Dinco v. Dylex Ltd.’s Empirical Analysis
111 F.3d 964 · 1997
Citation profile
5 federal appellate · 10 district · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 18 later decisions — most recently September 2013
5 federal appellate · 10 district · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Central Bank of Denver Na v. First Interstate Bank of Denver Na K · Brewer v. United States · Davet v. Maccarone · Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Erie Lackawanna, Inc. · Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“The certified question concerns the relationship between a special section of the Securities Act of 1934, section 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a), and various common law theories of vicarious liability (of which “apparent authority” is one). That section reads as follows: Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action. (Emphasis added.) The significance of this section here lies in the contrast between its proviso and the common law. The proviso requires a finding of liability unless the controlling person 1) “acted in good faith” and 2) did not “induce” the violation. By way of contrast, common law agency theories may impose liability upon a principal or an employer without these two preconditions. The case before us asks whether the Securities Act means that section 20(a) is an exclusive remedy. That is to say, does the existence of this section foreclose holding a principal (say, a corporation) or an employer (who ‘controls’ an agent or employee) ‘vicariously’ liable when the proviso’s two conditions are not met? The circuits seem to be split about the proper answer to this questio”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent“The phrase `vicarious liability' is something of a trap where used promiscuously to embrace markedly different theories of third-party liability, such as agency, partnership, and civil conspiracy. Central Bank involved none of those concepts, but rather rejected `aiding and abetting' liability under section 10(b)....”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“bar on 'ultimate issue' opinions ... is not a carte blanche for experts.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.