Case: 23-20095 Document: 148-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/07/2024
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
August 7, 2024
No. 23-20095 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Shanon Roy Santee,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Oceaneering International, Incorporated; Transocean
Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Incorporated; Chevron
USA, Incorporated,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:21-CV-3489
______________________________
Before Stewart, Duncan, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Carl E. Stewart, Circuit Judge:
In this maritime personal injury case, Plaintiff Shanon Roy Santee
(“Santee”) appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to remand and
grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Oceaneering
International, Inc. (“Oceaneering”), Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling, Inc. (“Transocean”), and Chevron USA, Inc. (“Chevron”)
(collectively, “Defendants”). Because Santee has at least some possibility of
proving his Jones Act claims on the facts alleged, we conclude that the district
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No. 23-20095
court erred in denying his motion to remand. Thus, we REVERSE and
REMAND to the district court, with instructions to remand this matter back
to state court.
I. Facts & Procedural History
From 1999 to 2021, Santee worked in the offshore drilling industry as
a remote-operated vehicle (“ROV”) technician. ROVs are submersible
machines that provide underwater visibility for offshore drilling operators
and service areas unreachable by human divers. ROV technicians operate
ROVs from a command center aboard a vessel and typically service the vessel
for a twenty-one-day or twenty-eight-day period. During his career, Santee
worked primarily for Oceaneering, a company that provides subsea
engineering and exploration services. After 2016, he worked mostly aboard
the M/V Deepwater Conqueror, a drillship serviced by Transocean, an offshore
drilling contractor. 1 Chevron contracted with Oceaneering and Transocean
to provide underwater exploration and drilling services.
In January 2021, Santee allegedly sustained a severe injury to his
shoulder and neck while servicing an ROV onboard the Deepwater Conqueror
in service to the Chevron contract. Santee’s injury occurred while he was
replacing a thirty-pound cursor pin on a launch and recovery system
(“LARS”), a device that releases and recaptures ROVs from the water. The
cursor pins hold the ROV in place during the ROV repair process. To
conduct this routine maintenance, ROV technicians raise the LARS device
with a hydraulic power unit, then climb a ladder to reach the port for the
cursor pins. From that position, the technician then reaches up with one hand
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1
The drillship’s owner and operator, Triton Conqueror GmbH, was not a named
party in this suit.
2
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to install the pin. During this motion, Santee alleged that he felt a “pop” and
sharp pain in his right shoulder. Santee averred that his condition worsened
after his injury and required surgical fusion of the vertebrae in his neck.
In September 2021, Santee filed suit against Defendants in Texas state
court. He brought claims under the Jones Act, 2 general maritime law, and the
Saving to Suitors Clause, 3 under theories of negligence and unseaworthiness
against Defendants. Defendants then removed the action to the Southern
District of Texas, asserting that federal question jurisdiction, general
admiralty jurisdiction, and original jurisdiction under the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) 4 governed Santee’s claims.
Santee moved to remand the case to state court, arguing that his
claims were not removable because he is a “seaman” under the Jones Act.
Defendants countered that Santee fraudulently pleaded his Jones Act claims,
thus providing the district court with exclusive jurisdiction under OCSLA.
In his reply, Santee asserted that Defendants waived their fraudulent
pleading argument because it was not raised in their notice of removal. The
district court denied Santee’s motion and held that he had fraudulently
pleaded his Jones Act claim to avoid removal because he was not a seaman at
the time of his injury. It further held that it had original jurisdiction under
OCSLA because the Deepwater Conqueror was attached to a seabed of the
Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”) at the time Santee was injured. The
district court denied Santee’s motion for reconsideration.
_____________________
2
46 U.S.C. § 30104.
3
28 U.S.C. § 1333.
4
43 U.S.C. § 1333.
3
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After the close of discovery, Defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted Oceaneering’s motion for summary
judgment on the basis that Santee could not maintain a claim for negligence
against his employer as a matter of law because he was not a Jones Act
seaman. Santee then filed motions to compel discovery and for a continuance
of the summary judgment submission date. The district court denied both
requests. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Transocean and Chevron because it had determined that Santee was not a
seaman, and thus was bound to the exclusive remedy provisions of the
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”). 5 It
further held that Santee’s unseaworthiness claim against Transocean was
barred under the LHWCA because he was not a Jones Act seaman. The
district court also granted summary judgment in favor of Chevron on
Santee’s negligence and unseaworthiness claims due to the lack of evidence
of operational control and ownership of the drillship. Santee timely appealed.
