110 Md. App. 464 - Scott v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

21 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 21 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) A judge should not participate in a proceeding in which the judge’s partiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: (a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding —”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 115 Md. App. 626 - Chapman v. State · 175 Md. App. 130 - Scott v. State

2. “[a] party who wishes to show that a judge is not impartial or disinterested has a high burden to meet. In Maryland, “there is a strong presumption ... that judges are impartial participants in the legal process, whose duty to preside when qualified is as strong as their duty to refrain from presiding when not qualified.” [Jefferson-El, 330 Md.] at 107, 622 A.2d 737 . “To overcome the presumption of impartiality, the party requesting recusal must prove that the trial judge has ‘a personal bias or prejudice’ concerning him or ‘personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings.’ ” Id. Further, “[o]nly bias, prejudice, or knowledge derived from an extrajudicial source is ‘personal.’ ” Id. A party wishing to show that a judge does not have the appearance of impartiality, however, has a slightly lesser burden. Appearance of disinterestedness or impartiality is determined by “examining the record facts and the law, and then deciding whether a reasonable person knowing and understanding all the relevant facts would recuse the judge.” Id. at 108 , 622 A.2d 737 , 330 Md. 99 , 622 A.2d 737 (citing Boyd v. State, 321 Md. 69, 86 , 581 A.2d 1 (1990)).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 140 Md. App. 379 - Cason v. State

3. “Although judicial anger is understandable, a judge should not let his displeasure with litigants, witnesses, or lawyers unduly affect his conduct in the courtroom---- In this case, [the] Judge ... allowed his anger to get the best of him; as a result, he adopted an unjudicial attitude toward appellant [and his counsel]. We think it is important to repeat the following admonition of this Court in Betz v. State, 99 Md.App. 60 , 635 A.2d 77 (1994): Many judges have experienced aggravating—sometimes even defiant—conduct on the part of lawyers and others (just as many lawyers, and others, have experienced aggravating conduct on the part of judges), and, in the press of attempting to move dockets and resolve cases fairly and efficiently, the experience can cause instant irritation. Judges, too, are human and have human emotions; they get angry, often for good reason. But, unlike other people, judges have the sovereign power to punish, to deprive persons of their liberty and property, and that alone requires that they restrain their irritation. Punishment for contempt should never be imposed in anger, as an immediate emotionally reflexive response.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Johnson v. State