Hardin v. Boyd’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

49 federal appellate · 10 district · 31 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 174 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““In reference to amendments of equity pleadings the courts have found it impracticable to lay down a rule that would cover all cases. This allowance must, at every stage of the cause, rest in the discretion of the court; and that discretion must depend largely on the special circumstances of each case. If may be said, generally, that in passing upon applications to amend, the ends of j ustice should never be sacrificed to mere form, or by too rigid an adherence to technical rules of practice. Undoubtedly, great caution should be exercised where the application comes after the litigation has continued for some time, or when the granting of it would cause serious inconvenience or expense to the opposite side. And an amendment should rarely, if ever, be permitted where it would materially change the very substance of the case made by the bill, and to which the parties have directed their proofs.””

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Richmond v. Irons · Gubbins v. Laughtenschlager

2. ““It is a well-settled rule that the complainant, if not certain as to the specific relief to which he is entitled, may frame his prayer in the alternative, so that if one kind of relief is denied another may be granted; the relief, of each Kind, being consistent with the ease made by the bill. * * * Under the liberal rules of chancery practice which now obtain, there is no sound reason why the original bill in this case might not have been framed with a prayer for the cancellation of the contract upon the ground of fraud, and an accounting between the parties, and, in the alternative, for a decree which, without disturbing the contract, would give a lien on the lands for unpaid purchase money. The matters in question arose out of one transaction, and were so directly connected with each other, that they could well have been incorporated in one suit involving the determination of the rights of the parties with respect to the lands.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. First Savings Bank & Trust Co. of Albuquerque v. Greenleaf

3. ““Under the liberal rules bf chancery practice which now obtain, there is no sound reason why the original bill in this case might not have been framed with a prayer for the cancellation of the contract upon the ground of fraud, and an accounting between the parties, and, in the alternative, for a decree which, without disturbing the contract, would give a lien on the lands for unpaid purchase-money. . . . The amendment had no other effect than to make the bill read just as it might have been originally prepared consistently with the established rules of equity practice. It suggested no change or modification of its allegations, and, in no just sense, made a new case.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Friederichsen v. Renard