¶1(after stating the facts). It will he noted from the statement of facts that Irvin died while he was serving Ms first term, and before his new term had commenced. The general rule is that if the deceased was Mmself the incumbent of the office and was elected to succeed himself, a vacancy is created in the first term by his death; but, by the weight of authority, at the commencement of the second term, no new vacancy arises, and the appointee for the balance of the first term holds over until the election and qualification of his succssor. State v. Speidel, 62 Ohio St. 156, 56 N. E. 871; State v. Elliott, 13 Utah 471, 45 Pac. 346. See, also, People v. Lord, 9 Mich. 227. That is to say, when one who is holding an office, and who has been elected to succeed Mmself, dies before entering upon the new term, a vacancy is thereby created in the term in which he was serving, but not in the new term for wMch he has been elected, and upon which he has not entered. Therefore, the one who is duly appointed and qualified to fill the vacancy thus created will hold the office for and during the unexpired term of the predecessor and until his successor has been elected or appointed and qualified in the manner provided by law.
¶2It is not disputed by counsel for Hartsfield that Townsley’s appointment was valid, but it is claimed that his term ended when Hartsfield was appointed in November, pursuant to the act of 1911, which provides for the filling of vacancies that may occur in the office of road overseer, and which, so far as relates to the question at issue in tMs appeal, is as follows:
‘ ‘ That when any vacancy in the office of road overseer shall occur from any cause whatever, or upon failure to elect by a tie vote or otherwise, the county court or judge thereof in vacation shall appoint an overseer for such district or fill such vacancy, as the case may be, whose term of service shall expire at the time designated for all county and townsMp officers to expire. Such judge shall make or cause to be made a true record of appointment. ’ ’
¶3The office of road overseer was created by statute, and it may be filled by election or by appointment, just as the statute may prescribe. It is manifest from the clause of the act just quoted that when Irvin died, the vacancy caused by his death should be filled by the county court. The section likewise provides that upon the failure to elect by a tie vote or otherwise, the county court, or judge thereof in vacation, shall appoint, etc. The words “or otherwise,” in law, when used as a general phrase following an enumeration of particulars, are commonly interpreted in a restricted sense as referring to such other matters as are kindred to the classes before mentioned. Century Dictionary. The author says the phrase “or otherwise,” when following an enumeration, should receive an ejusdem generis interpretation. Otherwise is also defined by Century Dictionary, the Standard Dictionary and by Webster, as meaning, “In a different manner; in any other way.” We think the phrase “or otherwise” in the act under consideration was intended to be used in its broadest and most comprehensive sense. The phrase ‘ ‘ or otherwise ” is not used in the statute as a general phrase following an enumeration of particulars; but it follows the words “upon failure to elect by-tie vote,” and is placed in juxtaposition to these words. When the whole clause “upon failure to elect by tie vote or otherwise,” is considered together with reference to the purpose and object of the act, it is evident that the Legislature intended to give the county judge the power to appoint where no one was elected or where the person elected failed for any reason to qualify when the time for entering upon the new term arrived. In short, we think the Legislature meant by the clause under consideration to give the county judge the power to appoint where there was no election or where the person elected for any reason failed to qualify. The county judge, pursuant to this section, exercised his power to appoint, and when he did so, the person appointed had a right to the office, and having qualified and entered upon the discharge of the duties of the office of road overseer, he was the lawful incumbent of that office. It follows that the judgment of the lower court must be affirmed.