¶1ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
¶2This opinion supplements the Court’s prior opinion dated May 30, 1986
¶3The sellers have petitioned for rehearing on the ground that our decision misapplies the doctrine of estoppel. They argue that the buyer has not suffered a detriment sufficient to invoke estoppel and, in any event, that estoppel confers an unfair advantage upon the buyer in the circumstances of this case. For reasons explained below, we adhere to our decision.
¶4Simply stated, the sellers’ argument concerning detriment is that if the real estate contract were enforced, the buyer would be liable only for the cost of curing the default — not for the entire unpaid balance— because the contract contains no explicit acceleration clause. So far as the record discloses, this argument is being made for the first time on appeal. No issue concerning the right to accelerate was raised below. Indeed, the sellers’ complaint sought judgment for the full contract balance. The sellers later sought unsuccessfully to dismiss their complaint without prejudice, so that a revised notice of default — referring to remedies other than forfeiture— could be sent to the buyer. But the sellers never moved to amend their complaint by withdrawing or qualifying the allegation that they were entitled to judgment for the entire amount owed on the contract.
¶5It is well settled in Idaho that issues in civil cases will not be considered on appeal unless they have been presented at the trial level. E.g., Green v. Young, 102 Idaho 735, 639 P.2d 433 (1981). Accordingly, we are constrained to disregard the sellers’ assertion that the contract cannot be accelerated. Absent that predicate, the sellers’ argument regarding lack of substantial detriment must fail.
¶6We now turn to the contention that estoppel confers an unfair benefit upon the buyer. We do not gainsay that our decision relieves the buyer of further liability on the contract. Conversely, the sellers will receive the subject property in forfeiture. This, of course, is precisely the consequence specified in the sellers’ notice of default, sent to the buyer at a time when the deteriorated condition of the property was known. The result may be unfortunate for the sellers, but we cannot characterize it as unfair.
¶7We have examined cases cited by the sellers to illustrate the proposition that estoppel should not be employed to reach an unfair result. We find them to be distinguishable. In Gay Johnson's Wyoming Automotive Service Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 367 P.2d 787 (Wyo.1961), opinion on rehearing, 369 P.2d 863 (Wyo.1962), a developer asked a city to vacate certain streets and alleys, presumably so the developer could acquire them. The city did so, but then it undertook to sell the land to a third party. When the developer sued to enjoin the sale, the third party claimed that the developer was estopped to challenge the city’s action. The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the city had no title to convey in vacated land, and that estoppel could not create for the third party a property right that did not otherwise exist. We find nothing in that holding to alter our view of the present case.
¶8In Varela v. Board of Police Commissioners, 107 Cal.App.2d 816, 238 P.2d 62 (1951), a city employee who claimed, in *364essence, that he had been wrongfully discharged, sued for reinstatement. Filing of suit was delayed by an abortive agreement with certain city officials who told the plaintiff that he would be voluntarily rehired. However, authority to determine any right of reinstatement was vested in a separate administrative board. The former employee’s claim was not presented to the board until a time limit on its jurisdiction had elapsed. When the former employee sued, the city asserted a defense of laches. The former employee responded that the city should be estopped to raise this defense. The California appellate court disagreed, holding that the former employee shared responsibility for failure to obtain a timely hearing before the board. Again, we find nothing in that holding which affects our analysis of the instant case.
¶9We conclude that the sellers have not established a ground for changing the Court’s decision. Accordingly, their petition for rehearing is denied.