II. Standard of Review
This court reviews “both the denial of a motion to remand and the
grant of summary judgment de novo.” Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of Tex.,
L.L.C., 997 F.3d 564, 568 (5th Cir. 2021) (en banc). Summary judgment is
appropriate if the record evidence shows that there is no genuine dispute of
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable
inferences, and unsupported speculation are not sufficient to defeat a motion
for summary judgment.” See Brown v. City of Houston,
337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th
Cir. 2003). “[R]easonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the non-
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5
33 U.S.C. § 901.
4
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moving party.” Robinson v. Orient Marine Co., 505 F.3d 364, 366 (5th Cir.
2007).
III. Discussion
On appeal, Santee raises five assignments of error. He challenges the
district court’s denial of his motion to remand and each of its summary
judgments in favor of Oceaneering, Transocean, and Chevron. In the
alternative, Santee asserts that the district court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for a continuance to collect more evidence to oppose
Transocean’s and Chevron’s motions for summary judgment. Because we
conclude that Santee did not fraudulently plead his Jones Act claim, we hold
that the district court improperly denied his motion to remand. Thus, our
discussion is limited to this threshold removal issue.
A. Governing Law
The Jones Act provides “a seaman” a cause of action for negligence
against his seafaring employer. 46 U.S.C. § 30104. However, only seamen
may bring Jones Act claims. Such claims filed in state court generally are “not
subject to removal to federal court.” Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc.,
531
U.S. 438, 455 (2001). We have stated that “[i]t is axiomatic that Jones Act
suits may not be removed from state court because [
46 U.S.C. § 668]
incorporates the general provisions of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act,
including
28 U.S.C. § 1445(a), which in turn bars removal.” Lackey v. Atl.
Richfield Co.,
990 F.2d 202, 207 (5th Cir. 1993).
However, a Jones Act claim that is “fraudulently pleaded,” or pleaded
where there is no possibility that the plaintiff can prove seaman status, may
be removed if there is an independent basis of federal jurisdiction. Hufnagel
v. Omega Serv. Indus., Inc., 182 F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 1995). Thus, remand
is inappropriate where “resolving all disputed facts and ambiguities in
current substantive law in plaintiff’s favor, the court determines that the
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plaintiff has no possibility of establishing a Jones Act claim on the merits.”
Holmes v. Atl. Sounding Co., 437 F.3d 441, 445 (5th Cir. 2006) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Lozman v. City of
Riviera Beach,
568 U.S. 115 (2013). But where a party does not fraudulently
plead a Jones Act claim, a district court’s denial of a motion to remand
constitutes reversible error. See Lackey, 990 F.2d at 208 (reversing and
remanding to the district court and instructing it to “remand the case back to
state court where it belongs”).
The Supreme Court has established a two-pronged test to determine
whether a party is a seaman under the Jones Act. McDermott Int’l, Inc. v.
Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 354–55 (1991). To be a seaman: (1) the plaintiff’s
duties must contribute to the function or mission of the vessel, and (2) the
plaintiff must have a connection to the vessel or fleet of vessels that is
substantial in duration and in nature. See id.; Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis,
515 U.S.
347, 368 (1995). In Sanchez v. Smart Fabricators of Texas, L.L.C., our en banc
court enumerated additional factors relevant to the second prong of the
seaman test.
997 F.3d at 574. We have set out four inquiries relevant to this
question: (1) whether the plaintiff is subject to “the perils of the sea,” (2)
whether the plaintiff owes “his allegiance to the vessel, rather than simply to
a shoreside employer,” (3) whether the plaintiff’s work is sea-based or
involves seagoing activity, and (4) whether the plaintiff’s “assignment to
[the] vessel is limited to a discrete task after which [his] connection to the
vessel ends.”
Id. (citing Chandris,
515 U.S. at 359).
B. Santee’s Jones Act Claims
Here, the district court did not discuss the “perils of the sea” inquiry.
