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← 113 F.2d 52 - Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co.

Fleming v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co.’s Empirical Analysis

113 F.2d 52 · 1940

Citation profile

106
cited by 106 later decisions
5
states following
March 2011
most recently cited

53 federal appellate · 11 district · 8 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 106 later decisions — most recently March 2011 · most notably Bowie v. Gonzalez (1941), Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota (1971)

53 federal appellate · 11 district · 8 state decisions

65019401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 12 U.S.C. § 90

Relies on Caminetti v. United States · Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp. · United States v. Katz · Territory of Hawaii v. Osaki Mankichi · Fox v. Standard Oil Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 106 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““The principal question presented, therefore, is whether § 6 so limits and controls § 7 that an employee whose compensation equals or exceeds the applicable minimum rate for each of the applicable maximum hours permissible without increased compensation, and in addition exceeds one and one-half times the minimum rate for each hour over that maximum number, is not entitled to additional compensation for overtime under § 7. The correlative question is whether the words ‘regular rate at which he is employed’ mean the minimum rate prescribed by § 6. If the sole purpose of § 7 is to eliminate sub-standard wages, and if it is controlled by § 6, the judgment was correct. If, however, the purpose of § 7 is to regulate hours of labor and to eliminate excessive hours by requiring the employer to pay time and a half for overtime at the regular rate paid the employee even though he is paid more than the' minimum set in § 6, then the judgment was erroneous. We think that the judgment of the District Court must be reversed. The wording of § 7 is unqualified and forbids employment of ‘any * * * employees * * * engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce’ longer than a specified workweek unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed. Title 29 U.S.C., § 207, 29 U.S.C.A. § 207 . The words ‘minimum wage’ or ‘minimum rate’ are not found in § ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““We must assume that all employees in interstate commerce, so far as reasonably possible, should be made subject to the provisions of the Act.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.