114 Cal. App. 4th 961 - People v. RENDEROS’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The proviso that the subsection does not apply unless the statute of limitations has expired in section 800 or 801, “obviously ensures that the one-year period in section 803(g)(1) does not override or otherwise conflict with sections 800 or 801 where [the victim] reports the crime to a qualifying law enforcement agency before the three-year or six-year period set forth in the latter provisions ‘has expired.’ In this way, the limitations period in Section 803(g) — like other ‘tolling’ and ‘extension’ provisions in the same statute — serves to prolong, rather than shorten, the time in which a felony child molestation prosecution may be commenced.” (People v. Frazer, [ 21 Cal.4th 737 , 752, 982 P.2d 180 , 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 312 (1999) ]). That the People could not prosecute an action until a report was filed by the victim ... does not support Renderos’s contention [that] the statute as applied to him had the effect of “reviving” a prosecution barred by the statute of limitations. Because the statute of limitations under section 800 had not expired when section 803(g) became effective on January 1, 1994, section 803(g) permitted the People to commence prosecution for the offenses within one year after the filing of Ryan’s report, notwithstanding the limitation period in section 800.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Renderos v. Ryan