Mr. Justice Gage,
¶1
concurring.
In my judgment B. F. Pennington owns the life estate and his children were remaindermen; both held legal estates; B. F. was not trustee for children. I think, therefore, the third postulate of the opinion is not relevant.
¶2
The occupancy of B. F. was not notice to McWhirter that the children had a right, and, therefore, the first postulate is not relevant. I agree, though, that B. F. had actual notice of the children’s right, and that Pitchford had notice of circumstances which, had he followed up, would have led him to know the interest of the children.
¶3
I, therefore, agree to postulates 4 and 5, and vote for reversal.
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Status
Disposition: Reversed and remanded
Case posture Disposition Reversed and remanded. Posture Before MAULDIN, J., Union, Fall term, 1918. Reversed and remanded.Action by Mrs. N.C. Oliver and others against C.M. McWhirter and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal.
See, also, 109 S.C. 358 , 96 S.E. 140 .
The master's report, referred to in the opinion, was as follows:
The above stated case having been referred to me, I beg leave to submit this as my report therein:
It is apparently agreed that there are only two issues for me to pass upon, namely:
(1) Did J.L. McWhirter have sufficient notice of unrecorded deeds from B.F. Pennington to the executors of Price, and from the executors of Price back to Pennington, to supply the place of the record of such deeds?
(2) Does the purchase by J.L. McWhirter, at the foreclosure sale under the mortgage given by Pennington to Pitchford Company, place McWhirter in a position where he can, even if he had notice of the alleged equities of the children of Pennington, make the claim of one who purchased from another who had no notice.
As to the first: I think it clear, from the testimony, that J.L. McWhirter had some notice that the children of Pennington should have had, or did have, some interest in this land. He evidently had heard something to this general effect. But there is nothing in the testimony that McWhirter had any actual knowledge that the money of those children had really been invested in this property. Nor is there anywhere in the record any evidence to show that McWhirter had any knowledge whatever of the fact that a deed had been made, nor that he knew of the contents of such deed. The statute law of this State expressly provides that actual notice shall be deemed and held sufficient to supply the place or registration only when such notice is of the instrument itself, or of the nature and purport. Section 3543, vol. I, Code of Laws 1912.
It has been argued before me that the rules of equity must, when there is a conflict, prevail over the rules of law. I apprehend that this argument is unsound, in so far as it applies to the statute law of the State. When the rules of the common law and of equity conflict, the former gives way to the latter, but not, I think, when the statute law is concerned. I find, therefore, as a matter of fact, that J.L. McWhirter had no notice of any unrecorded deed conveying this land out of Pennington, and find, further, that said McWhirter had no notice of the nature and purport of such deed or deeds.
As to the second issue: The evidence fails to satisfy me that Pitchford Company ever had any notice of any defect in B.F. Pennington's title to this property. Pitchford testifies, positively, that he did not, and there is no testimony in contradiction. The receipt, which is relied on by plaintiffs, uses the plural, to be sure; but that does not necessarily mean, by any means, that more than one deed was deposited with him. As one of the attorneys said in the argument, it is a common saying among people (laymen) that here are my titles, or my titles are good, meaning only one conveyance. In face of Pitchford's unequivocal statement that he knew nothing of any unrecorded deed, I do not think it possible to conclude that, from the wording of this receipt, more than one muniment of title was deposited with him. I find, therefore, that Pitchford Company had no knowledge or notice of either of the unrecorded deeds set up by the plaintiffs herein.
I, therefore, conclude as matter of law: First, that J.L. McWhirter had no knowledge or notice of any rights or equities of the plaintiffs in the said property in question sufficient to defeat the claim of purchase for value without notice; and, second, that the purchase by J.L. McWhirter of said property at the foreclosure sale under the said Pitchford mortgage placed McWhirter in the position of a purchaser from one without notice — his rights being measured
by those of Pitchford Company, who was a creditor without notice of any rights or equities of the plaintiffs in said premises.
The foregoing findings and conclusions render unnecessary consideration of the question of betterments, which was also argued before me. In reaching these conclusions of law and fact, I have not considered the testimony of L.G. Southard, to which plaintiffs objected, and which I myself, on reflection, think incompetent.
I, therefore, recommend that the complaint herein be dismissed, with the costs of the action. Cross reference See, also, 109 S. C.; 358, 96 S. E. 140. Source: CourtListener