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112 So. 2d 855

Docket No. B-92.

Allen v. Gaither

C.C. ALLEN and Walter Anderson. Petitioners, v. Virgil GAITHER, Respondent.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided May 28, 1959.

Rehearing Denied June 29, 1959.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1959-05-28

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““Plaintiff * * * takes the position that by requesting the placing of the cause on the trial docket he had fulfilled his obligation under the statute and it was not incumbent upon him * * * to see that the case was actually set for trial within the one year period or request a continuance. This position does not constitute sufficient cause for reinstatement. Miller v. Hartley’s, Inc., Fla.App.1957, 97 So.2d 211 ; 'Atlantic Coastline Railroad v. Hill, Fla.1955, 76 So.2d 861 ; Elmer A. Yelvington & Son, Inc., v. Sheridan, Fla., 1953, 65 So.2d 44 ; Railway Express Agency v. Hoagland, Fla., 1952, 62 So.2d 756 .””

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Schumaker v. Orange State Oil Co., 141 So. 2d 300 - Adams Engineering Co. v. Construction Products Corp.

“(1) All actions at law or suits in equity pending in the several courts of the state, and instituted subsequent to 12 o'clock noon, October 1, 1947, in which there shall not affirmatively appear from some action taken by filing of pleadings, order of court, or otherwise, that the same is being prosecuted, for a period of one (1) year, shall be deemed abated for want of prosecution and the same shall be dismissed by the court having jurisdiction of the cause, upon its own motion or upon motion of any person interested, whether a party to the action or suit or not, with notice to opposing counsel, provided that actions or suits dismissed under the provisions hereof may be reinstated by petition upon good cause shown to the court filed by any party in interest within one (1) month after such order of dismissal.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 156 So. 2d 497 - Adams Engineering Co. v. Construction Products Corp.

Relies on 53 So. 2d 706 - Gulf Appliance Distributors v. Long · Augusta Sugar Co. v. Haley · 97 So. 2d 211 - Miller v. Hartley's, Inc.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1959-05-28

How this case has been cited

Cited by 18 later decisions — most recently July 1984

18 state decisions

901959196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*856 Marks, Gray, Yates, Conroy & Gibbs, Jacksonville, for petitioners.

¶2Williams & Owen, Tallahassee, for respondent.

¶3MOODY, JAMES S., Associate Judge.

¶4The petitioners herein and defendants below ask certiorari to an order of the Circuit Court for Baker County reinstating the respondent's cause of action previously dismissed for lack of prosecution under Section 45.19(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A. This statute provides that after a cause has been dismissed it may be reinstated "by petition upon good cause shown to the court".

¶5It appears that the respondent, hereinafter called the plaintiff, filed his complaint February 18, 1956, for personal injuries, to which petitioners, hereinafter called the defendants, filed their answer on March 19, 1956. The pertinent subsequent proceedings were as follows: orders were entered requiring the plaintiff to submit to physical examination, the last order being dated September 1, 1956; plaintiff, by letter dated October 9, 1956, requested the clerk of the circuit court to place the case on the trial docket and the last affirmative matter of record was the filing of a deposition on March 5, 1957; thereafter, on March 6, 1958, defendants filed their motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution, which motion was granted and the case dismissed by order dated March 12, 1958.

¶6Within the required 30 day period plaintiff filed his petition to reinstate the cause, attaching various correspondence, all written prior to March 5, 1957, together with an affidavit by plaintiff stating in effect that he had been physically unable to take the physical examination ordered by the court due to his physical inability to travel from Tallahassee, his home, to Jacksonville, where the office of the examining physician was located. The affidavit stated further that "affiant is read for trial and has been ready for trial since June of 1956". Order granting said motion and reinstating the cause of action was entered November 21, 1958, reciting "that the ends of justice require that petition to reinstate this cause of action be granted on condition that the plaintiff, Virgil Gaither, submit himself to Dr. Hugh Haston, Jr. of Jacksonville, Florida, for a physical examination within thirty days …".

¶7Plaintiff frankly admits no action was taken in the cause after March 5, 1957, but takes the position that by requesting the placing of the cause on the trial docket he had fulfilled his obligation under the statute and it was not incumbent upon him under the above statute to see that the case was actually set for trial within the one year period or request a continuance. This position does not constitute sufficient cause for reinstatement. Miller v. Hartley's, Inc., Fla.App. 1957, 97 So.2d 211; Atlantic Coastline Railroad v. Hill, Fla., 1955, 76 So.2d 861; Elmer A. Yelvington & Son, Inc. v. Sheridan, Fla., 1953, 65 So.2d 44; Railway Express Agency v. Hoagland, Fla., 1952, 62 So.2d 756.

¶8*857 The primary purpose of the statute, as has been frequently stated, is to expedite litigation. In Gulf Appliance Distributors, Inc. v. Long, Fla., 1951, 53 So.2d 706, 707, the court quoted:

"As stated by the Louisiana court in Augusta Sugar Company Limited v. Haley, 163 La. 814, 112 So. 731, 732, in construing a similar statute: `We think that a step in the prosecution of a suit means something more than a mere passive effort to keep the suit on the docket of the court; it means some active measure taken by plaintiff, intended and calculated to hasten the suit to judgment. …'"

¶9Petition for writ of certiorari is hereby granted and the chancellor is directed to set aside the order dated November 21, 1958, reinstating the cause and to dismiss the cause.

¶10STURGIS, C.J., and WIGGINTON, J., concur.

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