Rush v. Scott Specialty Gases, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis
113 F.3d 476 · 1997
Citation profile
22 federal appellate · 17 district · 9 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 116 later decisions — most recently September 2021 · most notably Kim v. Nash Finch Company (1997), Lisa L. Fitzgerald v. William Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (2001)
22 federal appellate · 17 district · 9 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 28 U.S.C. § 1331 · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 706 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)
Relies on University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · Berry v. Board of Supervisors of L.S.U. · West v. Philadelphia Electric Co. · Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations · Abrams v. Lightolier Inc.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 116 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(1) subject matter — whether the violations constitute the same type of discrimination, tending to connect them in a continuing violation; (2) frequency— whether the acts are recurring or are more in the nature of isolated incidents; and (3) degree of permanence — whether the act had a degree of permanence which should trigger the plaintiffs awareness of and [sic] duty to assert his/her rights and whether the consequences of the act would continue even in the absence of a continuing intent to discriminate.”
12 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“(1) the occurrence of at least one discriminatory act within the statute of limitations period; and (2) the discrimination must be “more than the occurrence of Isolated or sporadic acts of Intentional discrimination”; that is, the acts must demonstrate a continuing pattern of discrimination.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“It is precisely because the entire hostile work environment encompasses a single unlawful employment practice that we do not hold, as have some of the Circuits, that the plaintiff may not base a suit on individual acts that occurred outside the statute of limitations unless it would have been unreasonable to expect the plaintiff to sue before the statute ran on such conduct. The statute does not separate individual acts that are part of the hostile environment claim from the whole for the purposes of timely filing and liability. And the statute does not contain a requirement that the employee file a charge prior to 180 or 300 days ‘after’ the single unlawful practice ‘occurred.’ Given, therefore, that the incidents constituting a hostile work environment are part of one unlawful employment practice, the employer may be liable for all acts that are part of this single claim. In order for the charge to be timely, the employee need only file a charge within 180 or 300 days of any act that is part of the hostile work environment.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.