Evans v. Blair’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate · 5 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The result of this class of cases, after some fluctuation, has been to leave the consignee a somewhat unlimited power in the matter of selecting the berth, regardless of its crowded state, provided only it is a safe one. This, however, comes from- the fact that the charter party or bill of lading contained express language favorable to the consignee, and from the application of the well-known rule that where, in maritime contracts, parties have seen fit to choose fixed forms of expression, the great variety of contingencies incidental to maritime transactions disenable the court from establishing any safe theory by which the latter can be modified to meet any supposed intent.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Anderson v. J. J. Moore & Co. · Anderson v. J. J. Moore & Co.

2. ““Therefore, in the present case, as the entire cargo belonged to the Maine Central Railroad Company, and was deliverable to it, and as the bill of lading failed to point out the specific wharf, or berth, at which it was to be discharged, the consignee had a privilege of selecting the place of discharge, and the vessel’s right to precedence, or, what is the same thing, her turn, was subject thereto. Nevertheless, as we have already said, this did not give the Maine Central Railroad Company an arbitrary right, but only one which was just and reasonable. As well said by Lord Esher, the Master of the Rolls, in Carleton Steamship Company v. Castle Company, [1897] 2 Q. B. 483, 490, although in a different connection, this ‘is a power given to the charterers for business reasons.’ “While the three vessels named in this case were each laden with bituminous coal, yet bituminous coal is of great varieties, and has so many different uses that the mere fact that they were all so laden does not of itself fix their right to a turn at a particular wharf other than if one was laden with coal, the second with flour, and the third with sugar. The limitations of the rule applicable to this, case are very well shadowed out, on the one hand, in Stephens v. Macleod, already referred to, which is well summed up in Carver’s Carriage by Sea (3d Ed.) 708, 709, and by the observations of Chief Justice Jervis in Leidemann v. Schultz, found in the work entitled, with a certain degree of liberality, Abbot”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. In re Cargo of 3,408 Tons of Pocahontas Coal

3. ““When the law itself attaches to a contract conditions beyond those expressed by the parties, and attaches them because some conditions beyond those expressed are essential to practically work out what the parties have undertaken to accomplish, the conditions thus attached will be just and reasonable."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Donnell v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co.