¶1concurring.
¶2I concur with the majority’s decision that, in this direct appeal proceeding of his convictions and death sentences, Robards is not entitled to relief. I write to address several points.
¶3First, in light of the close seven-to-fíve jury recommendation in this ease, the issue of why defense counsel deferred presenting mental health mitigation until the Spencer hearing will most likely require exploration in subsequent postconviction proceedings. While the record before this Court raises questions about this issue, I agree with the majority that further factual development is necessary in order for this claim to be fairly and properly adjudicated.
¶4Second, as to Robards’ claim regarding the constitutionality of the “bare majority” jury vote, although Florida remains alone among death penalty states in permitting a simple majority of the jury to recommend death, this case is unlike other cases where I have expressed my concern over the constitutionality of a seven-to-five jury recommendation for the death penalty. See, e.g., Peterson v. State, 94 So.3d 514, 538-40 (Fla.) (Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 793, 184 L.Ed.2d 586 (2012); Butler v. State, 842 So.2d 817, 835-40 (Fla.2003) (Pariente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Specifically, unlike those cases, where none of the ag-gravators found by the trial court involved findings determined by a jury, Robards’ convictions for the contemporaneous murder and robbery in this case satisfy the unanimity requirement that I believe is necessary for the imposition of the death penalty under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). See Baker v. State, 71 So.3d 802, 824 (Fla.2011) (explaining that Ringis not implicated when one of the aggravating circumstances is that the crime was committed in the course of a felony), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1639, 182 L.Ed.2d 238 (2012); Silvia v. State, 60 So.3d 959, 978 (Fla.2011) (stating that Ringdid not apply because of a contemporaneous conviction for attempted murder); Frances v. State, 970 So.2d 806, 822-23 (Fla.2007) (reviewing the Court’s precedent regarding the presence of the prior violent felony aggravator in denying Ringclaims).
¶5Third, as to the closing arguments in this case, while I concur that there was no reversible error based on a careful review of “the entire closing argument with specific attention to the objected-to arguments and the unobjected-to arguments,” Card v. State, 803 So.2d 613, 622 (Fla.2001), I emphasize the majority’s view that the last of the cited comments, although unobjected to, was certainly “ill-advised.” Majority op. at 1271. As stated in my specially concurring opinion in Wade v. State, 41 So.3d 857, 881 (Fla.2010) (Pariente, J., specially concurring), “[wjhile no reversible error occurred in this case, I once again urge prosecutors to remember to exercise caution in closing argument and to not cross the line from zealous advocacy to impermissible emotional and inflammatory arguments.” Not only are comments such as calling Robards “the world’s dumbest individual” and implying that the State did not “even show” the jury all the evidence police had gathered ill-advised because they potentially undermine the fairness of the trial, but the comments are also ill-advised because prosecutors unnecessarily risk having a death sentence reversed on that basis, which does not further the interests of justice.
¶6Finally, I join in Justice Labarga’s thoughtful observations in his concurring opinion and echo his view that although Robards has not demonstrated how he was *1275prejudiced by the State’s amended notice of aggravating circumstances, it is essential that trial judges maintain every appearance of impartiality throughout the course of judicial proceedings.
¶7concurring.
¶8I concur with the majority’s decision to affirm Robards’ convictions and sentences. I write, however, to address my concern about the trial court’s role in the State’s amendment of its notice of aggravating circumstances. Initially, the State’s notice included three proposed aggravating circumstances. While considering the proposed aggravators during a pretrial hearing, however, the trial court made the following observation:
Okay. All right. And then the only other question that I had — I really don’t want to give the State or defense or anyone any additional ideas. But after I went through the affidavit and the case law on that I thought that another prior aggravating factor may be previous conviction of capital or violent felony because of the alleged contemporaneous murder of the other person. Are you going to be asking for that or not?
¶9Three days later, the State filed a second notice which added, as suggested by the trial court, the prior conviction of a capital felony or felony involving use of threat of violence as a fourth aggravating circumstance.
¶10It is essential that trial judges remain wholly impartial throughout the duration of a criminal proceeding. In few contexts could this be more important than in the course of a death penalty ease while the state is in the process of determining which aggravating circumstances it will pursue as justification for the application of the death penalty. Here, while it is a fair conclusion that Robards could not have been unfairly surprised by the State’s pursuit of an aggravating circumstance that essentially amounted to whether he murdered each of the victims, it is patently clear from the transcript that the trial court was keenly aware of the tenuous propriety of its suggestion. Although Ro-bards cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the State’s amended notice, one can envision circumstances where such action could alter the trajectory of a penalty phase and sentencing. Moreover, the importance of the appearance of an impartial judiciary and its role in public confidence should not be ignored. In fact, the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to “act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” Fla. Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon 2A.
¶11Overall, the trial court is to be commended for its handling of this trial, which demonstrated respect for the parties and for counsel. Indeed, the civility demonstrated in the interactions between the court and others is refreshing. I write only to strongly suggest that our judicial system works best when judges and lawyers remain within their proper roles.
¶12PARIENTE, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur.