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111 Ill. App. 583

Melink v. Coman

Appellate Court of Illinois

Decided January 14, 1904

Appellate Court of Illinois · decided 1904-01-14

<p>1. Indebtedness—w/iaí prima facie evidence of, upon written instrument. The possession, of a written instrument providing for the payment of money is prima facie evidence that the debt contracted therein is unpaid; upon the production in evidence of such an instrument the burden of proof shifts.</p> <p>a. Computation op interest—by whom made. Technically, the computation of interest should be left to the jury; practically, it is a matter of evidence. The latter course may be pursued without the commission of reversible error.</p>

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently September 1947

1 state decisions

Relies on Stiger v. Bent · Morris v. Calumet & Chicago Canal & Dock Co. · Hart v. Duddleson

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Affirmed · Decided 1904-01-14

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Mb. Justice Ball

¶1delivered the opinion of the court.

¶2Appellant says there is no evidence in the record that the amount of the judgment was due and unpaid. He has mistaken the legal effect of the possession of an instrument for the payment of money. Such possession is prima facie evidence that the debt therein set forth is unpaid. Stewart v. Fellows, 20 Ill. App. 620. When this instrument was put in evidence the burden of proof shifted to the defendant. Witner v. Zeman, 30 Ill. App. 198.

¶3“ The objection is that no evidence was offered as to the ownership of the notes and trust deed introduced by Budert, and no evidence that said notes were still unpaid. The possession of the notes and trust deed, and their introduction in evidence by Budert constitutep>^nafacie proof of ownership. Stiger v. Bent, 111 Ill. 328. The game is true as to payment. The introduction of the uncancelled notes by the party claiming thereunder is prima facie evidence that they are existing liabilities.” Morris v. Calumet, etc., 91 Ill. App. 441.

¶4The rule is too familiar to justify further citations.

¶5The computation of the interest might have been left to the jury. In practice it is usually stated by the attorney for the plaintiff, without oath, in the presence and hearing of the jury. Evans v. Murphy Varnish Co., 59 Ill. App. 88.

¶6The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.

¶7Affirmed.

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