State v. Major’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

29 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “67-5102. Additional state jurisdiction with consent of tribe governing body. — Additional state jurisdiction in criminal and civil causes of action may be extended to particular reservations or Indian country with the consent of the governing body of the tribe occupying the Indian country effected [affected] by the assumption of such additional jurisdiction. This may be achieved by negotiation with the tribe or by unilateral action by the tribe. In every case the extent of such additional jurisdiction shall be determined by a resolution of the tribal governing body and become effective upon the tribe's transmittal of the resolution to the attorney general of the state of Idaho. Such resolution may effectively accept jurisdiction as to any particular field of criminal or civil jurisdiction. All state jurisdiction extended by virtue of this act shall be concurrent (and not exclusive) with jurisdiction in the same matters existing in the tribes or the federal government.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Robles v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes · State v. Marek

2. “"Indian country” ... means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Marek · State v. Ambro

3. “Whether a course of conduct constitutes one offense or several can be a troublesome question, [footnote omitted] The distinction is important: to charge a defendant with two offenses when only one was committed violates the defendant’s right against double jeopardy, U.S. Const, amend. V, Idaho Const, art. 1, § 13; conversely, to charge a defendant with one offense when more than one was committed can prejudice the defendant “in the shaping of evidentiary rulings, in producing a conviction on less than a unanimous verdict as to each separate offense, in sentencing, in limiting review on appeal, and in exposing the defendant to double jeopardy.” Criminal Procedure, § 19.2(e), p. 457. Whether a course of criminal conduct should be divided or aggregated depends on whether or not the conduct constituted “separate, distinct and independent crimes.” State v. Hall, 86 Idaho 63, 69 , 383 P.2d 602, 606 (1963). This inquiry requires consideration of the circumstances of the conduct, see State v. McCormick, 100 Idaho 111, 115-16 , 594 P.2d 149, 153-54 (1979) (Where act of burglary was completed before act of rape, these were separate criminal acts.); Hall, supra, 86 Idaho at 75 , 383 P.2d at 610 (Where robbery was completed before murder committed, these were separate acts.), and consideration of the “intent and objective of the actor.” In re Ward, 64 Cal.2d 672 , 51 Cal.Rptr. 272, 275 , 414 P.2d 400, 403 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 923 , 87 S.Ct. 238 , 17 L.Ed.2d 147 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Miller v. State