¶1 The statute under which the defendant is indicted is very comprehensive in its terms. It forbids (The Code, §2482) the willful wounding, injuring, torturing or tormenting, and the needless mutilation or killing of any useful beast, fowl or animal, and declares (section 2487) that any person who shall do any act towards the furtherance of an act of cruelty to any animal shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and that “the words torture, torment and cruelty shall be held to include every act of omission and neglect whereby unjustifiable physical pain, suffering or death is caused or permitted,” and then, as if to emphasize the prohibition by stating what is permitted, it enacts that “ nothing in this chapter shall be construed as prohibiting' the lawful shooting of birds, deer and other game 'for the purposes of human food.”
¶2 As was said of a similar statute in Commonwealth v. Turner, 145 Mass., 296, this act does not require the allegation or proof of torture or cruelty, except as involved in unnecessary suffering knowingly and willfully permitted.
¶3 By the special verdict it is found that the suffering and death, for the permission or infliction of which the defendant is indicted, were so inflicted “for amusement and *889 «port.” Mail’s desire for amusement and sport is no justification for the infliction of suffering or death upon any of the creatures protected by the statute now under consideration. it was enacted to protect the public morals, which the commission of cruel and barbarous acts tends to corrupt. Commonwealth v. Turner, supra, Since its enactment it has been unlawful in this State for man to gratify his angry passions or his love for amusement and sport at the cost of wounds and death to any useful creature over which he has control. Knowing that men of intelligence and refinement often differ as to what constitutes cruelty' in one’s treatment of dumb creatures, the Legislature has seen fit to define that word, and also the words “torture” and “torment,” and has thus made its intent very plain.
¶4 Upon the facts established by the special verdict we think the defendant was properly adjudged guilty.
¶5 No Error.