State v. Allen’s Empirical Analysis
2005
Citation profile
1 federal appellate · 14 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on Blakely v. Washington · 154 Wash. 2d 118 - State v. Hughes · 87 Wash. 2d 374 - State v. Arndt · 124 Wash. 2d 702 - State v. Ortega-Martinez · Delgado v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"[E]ven if unlawful remaining means is confined to situations where an initial entry is lawful, and the jury is instructed that the State must prove unlawful entry or remaining, there will generally be no prejudice to the defendant's right to a unanimous jury where the evidence establishes only an unlawful entry, because no rational juror could rely on the unlawful remaining means without necessarily also finding that the entry was unlawful. In such circumstances, the court can be certain that the verdict was unanimous."[ [45] ]”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“intended primarily for situations in which the initial entry to the building is lawful, but the defendant either exceeds the scope of the license or privilege to enter, or the license is impliedly or expressly terminated.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Howard · State v. Spencer“While this may be true, it does not necessarily follow that the "remaining unlawfully" provision is confined to those situations where the initial entry was lawful. We believe that such an interpretation would create an anomalous result. For instance, under Rudolph’s interpretation of the statute, one who enters lawfully but then remains unlawfully and forms the intent to commit another felony, theft, or assault is guilty of burglary while one who enters unlawfully and thereafter forms that same intent is guilty only of trespass. We are unable to see the distinction between the two scenarios. In our view, the actor in the second scenario is at least as dangerous and culpable as the actor in the first. Therefore, we are not satisfied that our legislature intended such a result when it enacted our current burglary statute.... [W]e hold that a person is guilty of burglary ... if he forms the intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault at the time he unlawfully enters a building or at any time thereafter while he continues to remain there unlawfully.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.