State v. Rusho’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

41 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “First, we note our standard of review. A judge’s factual findings on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Campbell, 104 Idaho 705 , 662 P.2d 1149 (Ct.App.1983). However, the same degree of deference does not necessarily apply to a trial court’s determination that the facts found demonstrate compliance with constitutional requirements for a valid warrantless search. Such a determination may be viewed as a matter of law, freely reviewable on appeal. E.g., People v. Leyba, [ 29 Cal.3d 591 ], 174 Cal.Rptr. 867 , 629 P.2d 961 (1981). * * * * * * Accordingly, we believe that the proper standard of review is one of deference to factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, but free review of a trial court’s determination as to whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of facts found.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Simmons

2. “fact patterns sufficient to excuse an officer from the requirement of obtaining a warrant to conduct a search for which he has probable cause.” Id. at 559 , 716 P.2d at 1331 . Citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 , 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), Rusho then stated,”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Barrett