113 Md. App. 254 - Baltimore County v. Fleming’s Empirical Analysis
1996
Citation profile
12 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 12 later decisions — most recently November 2010
12 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Bowen v. Smith · Fikar v. Montgomery County · Cooper v. Wicomico County · Newman v. Subsequent Injury Fund · Furley v. Warren-Ehret Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“By enacting § 9-601, the General Assembly has fixed the compensation rate as of the time of the accidental injury or occupational disease, and it is the statute in effect at the. time of injury or disease that governs. Prior to the enactment of § 36(11), the General Assembly, on an ad hoc basis, often would expressly provide that certain amendments would not apply to injuries predating the enactment of said amendments. See, e.g., Laws of Maryland 1974, ch. 450; 1973, ch. 671; 1971, ch. 404; 1920, ch. 456; State Accident Fund v. Jacobs, 140 Md. 622, 624 , 118 A. 159 (1922) (commenting on chapter 456, Acts of 1920). While the genesis of the principle that a claimant’s rights are governed by the statute in effect at the time of injury is the Act itself, the principle has generally found favor in case law, independent of the Act. In 1949, the Court of Appeals cited Jacobs for this proposition without discussing the fact that Jacobs involved application of a statute, chapter 456 of the Acts of 1920, which expressly provided that “nothing in this act shall affect any rights arising from injuries or disabilities received prior to June 1, 1920.” Furley v. Warren-Ehret Co., 195 Md. 339, 347-48 , 73 A.2d 497 (1949) [ (1950) ].... [I]t is important for practitioners and courts to be cognizant of the statutory genesis of the concept that the law in effect at the time of injury applies. Departure from the statute has the potential to raise certain red herrings such as the issue of vested ”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“By enacting § 9-601, the General Assembly has fixed the compensation rate as of the time of the accidental injury or occupational disease, and it is the statute in effect at the time of injury or disease that governs. Although in this case the Claimant’s worsening of condition occurred after the 1991 recodification, and his right to additional benefits accrued after the recodification, the effect of § 9-601 is essentially to freeze the entitlement to benefits as of the date of injury.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“(1) a law relating to an accidental personal injury or an occupational disease, that occurred before the effective date of the provision and for which a claim is made under this title; or (2) the payment basis in effect when an accidental personal injury or an occupational disease, for which a claim is made under this title, occurred.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.