Young v. Reno’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

13 federal appellate · 8 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 35 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Although Congress did not expressly address preferences for natural siblings, we must give full meaning to its clear intention to prevent natural parents from gaining benefits.... Thus, neither the plain language rule nor the failure by Congress to exclude preferences for natural siblings after adoption indicates that Congress clearly intended that the natural sibling relationship survive adoption for immigration purposes. The legislative history of section 101(b)(1)(E) further indicates that, when Congress adopted these provisions, it was not concerned with, and did not contemplate, whether the legal relationship between natural siblings would survive adoption. Prior to the enactment of section 101(b)(1)(E) in 1957, United States citizens were unable to bring adopted children into the U.S. because the definition of “child” did not include adopted children. H.R.Rep. No. 1199, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N.2016. Although Congress’s general purpose in enacting this provision was to keep families intact, their concern was focused on the adoptive, not the natural, family. Indeed, many of the adopted children were orphans. However, Congress did contemplate the effect of adoption on the natural-parent/adopted-child relationship, specifically providing that adoption severs that relationship. While [petitioner] is correct that congressional intent in adopting this provision was to preserve the family unit, there is no indication that this intention exten”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 439 F. Supp. 2d 410 - Kosak v. Devine

2. “As explained by the Ninth Circuit: The [agency’s] two-part test reasonably ties the sibling relationship to the primary familial relationship defined in the Act — the parent-child relationship. By doing so, the [agency’s] construction: 1) stays within four corners of the INA and does not rely on external definitions; 2) gives full meaning to the express language of the section 101(b)(1)(E) proviso prohibiting natural parents from benefit-ting from adoption; 3) prevents a scenario specifically prohibited by Congress whereby adopted children obtain preferences for natural siblings who then obtain preferences for natural parents; and 4) is consistent with the overall structure of [the] Act, which emphasizes the primacy of the parent-child relationship and confers more benefits on parents than other relatives.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 439 F. Supp. 2d 410 - Kosak v. Devine

3. “To conclude without judicial or precedent administrative determination to the contrary (and we find none) that the relationship of brother and sister created by the legitimate birth of the petitioner and beneficiary to the same parents was destroyed by the subsequent adoption of the latter would be to place upon the statute a harsher construction than that intended by Congress.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 439 F. Supp. 2d 410 - Kosak v. Devine