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← 114 F.3d 835 - Johnson v. Baldwin

Johnson v. Baldwin’s Empirical Analysis

114 F.3d 835 · 1997

Citation profile

51
cited by 51 later decisions
2
states following
June 2015
most recently cited

25 federal appellate · 4 district · 2 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 51 later decisions — most recently June 2015 · most notably Bean v. Calderon (1998), Alcala v. Woodford (2003)

25 federal appellate · 4 district · 2 state decisions

340199720002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2254 · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Breast Implant Tort Represented By O'Quinn v. Dow Corning Corp. · Lindh v. Murphy · United Mine Workers of America 1992 Benefit Plan v. Leckie Smokeless Coal Co. · Mak v. Blodgett

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 51 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “) had seen Henry in her home near the site of the shooting immediately before the shooting, with a shotgun under his coat. Grim did not call James as a witness and, following trial, did not move for a new trial based on James' written declaration. STANDARD OF REVIEW 4 Because Wilson's petition was filed after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “We do not find it anomalous that an attorney who fulfills his or her duty to investigate the facts of a case may discover and need to act upon information contrary to that which the client has furnished. As the facts were found by the state courts, [petitioner] offered [counsel] an uncorroborated denial that, in light of evidence that minimal investigation would have revealed, was utterly unconvincing. [Counsel] was not entitled to stop there, but for all practical purposes, he did.... Had [counsel] confronted [petitioner] with the lack of corroboration for his alibi, and the strength of the defense that no sexual intercourse had occurred, [petitioner] probably would have elected not to lie to the jury. The prejudice from failing to investigate the alibi and confer more fully with [petitioner] is not avoided by the fact the [petitioner] misinformed his attorney.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.