Daniel v. Lipscomb’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The case of Pettyjohn’s Ex’r v. Woodroof’s Ex’r, 77 Va. 507 , is greatly relied on to sustain appellant’s contention that William Daniel took a life estate and his children a remainder in the land in controversy. “In that case the testator divided his estate equally between his six children and grandson, Seth Woodroof, and provided that if any of the children should die without leaving lawful issue then the share of the child so dying should revert to the surviving children, with similar limitation as to the share of the grandson. Woodroof, after attaining his majority, died unmarried and without issue. The court held that the grandson had a life estate in his share, with remainder to testator’s children, contingent upon his dying without issue of his body. There is nothing in the language of the will to justify the statement that Woodroof took a life estate in his share. The bequest was to the children and grandson generally, but with the provision that if any of the legatees ‘should die without leaving lawful issue,’ his share should revert to the surviving children. That language, as we have seen, if applied to a devise of land, would not create a life estate in the first taker, but a defeasible fee. Possibly what the learned judge meant by saying that Woodroof took a life estate in his share was that, inasmuch as he died without issue his actual beneficial enjoyment was for life,, since at his death ‘without leaving lawful issue’ the share shifted to others.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Moorefield v. Knigoff · Thomas v. Thomas

2. ““The object of this suit is to construe certain clauses in the wills of Elizabeth W. Spencer and George W. Daniel, and to set up a remainder, by way of executory limitation, in the children of William Daniel in an undivided moiety of two tracts of land situated in Cumberland County, Virginia, known as the ‘Gibson’ and ‘Springfield’ tracts. “The circuit court held that the children of William Daniel took no interest in the moiety of the lands devised to John S. Daniel by the will of his father, George W. Daniel, construed either alone or read in connection with the will of Elizabeth W. Spencer, which is referred to and made a part of George W. Daniel’s will, and dismissed the bill on demurrer. From that decree this appeal was allowed. “Mrs. Spencer’s will bears date June 6, 1850, and directs that the money arising from the sale of her slaves, and the residue of her estate not otherwise disposed of, shall be divided into five equal parts. One of these parts she bequeathed to her grandsons, John S. and William Daniel, to he equally divided between them; and the will declares that ‘if either of my grandsons should die leaving no child or descendants surviving him, the share he receives under this will is to go to his surviving brother; and if both of my grandsons die leaving no child or descendants surviving them, then the whole of what is herein given them shall be divided equally between my son, James L. Spencer, and my daughters, Anna Louisa Sims and Elizabeth Price McChes-ney”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Moorefield v. Knigoff