Instead, it concluded that two of the other three factors weighed against
Santee. It posited that Santee owed allegiance to Oceaneering, a land-based
employer that did not own or operate the Deepwater Conqueror. It further held
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that Santee’s assignment was discrete or limited because he was not
permanently assigned to the Deepwater Conqueror or to any fleet of vessels to
which it belonged. The district court then noted that “[t]he only factor
weighing in favor of finding Santee satisfies the nature requirement is the fact
[that] his work was sea-based.” Thus, it concluded that Santee was not a
seaman under the Jones Act and denied remand based on his fraudulent
pleading because he has “no reasonable possibility of establishing a Jones Act
claim.” Our review of the record leads us to a different conclusion.
At the outset, the first prong of the seaman test is easily satisfied
because Santee’s work clearly contributed to the function or mission of the
vessel, as the ROV operations supported the Deepwater Conqueror’s
underwater drilling efforts. With respect to the Sanchez factors for the second
prong of the seaman test, it is also uncontested that the ROV work was sea-based and that Santee was subjected to the perils of the sea. With respect to
the remaining Sanchez factors, Santee asserts that he has pleaded a classic
dual allegiance case and argues that his assignment was not limited to discrete
functions suggesting a limited connection with the vessel. He contends that
Defendants failed to demonstrate that he “ha[d] no possibility of establishing
his claim on the merits” because he is a Jones Act seaman. We agree.
In Sanchez, the en banc court addressed whether a welder that spent
most of his career servicing one fleet of vessels was a Jones Act seaman. 997
F.3d at 576. The welder was working for a contractor to repair a docked vessel
when he sustained a severe injury.
Id. at 567. We noted that there are “two
types of workers . . . found on drilling rigs”: the “drilling crew” or “workers
who support” drilling operations and the “specialized transient workers,
usually employed by contractors.”
Id. at 576. The welder in Sanchez easily
satisfied the first prong of the seaman-status test but was held to not be a
seaman because most of the factors of the nature element of the second prong
weighed against him.
Id. at 575–76 (failing to satisfy exposure to perils of the
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sea, assignment, and seagoing nature factors). The court determined that,
based on the record, the welder did not satisfy the assignment factor because
his assignments were limited to two specific repair jobs on vessels within the
same fleet. The court concluded that the transient, specialized nature of his
work weighed against a determination that the welder was a Jones Act
seaman. Id.
Unlike the welder in Sanchez, Santee satisfies the “sea-based” work
and perils of the sea factors. The record shows that he was exposed to the
perils of the sea, his work was sea-based, his allegiance lied with both his
shoreside employer and the Deepwater Conqueror, and that his assignments
were not limited to the performance of a discrete task after which his
connection to the vessel ended. The allegiance factor contemplates that a
worker may have allegiance to both the vessel and his shoreside employer. Id.
at 574 (examining whether the worker’s allegiance was “to the vessel, rather
than simply to [his employer]”). Defendants argue that Santee’s allegiance is
not to any vessel because his “record of work locations show[s] he was never
permanently assigned to work aboard any one vessel or fleet of vessels.”
They further assert that allegiance solely to Oceaneering can be gleaned from
“the fact that Santee recognized he could ‘pick up extra jobs’ [on other
vessels] in between hitches on the” Deepwater Conqueror. But these
arguments advance a restrictive view of the allegiance factor that neither this
court nor the Supreme Court has adopted.
Binding jurisprudence demonstrates that a maritime worker may
possess allegiance to both a vessel on which he has had longstanding
employment and his shoreside employer. In McDermott International, Inc. v.
Wilander, the Supreme Court held that the Jones Act “established a clear
distinction between land-based and sea-based maritime workers” and that
those “who owe their allegiance to a vessel and not solely to a land-based
employer, are seamen.” 498 U.S. at 347 (emphasis added). Here, Santee has
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spent over 96% of his employment time in the last five years with Oceaneering
(specifically assigned to the Deepwater Conqueror), reported to Chevron’s
project leader, and took orders from both Chevron and the captain of the
vessel. The record evidence from Santee’s affidavit and work history
documents is sufficient to create at least some fact issue that survives the
limited summary determination in a fraudulent pleading inquiry. See Great
Plains Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 311–12 (5th
Cir. 2002) (noting that a court “can employ a summary judgment-like
procedure that allows it to pierce the pleadings and examine affidavits and
deposition testimony for evidence of fraud or the possibility that the plaintiff
can state a claim” under the relevant law); Lackey, 990 F.2d at 208 (applying
the same procedure to the fraudulent pleading inquiry in Jones Act cases).
