Sanchez v. Galey’s Empirical Analysis
1987
Citation profile
4 federal appellate · 1 district · 49 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 57 later decisions — most recently April 2020 · most notably Lubcke v. Boise City/Ada County Housing Authority (1993), Lawton v. City of Pocatello (1994)
4 federal appellate · 1 district · 49 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 29 U.S.C. § 651 (§ 2 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970) · 29 U.S.C. § 653 (§ 4 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970) · 29 U.S.C. § 654 (§ 5 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970) · 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (§ 201 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter))
Relies on 65 Cal. 2d 263 - Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. · 162 Cal. App. 3d 358 - San Diego Navy Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society · Dixon v. International Harvester Co. · Quick v. Crane · EMPLOYERS'FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Beals
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 57 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[I]n Idaho, it is well established that statutes and administrative regulations may define the applicable standard of care owed, and that violations of such statutes and regulations may constitute negligence per se.”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage“[S]ince it is a jury function to set the damage award based on its sense of fairness and justice, the trial judge must defer to the jury, unless it is apparent to the trial judge that there is a great disparity between the two damage awards and that disparity cannot be explained away as simply the product of two separate entities valuing the proof of the plaintiff’s injuries in two equally fair ways. In other words, if the trial judge discovers that his determination of damages is so substantially different from that of the jury that he can only explain this difference as resulting from some unfair behavior, or what the law calls “passion or prejudice,” on the part of the jury against one or some of the parties, then he should grant a new trial. How substantial this difference must be is impossible to formulate with any degree of accuracy. It will necessarily vary with the factual context of each case and the trial judge’s sense of fairness and justice. (Emphasis in original).”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage“[T]he trial court indicated that he found no fault with the jury to prompt his conditional order of new trial: I was impressed with the jury, I think. I thought we had a very well selected jury. I thought they were a good cross-section of age, income, occupations, intelligence, certainly conscientious. I don’t think I could say I’ve had a finer jury in any case .... [T]he trial court merely substituted its award amount, reached by way of a different method of calculation, for that of the jury. The trial court made no finding that the amount of the jury verdict ‘appeared to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.’”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Sanchez v. Galey
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.