113 Ill. 2d 273 - Owen v. Carr’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

15 federal appellate · 6 district · 95 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 154 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““[A] written or oral statement is to be considered in context, with the words and the implications therefrom given their natural and obvious meaning; if, as so construed, the statement may reasonably be innocently interpreted or reasonably be interpreted as referring to someone other than the plaintiff it cannot be actionable per se. This preliminary determination is properly a question of law to be resolved by the court in the first instance; whether the publication was in fact understood to be defamatory or to refer to the plaintiff is a question for the jury should the initial determination be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.” Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 352 .”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 153 Ill. App. 3d 956 - Costello v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc. · 179 Ill. App. 3d 592 - Lowe v. Rockford Newspaper, Inc.

2. ““We observe, too, that the Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional privilege for expressions of opinion. (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), 418 U.S. 323 , 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 , 94 S. Ct. 2997 .) Whether a statement is to be judged to be one of fact or one of opinion is a matter of law (Lewis v. Time Inc. (9th Cir. 1983), 710 F.2d 549 ), and the involved language must be considered in context to determine whether the statement should be construed to be an expression of opinion (Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin (1974), 418 U.S. 264 , 41 L. Ed. 2d 745 , 94 S. Ct. 2770 ; Oilman v. Evans (D.C. Cir. 1984), 750 F.2d 970 ). As stated, the statements may reasonably be viewed as an expression of Carr’s opinion regarding his client’s allegations against Owen. Carr’s acknowledgment that he did not know the specific information Owen gave the Judicial Inquiry Board shows that his statement was not a factual charge and actionable as a matter of law.” (Emphasis added.) Owen v. Carr (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 273, 280-81 , 497 N.E.2d 1145, 1148 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 153 Ill. App. 3d 956 - Costello v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc. · 151 Ill. App. 3d 888 - Stewart v. Chicago Title Insurance Co.

3. “so obviously and naturally harmful to the person to whom it refers that a showing of special damages is unnecessary.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 217 Ill. App. 3d 803 - Kolengas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp.