Davis Tsi v. Gracey’s Empirical Analysis
111 F.3d 1472 · 1997
Citation profile
26 federal appellate · 10 district · 3 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 55 later decisions — most recently January 2019 · most notably Lawmaster v. Ward (1997), Lee v. City of Chicago (2003)
26 federal appellate · 10 district · 3 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on United States v. Leon · Coolidge v. New Hampshire · Malley v. Briggs · Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee · Siegert v. Gilley
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 55 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“'right was clearly established such that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have known that [his] conduct violated the right.'”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage“We review de novo the district court's grant of qualified immunity on summary judgment, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage““The fourth amendment requires that a search warrant describe the things to be seized with sufficient particularity to prevent a ‘general, exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings.’ ” Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 404 (10th Cir.1985) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2038 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)). “The particularity requirement ensures that a search is confined in scope to particularly described evidence relating to a specific crime for which there is demonstrated probable cause.” Id. “The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the .officer executing the warrant.” Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 , 48 S.Ct. 74, 76 , 72 L.Ed. 231 (1927). We have stated that “[t]he test applied to the description of the items to be seized is a practical one,” [United States v.] Leary, 846 F.2d [592] at 600 [ (10th Cir. 1988) ], and the language in warrants is to be read in a “common sense fashion,” In re Search of Kitty’s East, 905 F.2d [1367] at 1374 [ (10th Cir.1990) ]. Thus, “‘[a] description is sufficiently particular when it enables the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things authorized to be- seized.’ ” Leary, 846 F.2d at 600 (quot- - ing United States v. Wolfenbarger, 696 F.2d 750, 752 (10th Cir.1”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.