Hakkila v. Hakkila’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

47 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 49 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Conduct intentionally or recklessly causing emotional distress to one’s spouse is prevalent in our society. This is unfortunate but perhaps not surprising, given the length and intensity of the marital relationship. Yet even when the conduct of feuding spouses is not particularly unusual, high emotions can readily cause an offended spouse to view the other’s misconduct as ‘extreme and outrageous.’ Thus, if the tort of outrage is construed loosely or broadly, claims of outrage may be tacked on in typical marital disputes, taxing judicial resources. In addition, a spouse’s most distressing conduct is likely to be privileged. Partners who are pledged to live together for a lifetime have a right to criticize each other’s behavior. [Citation.] Even though one may question the utility of such comments, spouses are also free to express negative opinions of one another. ‘You look awful’ or even T don’t love you’ can be very wounding, but these statements cannot justify liability.” Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 176-77 , 812 E2d at 1324-25, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, Illustration 13, at 76 (1965) (“she looks like a hippopotamus”).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 122 Md. App. 295 - Doe v. Doe · 333 Ill. App. 3d 1167 - Feltmeier v. Feltmeier

2. “[I]n determining when the tort of outrage [i.e. intentional infliction of emotional distress] should be recognized in the marital setting, the threshold of outra-geousness should be set high enough — or the circumstances in which the tort is recognized be described precisely enough ... — that the social good from recognizing the tort will not be outweighed by unseemly and invasive litigation of merit-less claims.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Henriksen v. Cameron

3. “[I]n determining when the tort of outrage [i.e. intentional infliction of emotional distress] should be recognized in the marital setting, the threshold of outrageousness should be set high enough — or the circumstances in which the tort is recognized be described precisely enough... — that the social good from recognizing the tort will not be outweighed by unseemly and invasive litigation of meritless claims.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Henriksen v. Cameron