For the purposes of this inquiry, the allegiance factor weighs in favor of
Santee here.
With respect to the assignment factor, we conclude that Santee’s
assignment was not a discrete, transient job like the work done by
longshoremen when a vessel calls in port. In Sanchez, this court noted that
this consideration derives from the Supreme Court’s decision in Harbor Tug
& Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548 (1997), where it concluded that a plaintiff’s
work, limited to discrete repair engagements while the boat had been docked,
did not support a determination that he was a seaman. See 997 F.3d at 571–72
(discussing 520 U.S. at 559–60). The Sanchez court noted that the welder’s
assignment was discrete because following the completion of his two welding
assignments, the welder “would have no further connection to the vessel.”
Id. at 576. It also noted that a plaintiff’s work on a vessel limited to a term was
further evidence that the plaintiff’s assignment did not weigh in favor of
seaman status. Id. & n.72 (collecting cases); see also Wilcox v. Wild Well
Control, Inc.,
794 F.3d 531, 538–39 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that the plaintiff
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had a discrete assignment aboard the vessel and was not a seaman because he
was only assigned for one specific project for a clear two-month term).
Here, Santee averred that he never had an end date to his assignment,
and that he surmised that he was indefinitely assigned to the Deepwater
Conqueror. His work record supports that he was not assigned to a short-term,
transitory task on the vessel. The fact that Santee could have picked up extra
jobs between hitches and that he was never formally assigned to work aboard
a specific vessel do not factor into whether he was substantially connected to
the vessel and integral to its drilling operations. Furthermore, Santee stated
in his affidavit that the nature of the ROV work was critical to the vessel’s
mineral exploration and drilling operations and was conducted for an
indefinite period of time. This is sufficient to set out a Jones Act claim under
the limited inquiry we conduct here.
We have previously stated that a court conducting a fraudulent
pleading analysis “must resolve all disputed questions of fact from the
pleadings and affidavits in favor of the plaintiff, and then determine whether
there could possibly be a valid claim against the defendant[s] in question.”
Lackey, 990 F.2d at 208. Reading any conflicts of fact as to Santee’s
assignment and allegiance in his favor, we cannot say that his Jones Act
claims “are baseless in law and in fact and serve[] only to frustrate federal
jurisdiction.” Id. at 207 (quoting Dodd v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 82,
85 (10th Cir. 1964) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In its denial of
Santee’s motion to remand, the district court omitted one of the Sanchez
factors and failed to view the facts and pleadings in the light most favorable
to Santee. This constitutes reversible error because, under our jurisprudence,
Santee has a possibility of proving that he is a Jones Act seaman on this
record. Because we have identified error in the district court’s seaman status
determination, we conclude that this case was improperly removed. See
28
U.S.C. § 1445(a). Where the removing defendants fail to demonstrate that a
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plaintiff has fraudulently pleaded his Jones Act claim, the matter must be
remanded back to state court. Lackey, 990 F.2d at 207–08 (reversing and
remanding because the Jones Act provides seamen with the “right to choose
a state court forum”). Thus, we need not address Santee’s other arguments
regarding jurisdiction or his alternative claims under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). 6
IV. Conclusion
The district court erred in holding that Santee fraudulently pleaded
his Jones Act claim, and thus this case was improperly removed. For the
aforementioned reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of
Santee’s motion to remand and REMAND with instructions for the district
court to remand this matter back to state court.
_____________________
6
If a party is not a Jones Act seaman, then his only remedy lies in the form of
compensation benefits under the LHWCA. Becker v. Tidewater, Inc., 335 F.3d 376, 386 (5th
Cir. 2003);
33 U.S.C. §§ 904, 905(a).
11