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← 111 F.2d 557 - Schram v. Burt

Schram v. Burt’s Empirical Analysis

111 F.2d 557 · 1940

Citation profile

31
cited by 31 later decisions
4
states following
January 2012
most recently cited

13 federal appellate · 1 district · 5 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 31 later decisions — most recently January 2012 · most notably 78 Ill. 2d 555 - Chicago Park District v. Kenroy, Inc. (1980), Rex v. Warner (1958)

13 federal appellate · 1 district · 5 state decisions

10019401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on American Surety Co of New York v. Pauly · Deitrick v. Greaney · Lightner Mining Co. v. Lane · Foster Lumber Co. v. Harlan County Bank · De Haan v. Winter

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The rule is clearly established that where one party advances money to another upon the faith of a verbal agreement by the latter to secure its payment by a mortgage upon certain lands and improvements, which is not executed, or which, if executed, is so defective or informal as to fall short of being a duly executed mortgage, equity will impress upon such land and improvements a lien in favor of the creditor who advances the money for the security in satisfaction of his debt.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““ ‘In this connection it is the general rule of law that the knowledge of an agent is imputed to the principal. The reason for this rule, recognized by most courts, is that it is presumed the agent will communicate his information to the principal. This reason has been criticized by some eminent authorities who urge that the real reason is based upon broader ground of policy and expediency to safeguard the affairs of business and society. Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence, 94th Ed. vol. 2, par. 676. “ ‘Regardless of the reason for the rule, there is universally recognized exception; namely, that the knowledge of the agent will not be imputed to the principal when such knowledge concerns a transaction in which the agent is “Engaged in the commission of an independent fraudulent act on his own account and the facts to be imputed relate to this fraudulent act.” 21 R.C.L. page 844. “ ‘The reason for this exception recognized by the authorities which place the reason for the rule upon the basis of presumed communication is that where the agent is committing a fraud it would be contrary to common sense to presume that he would communicate the facts to his principal. The reason for the exception, recognized by the authorities who place the rule upon the ground of expediency and policy, is that when engaged in the perpetration of a fraud, the agent is not really acting for his principal, but is really acting for himself entirely outside the scope of agency. * * * The plaintiff * * * st”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.