which was involved in
the accident). 
Id.
 The federal district court in South Carolina certified several
questions to the South Carolina Supreme Court, including whether
“coverage on each of the vehicles insured under each [insurer’s] policy
[could] be stacked.” 
Id.
 Because Garris was a Class II insured (none of his
covered vehicles was involved in the accident), the court concluded that
Garris could not stack UIM coverage for the sixteen other vehicles insured
under the same Cincinnati policy on top of the UIM benefits covering the
involved vehicle. Id. at 727. The South Carolina Supreme Court then
separately addressed Garris’s own policy with Allstate, interpreted the
identical statutory language 8 present in our case, and determined:
        The obvious intent of the legislature is to allow insureds or
        named insureds to take advantage of the benefit of their bargain
        with their insurance carrier when they are injured by an
        underinsured motorist and their vehicle is not involved in the
        accident. But, the recovery here is limited to the extent of
        coverage on one vehicle with the underinsured motorist
        coverage, as the decedents are members of the second class.
        Thus, plaintiffs cannot stack the coverage of the other vehicles under
        the policies issued to them, but may only recover benefits on one
        vehicle with the coverage.
Id. (emphasis added). While written somewhat obliquely, this last
sentence—with its distinction between “other vehicles” and the “one
vehicle with the coverage” under “policies issued to [plaintiffs]”—would

        _____________________
        8
           While the South Carolina Supreme Court was interpreting the predecessor
statute, formerly codified at Section 56–9–831, the pertinent language in the 1987 version
is identical to the current version: “If none of the insured’s or named insured’s vehicles is
involved in the accident, coverage is available only to the extent of coverage on any one of
the vehicles with the excess or underinsured coverage.”




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                                  No. 24-30014


allow Garris’s estate to recover UIM benefits under his personal insurance
policy, but would limit that recovery to the UIM coverage provided to one of
personal vehicles not involved in the accident.
        A treatise published by the South Carolina Bar Association in 2015
reads the Garris opinion similarly, concluding that the South Carolina
Supreme Court limited Garris to recovering the UIM policy limits covering
one of his (at-home) insured vehicles, totaling $15,000, in addition to the
UIM benefits received from Cincinnati Insurance that covered the involved
vehicle. See A. Johnston Cox, Stacking, in The Law of Automobile
Insurance in South Carolina 345 (William F. Barnes, et al., eds.
2015). That same treatise summarized what UIM benefits a Class II insured
may recover:
       Class II insureds (which includes permissive users and guests)
       may not stack even basic UM and UIM policies; stated another
       way, if none of the insured’s vehicles is involved in the
       accident, the insured can only collect the UM or UIM benefits
       on the accident vehicle, plus UM or UIM coverage on one of
       the insured[’s] own uninvolved “at home” vehicles.
Id. at 357.
       This interpretation—that § 38-77-160 of the South Carolina Code
bars Class II insureds from stacking multiple coverages issued under a single
policy or multiple coverages that the insured holds but does not prevent the
insured from recovering under a single personal UIM policy if he also
received UIM benefits from a third-party insurer—appears consistent with
the purpose of UIM insurance, in which individuals contract (and pay extra)
to protect themselves in scenarios where their injuries exceed the available
policy limits of third parties. See also Burgess v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 
644 S.E.2d 40, 42
 (2007) (“[A]s general proposition, UIM coverage follows the
individual insured rather than the vehicle insured, that is, UIM coverage, like




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                               No. 24-30014


UM, is personal and portable.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
                                   …
       Because we conclude that South Carolina’s law on the prohibition of
stacking UIM coverage by Class II insureds does not bar Carson’s recovery
of UIM benefits under his USAA policy, we VACATE the district court’s
summary judgment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.




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